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lNTRODUCflON 
How is it that millions of people entrust trillions of dollars to corporate 
managers over whom they have little control and on whose discretion their 
profits depend? How is it that most managers most of the time seem to do 
a pretty good job looking out for shareholders' interests? This, for me, is 
the central mystery of corporate law, made especially intriguing by the 
apparent infirmity of the various legal, institutional , and market checks on 
managers'  discretion. 
Sixty years ago, one might have predicted from Berle and Means' 
detailed analysis of shareholders' exposure to unconstrained managers , that 
a rational investor would shift assets away from equities and into bonds.1 
But such a prediction would have been wrong. Investors did not abandon 
1 .  ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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equity and were right: Stocks significantly outperformed corporate bonds. 2 
The assumptions of this Article are that shareholders made the right deci, 
sion, and that they did so, at least in part, because managers generally 
perform pretty well. 
How is it that most managers do a good job most of the time? How is 
it that most managers most of the time are worthy of the trust of investors? 
The traditional corporate law answers to these core questions fall into three 
types . First, there are the legal constraints: The courts , through the 
enforcement of specific legal prohibitions (like laws outlawing theft, embez, 
zlement, insider trading, and the like) , and through the enforcement of 
more vague legal constraints (the duty of care and the duty of loyalty) , 
sometimes catch errant managers. Second, institutional structures such as 
the board of directors , outside directors , shareholder voting, proxy contests , 
and derivative suits may keep managers in line. Third, pressure from the 
various markets that impinge on the corporation and managers (the product 
markets , the managerial labor market ,  capital markets, and the market for 
corporate control) may keep managers in line. 
But on examination, none of these checks , with the exception of 
competitive product markets , when they exist, seems to provide a very 
robust check on managers. Each seems to help a little some of the time, 
and only occasionally seems to help a lot. At the end of a term in which I 
teach the basic Corporations course or a seminar on Corporate Gover, 
nance, after weeks of exploring the weaknesses of each of the checks on 
managers , I find myself most impressed by the apparent impotence of the 
constraints .3 
But, more importantly , the standard answers tell us little of the mecha, 
nism by which these checks constrain managers . Implicitly, the various 
answers seem to assume a crudely behaviorist model of managerial behavior, 
a "stick,and,carrot" approach. The implicit assumption seems to be that 
the sanction imposed, discounted by the likelihood of detection and pun, 
ishment, outweighs the benefit to the agent of sloth or theft. To take but 
one familiar example, in the standard 1980s story , if managers mismanage, 
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., CoRPORATE FINANCE 232-36 (2d ed. 1 988). This is 
hardly conclusive proof that managers, on the whole, behave well. Indeed, finance theory 
teaches us that, in equilibrium, one would expect that higher variance assets, like equities, will 
outperform lower variance assets, such as bonds, of the same corporation. 
3. For a comprehensive survey of the (at least apparent) impotence of corporate law con­
straints on managerial discretion, see CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 
SOCIAL CoNTROL OF CoRPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). 
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the stock price will drop and a takeover entrepreneur will buy up the shares 
to gain control , replacing bad managers with good managers . The threat of 
such a takeover, the story asserts , will lead all managers to manage better. 4  
In the corporate context, however, the assumption of "direct deter, 
renee" is particularly implausible: There are hundreds of corporations , the 
directors and officers of which have comprehensive liability insurance; 
damage liability is extremely rare; and, after the enactment by Delaware of 
section 102(b) (7) of the General Corporation Law,5 which allows Delaware 
corporations to opt out of director liability for breach of the duty of care,  
damage liability has become even rarer. If the principal sanction is not 
directly financial but reputational, then one must explain how this sanction 
works , an account entirely absent from the standard account. 
And yet, the system seems to work. The triplet of restraints-legal , 
institutional , and market-seems to constrain managers generally to act for 
shareholders , despite their manifest looseness (if not impotence) . How is it 
that they do so? What is the mechanism that connects these constraints 
with managerial behavior? In this Article ,  I do not claim that the tradi, 
tional constraints do not "work, "  that is, do not generally constrain man, 
agers to act for shareholders . Rather , I assume that they do work, and I try 
to figure out how. The theory outlined in the following pages is incom, 
plete , perhaps at times implausible, and certainly only partially verified . 
But it is a theory of how corporate law works , and , in evaluating it, it is 
worth keeping in mind the old Chicago School maxim: It takes a theory to 
beat a theory.6 In part, my aim here is to highlight the absence of any 
developed theory to explain how corporate law works. 
This leads me back to my original question: How is it that managers at 
least try to do a good job most of the time? This is, of course ,  part of a 
more general question: How is it that most people most of the time try to 
do a pretty good job ,  even though the likelihood of sanctions is obj ectively 
4. See, e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender 
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of 
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.  REv. 1 1 6 1  ( 198 1 ) .  
5 .  DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8 ,  § 102(b)(7) (1 994). This i s  not  the place for an extended discus­
sion of the strengths and weaknesses of a direct deterrence model of co rporate duties. For recent 
discussions reviewing such models, see John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, On the Plausibility of 
Corporate Crime Theory, in 2 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 15 (William S .  Laufer & 
Freda Adler eds . ,  1 990); John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of 
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 7 (199 1) .  
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J .L.  
& EcoN. 425 , 434 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law and Reality: A Rejoinder 
to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 , 1 435 (1983) .  
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slight? How is it that most tenured law professors (at least at Penn) try to 
teach well, even though we all know that we will not be fired if we do not? 
The beginning of a thicker answer is that all of us internalize rules and 
standards of conduct with which we generally try to comply. We do this 
not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or informal , but also 
because doing so is important to our sense of self�worth, because we believe 
that doing a good job is the right thing to do. How are these rules and 
standards , which are the rails along which so much of our lives run, gener� 
ated and maintained? For most employees of the firm, the set of formal and 
informal systems of socialization, detection, and sanction are sufficient. 
Thus , for the typical middle manager ,  the example of other managers , the 
gossip around the coffee machine, and the possibility of discharge by a more 
senior manager can provide an adequate set of instructions and sanctions. 
The problem faced by such a "norm�based" account of managerial 
behavior is that senior managers and directors are, by design, the chief 
criticizers and the chief sanctioners . As such, they are less constrained by 
gossip around the coffee machine . What replaces gossip and other sane� 
tions for this critically important group? How are the rules and standards 
that govern the behavior of senior managers and directors generated and 
maintained? A claim of this Article is that the Delaware courts provide a 
supplemental source of gossip , criticism, and sanction for this set of actors 
who are beyond the reach of the firm's normal systems of social control. 
The subjects of the study of U.S. corporate governance-the senior 
managers and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and the lawyers 
who advise them-form a surprisingly small and close�knit community. The 
directors of large, publicly held corporations number roughly four to five 
thousand.7 A small group of lawyers , centered in New York and Wilming� 
ton, with others in Chicago and Los Angeles, specialize in Delaware corpo� 
rate law. The community has its own court , the Delaware Chancery Court, 
with review by the Delaware Supreme Court. It has its own newspapers : 
the Wall Street Journal and, for the lawyers , the New Y ark Law journal. 
People know each other and, as we will see below, apparently care about 
their reputation in the community. The story I tell in this Article is very 
7 .  According to Fl.EIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD ( 1988) ,  the average 
board of a Fortune 500 company has 1 3  directors. Id. at 2. Thus, there are approximately 6500 
directorships of Fortune 500 companies. One must subtract from thts the number of directors 
who serve on more than one board. Again, according to Heidrick and Struggles, 18 .3% of direc­
tors hold one directorship in addition to their own company, 28% hold two , 1 7 .9% hold three , 
14% hold four, and 3 .9% hold more than four. Id. at 13 .  
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much the story of how a small community imposes formal and informal , 
legal and nonlegal , sanctions on its members .8 
From this perspective, three questions immediately present themselves: 
First, how is the content of corporate law rules and standards determined? 
Second, how are they generated? And third, how are they communicated 
to officers and directors? In this Article, I ignore the first question, which 
goes to the substance of corporate law, and has been the subj ect of much 
scholarship .9 Instead, I focus on the ·second and third questions, which go 
to the mechanisms of corporate law and have been almost entirely ignored. 
There is a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware corporate 
law largely involves standards , but then to try to reduce it to a set of 
rules. 10 Take, for example, the following description: "Under Delaware 
law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's 
Board of Directors is required to act as would 'auctioneers charged with 
8. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) {noting that people often handle their disputes in a cooperative manner without 
relying on the applicable law). 
A contemporary anecdote illustrates the close-knit quality of the Delaware corporate law 
community, and its ability to sanction members who depart significantly from generally accepted 
conduct. In Delaware, judges of the chancery and supreme courts are nominated by the gover­
nor, and confirmed by the Senate, for a 12-year term. DEL CoNST. art. IV, § 3. The practice is 
that the governor may only choose from a list of candidates assembled by a nominating commis­
sion, members of which are appointed by the governor and include both lawyers and nonlawyers. 
See generally Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 659 A.2d 777 (Del. 1995). As the term of 
Justice Andrew Moore drew to a close, the nominating commission did not put his name forward, 
even as one among several qualified candidates. Observers agreed that this was not because of 
any question regarding the competence of his judicial opinions-indeed, his opinions were and 
are generally well respected-but, rather, because of his practice of humiliating lawyers who 
appeared before him. Richard B. Schmitt, Reappointment Seems Unlikely for Moore, WALL ST. J., 
May 18, 1994, at 87. 
9. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CoRPORATE LAW (1993); 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987). 
10. On rules versus standards, see, for example, Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 14 (1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAR.v. L.  REV. 1685 
(1976). 
For examples of this tendency within corporate law, see, for example, Marcel Kahan's excel­
lent discussion of the Viacom case in which he tries to identify the factors that explain the out­
comes of the various Delaware takeover cases. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The 
Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CoRP. L. 583 (1994); see also Roberta 
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 55, 85 (1991) 
("As few suits produce a legal rule (only two in this sample), this [public goods] explanation of 
lawsuit efficacy turns on the need for a large number of lawsuits in order to obtain a ruling."). 
Saints and Sinners 1015 
getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company."'11 
This description views Delaware law as largely substantive: When a poten­
tial acquirer makes a serious bid for control , the target board must act as a 
neutral auctioneer, regardless of what sort of process it might follow in 
coming to the conclusion that it should not act as an auctioneer. Likewise, 
on this view, the Delaware cases established a rule for the conduct of target 
managers: If a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for control , then target 
management must act as a neutral auctioneer. 
I mean to contrast this view-a view which naturally emerges from 
teaching Corporations and trying to help students synthesize cases into 
useful principles or algorithms-with a fundamentally different view that 
provides a much better description of Delaware fiduciary duty law. In the 
1960s, when Delaware was revising its corporation law, Samuel Arsht, a 
leading figure of the Delaware corporate bar, is said to have proposed that 
the law be simplified to the following principle: Directors of Delaware 
corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as 
long as they act in good faith. This principle-which is , in my view, a 
completely accurate description of Delaware fiduciary duty 
law-conceptualizes Delaware fiduciary duty law in process terms {boards 
can do whatever they want as long as they follow the right process) and as 
setting standards as opposed to rules {boards must act in good faith) . Most 
importantly, the formulation is largely empty until the concept of good 
faith is defined. As I describe more fully below, in what is a central claim 
of this Article ,  the Delaware courts fill out the concept of "good faith" 
through fact-intensive , normatively saturated descriptions of manager, 
director, and lawyer conduct , and of process-descriptions that are not 
reducible to rules of the sort described above. Indeed, most such rules� like 
the one above, turn out to be manifestly incorrect descriptions of Delaware 
lawY 
1 1 .  Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 
J.L. ECON. & ORO. 27 ,  27  (1991 )  (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,  
506 A.2d 173  (Del. 1986)). 
1 2 .  Revlon does not stand for the proposition described by Cramton and Schwartz, and, 
even if Revlon could be read for that holding, subsequent cases make clear that it does not repre­
sent a general principle. Cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,  5 7 1  A.2d 1 140 
(Del. 1990). As I will discuss below, the once common reading of Time-Warner as standing for 
the proposition that target management can "just say no " was likewise inaccurate, much to the 
chagrin of Paramount. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 
(Del. 1 994) (Viacom joined Paramount as a plaintiff in this action); infra text accompanying notes 
174-224. 
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To put my point differently, in this Article I seek to take the standard, 
like quality of Delaware fiduciary duty law seriously. At the core of my 
analysis is a claim that standards work very differently than rules , that 
standards are typically generated and articulated through a distinctively 
narrative process , leading to a set of stories that is typically not reducible to 
a rule.13 
My claim here-which is a descriptive claim-is that the Delaware 
courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct (which 
influence the development of the social norms of directors , officers , and 
lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as "corporate law 
sermons. " These richly detailed and judgmental factual recitations, com, 
bined with explicitly judgmental conclusions, sometimes impose legal sane, 
tions but surprisingly often do not.14 Taken as a whole ,  the Delaware 
opinions can be understood as providing a set of parables-instructive 
tales-of good managers and bad managers , of good lawyers and bad law, 
yers, that, in combination, fill out the normative job description of these 
critical players . My intuition is that we come much closer to understanding 
the role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers 
than as policemen.15 
1 3. See generaUy MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY 
AND LITERATURE ( 1 990) (especially Chapter 1 ) .  My Hebrew University colleague Ruth Gavison 
argues that standards are always articulated through narratives. If this argument is correct-and I 
think it is-then what one sees in Delaware fiduciary duty cases is an example of a more general 
legal phenomenon played out in a small community. 
This insight raises the question of why Delaware courts rely on such detailed narratives when 
other courts interpreting standards, such as the requirement of good faith under § 1 -203 of the 
U.C.C. , rely on far briefer descriptions. My intuition is that the difference reflects a difference in 
the size of the relevant communities and not a difference between parties engaged in repeat inter­
actions, but a full comparative analysis is beyond the reach of this Article. As I discuss in more 
detail below, in a small community with repeat players, the potential to generate norms through 
critical description without direct legal sanction seems to be greater. 
14 .  I briefly discuss this claim in Edward B. Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J. CoRP. L. 605 
{1 992) (reviewing LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CoRPORATE FINANCE { 1 99 1)) . 
1 5 .  This work owes an enormous debt to the work of Robert Cover in the conceptualization 
of judicial narratives as sacred texts and in the role of "legal" narrative in constituting com­
munity. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV . 
179  (1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales]; Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HAR.v. L. REv. 4 (1983). It also owes a debt to the rich discussion of the role of narrative in law 
over the last decade. For discussions of that literature, see ,  for example, Kathryn Abrams, 
Hearing the CaU of Stories , 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 ( 1991); Jane B .  Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law 
Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming Winter 1 997); Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: 
Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 8 1  VA. L. REV. 1 229 (1995); Daniel A. 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, TeUing Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 807 ( 1993); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: TeUing Stories , 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 ( 1 989); 
Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of StoryteUing in Law, 23 RUTGERS L .J . 79 (1991)  (book 
review). See also LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul 
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M y  claim is not that Delaware law is unpredictable and indefinite. In 
fact, as we will see below, despite the fact,specific, narrative quality of 
Delaware opinions, over time they yield reasonably determinate guidelines. 
My claim is, rather, that the process that leads to reasonably precise stan, 
dards proceeds through the elaboration of the concepts of independence, 
good faith, and due care through richly detailed narratives of good and bad 
behavior, of positive and negative examples, that are not reducible to rules 
or algorithms . 
The second part of my claim is a causal claim that I can only begin to 
defend here: that these standards of conduct are communicated to managers 
by corporate counsel, and that the j udgments of the courts play an impor, 
tant role in the evolution of (nonlegal) norms of conduct. As I will try to 
show below, these claims, if true, have fundamental implications for how 
we think about corporate law. 
To sketch out this picture of corporate law, I examine the emergence 
during the 1980s of new corporate law standards-or, equivalently, the 
elaboration of the same old standards in a new factual context-to govern 
management buyouts of large, publicly held corporations (MBOs) . I focus 
on the situation in which managers who do not hold a controlling equity 
interest rely on outside financing ultimately secured by the assets of the 
corporation to buy the corporation from the public shareholders. This 
Gewirtz eds . ,  1996) [hereinafter LAW 'S STORIES]. 
The approach to cases implicit in this Article is similar to that described in KIM LANE 
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE CoMMON LAW 86- 108 (1 988), 
in a chapter entitled: "A Theory of Legal Interpretation: The Mutual Construction of Rules and 
Facts . "  Scheppele uses the common law to examine norms of secrecy; I use the Delaware fidu­
ciary duty law to understand norms of corporate governance. See also Robert C. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 7 7  CAL. L. REv. 957 (1 989) 
(discussing the ways that privacy torts both express community norms of privacy and, at the same 
time, protect and remforce those norms and help to create the very community that underlies the 
norms) . 
As the law-and-narrattve literature has emphasized, legal analysis often involves storytelling. 
What, for me. is so striking about the Delaware cases is that storytelling is so prominent in the 
decisions and so unabashedly normative. Moreover, through what is probably an accident of 
academic specialization, (i.e., law-and-narrative folks do not generally teach Corporations), corpo­
rate law opinions have been almost entirely absent from the law-and-narrative discussions. For 
example, in LAW'S STORIES, supra, in a volume of papers presented at a recent Yale conference 
on law as narrative,  there seems to be not a single reference to Delaware corporate law opinions, 
nor any entry in the index to corporate law. As Sanford Levinson notes in his contribution to 
the Yale conference, this parochialism may skew the sample.  Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of 
the Judicial Opinion, in LAW 'S STORIES, supra, at 1 8 7 ,  189-90 ("[Constitutional law] is, to put it 
mildly, but one small branch (or genre) of one legal system. No doubt someone whose expertise 
was different, even within the U.S. legal system, would stress different aspects of judicial opin­
ions . . . .  ") . For a notable exception, see David Skeel, Saul and David and Corporate Takeover 
Law (Oct. 12, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) . 
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situation must be distinguished, on the one hand, from management 
buyouts of divisions (when the selling company can fully protect the inter, 
ests of its shareholders) , and from parent,subsidiary freeze,out mergers , when 
the parent company already has control. Although each of these other 
situations is important, neither poses the same dramatic conflict between 
managers' self interest (which is to buy the company for the lowest possible 
price) and their duty to shareholders (which is to sell for the highest pos, 
sible price) in the context of widely dispersed public shareholders. As such, 
MBOs pose particularly hard questions of duty for the officers and directors 
that cannot be answered by reference to general social norms. 16 
As many of the cases discussed here demonstrate , the "kindergarten" 
norms , like loyalty and cooperation, provide limited guidance when direc, 
tors are faced with a conflict between loyalty to and cooperation with 
senior managers , with whom they have worked for years, and loyalty to the 
much more abstract "shareholders . "  This conflict is muddied further by the 
notion that directors owe their duties of loyalty and care to the "corpora, 
tion, " where "corporation" is left undefined, but, in practice at least, is 
often thought not to be identical with the shareholders. As we see below 
in many of the management buyout cases , when some "outsider" comes 
along and "threatens" one 's friends, the managers for whom one has the 
greatest respect, the directors ' "right" response, at least on the unreflective 
application of general social norms, may appear to be the support of man, 
agement. 17 It is in situations such as these-when general social norms 
provide insufficient guidance or may be in conflict with the goals or funda, 
mental principles of corporate governance-that the generation and pro, 
16. The definition and identification of MBOs is necessarily somewhat imprecise. Is it an 
MBO, for example, when an unrelated third party bids for control and offers incumbent man­
agement an equity stake and long-term employment contracts? Does it matter whether the offer 
of an equity stake was made before or after the bidder achieved control? In each case , the ques­
tion is whether the management is "interested ." AB we will see below, because of the case-by­
case approach taken by the Delaware courts, the definitional question of what is and what is not 
an MBO is not critical. 
1 7 .  In this connection, the path-breaking article by James D. Cox & Harry L Munsinger, 
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAw 
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1 985, at 83, is clearly relevant. See also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior: The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering 
(Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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mulgation of role,specific standards for managers and directors become so 
critical . On this view, the Delaware decisions can be viewed as part of the 
definition and description of the "roles " that managers and directors are 
expected to fill.18 
Because MBOs of significant publicly held companies suddenly 
assumed prominence in the 1 980s, they provide a case study in which we 
can watch Delaware corporate law in action: the development and articula, 
tion of standards of conduct and the communication of those standards to 
officers , directors, and lawyers. The evolution of the standards of conduct 
relating to MBOs is a sufficiently narrow example so that I can focus on the 
mechanics of their generation-on the language of the opinions-in suffi, 
dent detail to make the claim plausible. Finally, MBOs provide a useful 
context to consider the ebb and flow of corporate law: how quickly cases 
appear, how many cases there are relative to the number of transactions , 
and how much it costs (at least in terms of plaintiffs ' attorneys' fees) to 
develop new norms. 
In Part I of this Article, I trace out this evolution in the MBO opin, 
ions of the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts. In Part II ,  I begin to 
trace the transmission of these standards to their ultimate target by examin, 
ing press accounts {both trade and popular) , extra,judicial utterances , and 
the interesting but little discussed legal genre , the "memorandum to our 
clients , "  that a number of prominent Wall Street firms use to keep their 
clients apprised of developments in the law. The critical empirical 
1 8 .  Because my target here is how corporate law works, I leave to one side the dispute over 
the morality of "role morality. " For discussions of role morality in the corporate context, see, for 
example, PETER A. FRENCH, CoLLECfiVE AND CoRPORATE REsPONSIBILITY (1 984); ELIZABETH 
WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON: LOST RESPONSIBILITY IN PROFESSIONS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS (1992); Lawrence E .  Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modem 
Corporation: An Inquiry into the CAuses of Corporate Immorality , 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995). See 
also, e .g . , DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1 988); Michael 0. 
Hardimon, Role Obligations , 91 J. PHIL. 333 (1994) (discussing role morality as an issue in moral 
philosophy); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 
(1 980); Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality , in THE GooD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND 
LA WYERS' ETHICS 25 (David Luban ed . ,  1983) (discussing role morality in the legal context). 
Part of what makes these cases interesting is that the situations generally do not involve 
conflicts between demands of private morality and role obligations, but, rather, are situations in 
which the guidance provided by ordinary morality runs out. 
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work-the investigation not of what the courts are saying, but of what the 
directors and their lawyers are hearing-is a separate project.19 
In Part III ,  I explore some of the implications of this normative/narra, 
tive theory of corporate law. This view of Delaware fiduciary duty law has 
important implications for how lawyers should advise their clients, as a 
review of the QVC v. Viacom20 cases demonstrates. It also has important 
implications for how we think about shareholder litigation in the Delaware 
courts. In particular, a review of the quantity and timing of Delaware MBO 
opinions, in the context of the development of MBOs as a transactional 
form, suggests that the problem with shareholder litigation in Delaware 
courts could be just the opposite of the conventional wisdom: too little 
rather than too much. Moreover, a further implication is that the genera, 
tion of legal standards or nonlegal norms, both of which are public goods, 
should be thought of as the primary and not the tertiary function of share, 
holder litigation. 21 I close with a brief conclusion and an outline of fur, 
ther research. 22 
19. Michael Useem and I are working on a project to examine what lawyers tell boards and 
what boards hear about their fiduciary duties through interviews with the relevant actors. We 
use an approach similar to that of }AY W. LORSCH, DIRECTORS: PAWNS OR POTENTATES (1989), 
and MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYfH AND REALITY (1971). See MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE 
DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CoRPORATE REORGANIZATION : THE REALITY OF 
AMERICA'S CoRPORATE BOARDS (1993). 
20. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 
1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
21. On this view, but beyond the reach of this Article, it may make more sense to construe 
incentive compensation and criminal liability-i.e., positive and negative inducements to 
managers-as important insofar as they assist in the articulation or promulgation of legal stan­
dards and social norms, or because of their role in expressing such standards and norms, and not 
because they act to constrain managers in any direct way. 
22. Deborah A. DeMott is struck by many of the same features of the Delaware case law 
that I examine in detail here. The approach I take in this Article is somewhat similar to her 
approach in Deborah A. DeMott, Puzzles and Parables :  Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context, 
25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15 (1990), which analyzes the MBO cases as giving examples of what 
counts as "bad faith." Other aspects of this analysis are briefly alluded to in Robert C. Clark, 
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCT'URE OF BUSINESS 
55 Oohn W. Pratt & Richard]. Zeckhauser eds., 1985), and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes 
of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature , 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589-90, 594 (1984), 
which describe corporate law as norm generative and role descriptive. See also Ronald J. Gilson 
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intennediate Standa.rd for Defensive Tactics : Is There Substance to 
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247,271 (1989). 
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I .  WHEN MANAGERS TRY TO BUY THE COMPANY: A CASE STUDY IN 
THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE NORMS 
A. Setting the Stage: The Leverage Buyout Boom 
Leveraged buyouts of publicly held companies date at least to the early 
1970s. 23 During this first wave, controlling shareholders of small com, 
panies that had gone public in the hot new issues market of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s found that the costs of being publicly held outweighed the 
benefits in the recession, battered market of the mid, 1970s.24 In response, 
some of these companies were "taken private" by their managers/control, 
ling shareholders. 25 Although there was a certain amount of attention 
paid to these transactions , and much criticism, 26 these transactions were 
economically insignificant. 
All this changed in 1979  when Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR) 
organized a leveraged buyout of Houdaille, a Fortune 500 machine tool 
companyY KKR's ability to acquire Houdaille, combined with William 
Simon's enormous and widely publicized profits on the 1984 public offering 
of Gibson Greetings, which had been acquired in a divisional leveraged 
buyout from RCA just three years before/8 stimulated the growth of LBOs 
and, with that, the growth of the subset, MBOs. 
23 .  Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 730 (1 985). In a 
leveraged buyout (LBO) , a company is acquired from its public shareholders, using borrowed 
money which is ultimately secured by the assets of the target company. In a management buyout 
(MBO) , the managers of the company participate in the acquisition group. 
24. Id. 
25 . Thus , these transactions were often known as "going-private" transactions. 
26 .  See, e.g., Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 987 (1974); Victor Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 6 1  VA. L. REV. 10 19  ( 1 975); 
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 
1354 (1978); A.A. Sommer, Jr. , "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1 974- 1975 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,010 (Nov. 20, 1 974). 
27. See GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT: KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 19-4 1 (1 992); EDWARD K. CRAWFORD, A MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 3-5 ( 1987); Lowenstein, supra note 23. 
28. ANDERS, supra note 27, at 37. 
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In addition to the potential for large profits ,  hostile tender offers, 29 
which likewise increased in frequency in the early 1980s , provided the 
other stimulus for the growth of MBOs. As managers ' jobs became more 
insecure , the attraction of securing control through an MBO grew. 
And the numbers of LBOs and MBOs grew dramatically. Table I 
summarizes the growth of LBOs between 1981 and 1990.30 In the two 
years after the Houdaille MBO in 197 9, MBOs passed the $2 billion thresh, 
old. By 1984 , there were around sixty deals worth about $ 13 billion. By 
1986, the value of the forty,three going,private transactions was around $25 
billion. By 1988, when, as we will see below, the Delaware j urisprudence 
on MBOs reached its maturity, there had already been around 250 deals 
worth around $75  billion. In the space of a decade, there were around 400 
buyouts valued at more than $ 160 billion. As I will develop in more detail, 
these numbers pose one of the most striking features of the development of 
the Delaware MBO norms: compared to the pace of the deal,making and 
the vast amounts at stake, these cases arose late. 
B .  Management Buyouts in the Delaware Courts 
In an MBO, when senior managers with outside financial partners buy 
control of the company from the public shareholders , they face obvious and 
severe conflicts of interest between their self,interest (to acquire the com, 
pany for a low price) and their duty to shareholders (to sell the company for 
a high price) . M oreover, this conflict arises in a context in which managers 
inevitably have inside information regarding the corporation, information 
29. In a hostile tender offer, a b idding company seeks control of a target company by acquir­
ing the target company's shares directly from the target shareholders over the opposition of the 
target management. 
30. Table I, drawn from Leveraged Buyout Trends 1 98 1  Through First Half 1 987, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1 987, at 8 1 ,  8 1  [hereinafter Leveraged Buyout Trends] , and LBO 
Signposts, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS , Nov.-Dec. 1 99 1 ,  at 6 1 ,  6 1 ,  includes all "going private 
transactions" involving publicly held companies, but excludes divisional leveraged buyouts. See 
Table I infra p. 1 09 1 .  As such, it is somewhat over-inclusive in that a small number of going­
private leveraged buyout transactions cannot fairly be characterized as MBOs because manage­
ment does not participate.  For example, see the KKR buyout of RJR Nabisco in which KKR 
outbid the CEO's buyout group. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. ,  No. CIV.A. 1 0389, 
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at  *5  (Feb . 14,  1 989). The numbers in Table I are consistent with the 
numbers of MBOs identified in other studies. See, e.g., Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr. , Management 
Buyouts of Public Corporations: An Analysis of Prior Characteristics, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT 
BUYOUTS: CAUSES AND CoNSEQUENCES 35 , 47 tbl.2-l (Yakov Amihud ed. ,  1 989) (listing statis­
tics for going-private transactions from 1981  to 1985); John Easterwood et al. ,  Limits on Manage­
rial Discretion in Management Buyouts: The Effectiveness of Institutional, Market and Legal 
Mechanisms (Dec. 1 995)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) . For my purposes here, 
the exact numbers are less important than the order of magnitude. 
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that they have acquired in the course of their employment and at firm 
expense. In addition, management is also sometimes in the position to 
control the timing of the transaction, again based on its inside information. 
This severe conflict of interest likewise puts the board of directors in an 
awkward position: Directors often have personal ties with the very man, 
agers who are seeking to buy the company. Indeed, those managers are 
often themselves members of the hoard. 
Although the existence and severity of the conflict is obvious, the 
appropriate solution is not. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein, two of the 
earliest commentators , took the position that the conflicts were so severe, 
the potential benefits so slight, and the mechanisms for controlling con, 
flicts so feeble, that management buyouts should be per se illegal.3 1 
But Delaware courts do not rely on such per se rules. Instead, in a 
quite remarkable series of decisions over the latter part of the 1980s , the 
Delaware courts elaborated a set of principles governing the behavior of 
officers , directors , and lawyers involved in management buyouts. It is this 
development that I wish to survey here. 
1 .  The Doctrinal Background 
Management buyout cases were analyzed within the classic doctrinal 
structure of Delaware fiduciary duty law, that is , under either the business 
judgment rule or the entire fairness standard. 32 Under the business 
j udgment rule, there are three core elements to the analysis: First, as a 
threshold matter , the directors must be " independent" in the sense of 
financially disinterested; second, the directors must have acted with good 
faith; third, they must have acted with due care, that is , not with gross 
negligence . 33 
When the requirements of the business judgment rule are not satisfied, 
the "entire fairness" standard applies , under which the directors have the 
3 1 .  Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 26,  at 1 365-70. 
32 .  In its classic articulation, the business judgment rule shields directors from liability and 
shields a decision from injunction, if the decision is made by independent directors acting in 
good faith and with due care. See, e.g. , R]R Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *39. See 
generaUy ROBERT C. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986) .  
33 .  A question lurks in the discussion of R]R Nabisco whether, in addition to independence, 
good faith, and due care, the decision must also be "reasonable" or "rational." See , e .g. , R]R 
Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9; see also ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994) (discussing the pros and cons of reasonable 
test versus good faith test). Whether the irrationality of a decision is an independent basis for 
liability or injunction, or whether it is simply evidence of lack of good faith and due care is 
unclear and of little practical importance. 
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burden of establishing that the transaction is entirely fair to the corpora� 
tion. In such cases , the courts review the terms of the transaction and not 
simply the process leading up to it. According to the Delaware courts , the 
entire fairness standard has two aspects: fair dealing and fair price.34 
The MBO cases were analyzed within this bipolar framework. In cases 
in which managers were, in fact, on both sides of the transaction, the 
review was under the entire fairness standard. 35 In cases in which a spe� 
cial committee was involved, the review was, in the first instance , con� 
ducted pursuant to the business judgment rule and, if its conditions did not 
obtain, then under the entire fairness standard. 36 Although perhaps odd 
to those unaccustomed to Delaware case law, the doctrinal discussions in 
the MBO cases did not go beyond the identification and description of 
these two basic standards.37 
What is important to see about each of these standards of review is 
that they are standards , not rules .38 The critical concepts of the business 
judgment rule are " independence , "  "good faith, " and "due care. "  The 
critical concepts of the entire fairness standard are "fair dealing" and "fair 
price ."  These are the classic terms used for signaling the presence of 
"standards" and, as we see both in the MBO cases and more generally in 
Delaware law, are only given content in the distinctive narratives of the 
Delaware courts. 
2 .  The Doctrinal Pre�History 
As we will see below, a striking feature of the Delaware case law is that 
although MBOs were prominent and common from at least 198 1 ,  manage� 
34.  Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp . ,  498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v .  
UOP, Inc . ,  457 A.2d 70 1 , 7 1 1  (Del. 1 983). 
35 . See, e .g . , the early cases of EAC Industries and Green fie/a, discussed infra Parts l .B.4.a 
and I .B.4.b,  respectively. 
36. See , e .g . , the critical trilogy, MacmiUan, Fort Howard, and RJR Nabisco, discussed infra 
Part l.B.5 . 
37 .  In cases dealing with hostile tender offers, the Delaware courts also developed what may 
either be considered an intermediate standard of review, or alternatively, an application of the 
business judgment rule in a particular recurring factual  context. See generaUy Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra note 22 (discussing the Delaware proportionality test) . In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.,  493 A.2d 946 {Del. 1985), the court, recognizing that directors face a potential 
conflict of interest when a hostile tender offer has been made, reviewed director action under a 
"proportionality" standard. Under this standard, one first looks to see if there was a "threat" to 
the corporation and, if so , whether the directors' actions m response were "proportional" to the 
threat. The Unocal standard was not generally relied upon in MBO cases. 
38 .  This is so despite the business judgment rule's name. 
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ment buyout cases did not begin to appear in the Delaware courts in appre, 
ciable numbers until 1985 or 1986 (depending on whether one considers 
the Revlon39 case to be in part an MBO case) , and the norms governing 
MBOs were not worked out until 1988-1989 . When the cases did arise, 
however , they arose against the background of the earlier cases in which a 
parent acquired minority shares of a partially owned subsidiary, and in 
which management bought a division from a parent corporation. 
In Delaware, one line of cases addressed the question of when and how 
a parent corporation can freeze out minority shareholders of a subsidiary. 
During the 1970s ,  Delaware flirted with prohibiting such mergers absent an 
independent "business purpose.  "40 And even if a merger did have such a 
purpose ,  the burden was placed on the controlling shareholders to demon, 
strate "entire fairness. "41  This "business purpose" requirement was quickly 
undermined when the Delaware Supreme Court held, a month later, that a 
business purpose of the parent corporation sufficed. 42 
In 1983 , the Delaware Supreme Court decided Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc. ,43 a case that finally abandoned the business purpose test in parent, 
subsidiary mergers , and that set the doctrinal stage for Delaware 's analysis 
of MBOs. The Signal Companies owned 50.5% of UOP, and nominated 
and elected six of the thirteen members of the UOP board. After two 
Signal officers , who were also directors of UOP, concluded in a feasibility 
study that acquiring the remaining shares of UOP would be a good invest, 
ment for Signal at any price up to $24 per share , Signal decided to acquire 
the remaining shares . Signal offered to merge with UOP, with the UOP 
minority shareholders receiving $2 1 per share. 
The UOP board, advised by its investment banker , considered and 
ultimately accepted the Signal offer , but, according to the court, was never 
informed of the existence or content of the feasibility study developed by 
two of the UOP directors for Signal's  use .  In particular, the non,Signal 
directors were never informed that the feasibility study concluded that a 
price up to $24 per share would be a good investment for Signal. It was 
this failure by Signal�affiliated directors that the court found to be the 
primary breach of fiduciary duty. 
39.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc . ,  506 A.2d 1 73  (Del. 1 986). 
40. S inger v. Magna vox Co. ,  380 A.2d 969, 97 8-80 (Del. 1977) ,  overruled by Weinberger v. 
UOP , Inc. , 457 A.2d 701  (Del. 1983). 
4 1 .  Id. at 980. 
42 .  Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus . ,  lnc. , 379 A.2d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 24 (Del. 1977) .  
43 .  457 A.2d 70 1  (Del .  1983). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme 
Court opinion. See id. at 704-08. 
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In holding that Signal had breached its fiduciary duties in cashing out 
the minority shareholders of UOP, the court emphasized the absence of an 
independent committee to represent the public shareholders: 
[T]he result here could have been entirely different if UOP had 
appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside 
directors to deal with Signal at arm's length. Since fairness in this 
context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly indepen, 
dent , board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is 
unfortunate that this course apparently was neither considered nor 
pursued.44 
This language in Weinberger led to the near universal use of " special com, 
mittees " of independent directors in MBOs. The story of management 
buyouts thus becomes a set of stories about how managers should behave, 
on the one hand, and how special committees should behave in represent, 
ing the interests of the corporation or the shareholders on the other. 45 
The first Delaware case involving a management buyout of a division 
that I have been able to identify is the 1 982 case of Field v. Allyn. 46 In 
that case, incumbent management participated in what we would now 
characterize as a management buyout of Penn Central's 92.6% interest in 
the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad. From today's vantage point, two 
things stand out. First, the majority shareholder, Penn Central , actively 
protected its own interests, by shopping for competing bids, as well as the 
minority shareholders' interests, by insisting that it would not sell its shares 
to anyone who would not immediately make a tender offer for the minority 
shares at an identical price. 
Second, the opinion makes clear that the court was writing on a clean 
slate. Plaintiffs, although convinced that something was deeply improper 
about management participating in a buyout of the company when 100% of 
the purchase price was ultimately secured by the company's own assets , had 
great difficulty in, as the court said, "placing their finger on precisely what 
it is that is wrong. "47 The court, noting "the absence of any direct prece, 
44. Id. at 709 n.7 (citation omitted). 
45.  The use of special committees in the context of derivative suits, see , e.g. , Zapata Corp . 
v. Maldonado , 430 A.2d 7 79 (Del. 1981 ) ,  and uninvited and (from management's perspective) 
unwelcome bids for control, see, e .g. , In re TWA, Inc. Shareholders Litig . ,  No. CIV.A.9844, 
1 988 WL 1 1 1 27 1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2 1 ,  1 988), provided additional points of reference for the court's 
appraisal of special committees in MBO transactions. 
46. 457 A.2d 1089 (Del. Ch .) , aff'd per curiam, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1 983). The factual 
account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme Chancery Court opinton. See id. at 1090-96. 
47. Id. at 1090. 
Saints and Sinners 1027 
dent cited by the plaintiffs under the law of Delaware or elsewhere, " 48 
reviewed the transaction, found nothing improper , and granted summary 
judgment to defendants . 
3 .  The Normative Backdrop: Two Plausible Views 
In order to appreciate the dilemma facing directors during this period, 
and the role that Delaware courts played in developing role specific norms 
for MBOs,  one must briefly reconstruct the competing normative frame, 
works within which directors functioned. In particular, one must recall the 
radically different views of takeovers , in general , and the role of the board 
of directors in MBOs , derivatively, that clashed during the 1980s. 
Two inconsistent views competed both intellectually and practically. 
According to one view-the "managerialist" view-hostile tender offers 
were bad for companies, communities , and society as a whole. From this 
perspective, the 1980s were a dangerous time, with sharks circling proud 
and once,proud companies , looking for any sign of weakness, and then 
moving in for the kill. In the process , enormous debt was incurred, com, 
panies were destroyed, assets sold off, the work of generations of expansion 
lost, and the nation mortgaged its future. 
According to the competing view-the "free market" view-tender 
offers were the great engine of managerial accountability and efficiency. 
They were a sign that markets worked. When managers mismanaged, the 
market price of the stock dropped, providing an opportunity for an entre, 
preneur to enter, buy up the shares at a premium above market price , fix 
the problems in the company, and profit thereby. When managers of com, 
panies with free cash flow spent it on inefficient expansion or diversifica, 
tion, the solution was to break up the company and sell off pieces to people 
who knew how to manage them more efficiently. On this view, takeover 
entrepreneurs benefited shareholders and society as a whole by moving 
assets to their highest and best use , by disciplining bad managers, and by 
paying premia to target shareholders. 
If one adopted the managerialist view-as many managers and directors 
instinctively did-then one might plausibly conclude that the best solution 
for a company was to "remain independent. "  When, however, sharks had 
been spotted, a second,best solution was to sell the company to the man, 
agers , thereby protecting the company from the depredations of a hostile 
takeover. From this perspective, it was plausible to take the position that it 
48. Id. at 109 1 .  
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made sense to sell the company to the managers, if they could pay a fair 
price. If, however, managers could not afford a fair price, other defensive 
measures should be used to prevent a leveraged bust, up takeover. 
If, by contrast, one started from a "free market" position, it was wrong 
to sell the company to managers for a "fair price" without first checking the 
market to see if the shareholders were getting the highest price for their 
shares, whether from managers or from a takeover entrepreneur. If one 
started with the premise that the company belongs to the shareholders, and 
the managers ' and directors' duty was to maximize shareholder value, then 
it followed immediately that the company should not be sold to managers 
without first making sure that shareholders were receiving top dollar. 
In the Delaware MBO cases that follow, one witnesses the managerial, 
ist intuitions of managers and directors in confrontation with a changing, 
increasingly market,driven environment, with the chancery court serving as 
referee. One sees an evolution-under the critical and often caustic eye of 
the Delaware courts-in what directors believe to be the right thing to do, a 
change that is both reflected in, and apparently at least in part caused by, 
the Delaware decisions. 
4.  The Early MBO Cases 
a. EAC Industries, Inc. v. Frantz Manufacturing Co. ( 1985) 
The first Delaware MBO case involving a publicly held company seems 
to have been the 1 985 case of EAC Industries, Inc. v. Frantz Manufacturing 
Co. 49 In that case, the CEO's attempt to acquire the company in an 
MBO transaction was frustrated when the retiring chairman of the board 
sold his shares to a third party, EAC, thereby giving it a fifty,one percent 
stake. The chancery court, in an opinion later affirmed by the supreme 
court, enjoined the transfer of a block of stock to an employee stock owner, 
ship plan ("ESOP") that would have diluted the EAC's holding to below 
fifty percent, and blocked other measures adopted by the board to interfere 
with EAC's acquisition of control over the corporation. 
The EAC case provides an early example of what not to do if you were 
a manager. Vice Chancellor Walsh painted a vivid picture of the actions of 
Musgrove, Frantz's  CEO, in response to EAC's acquisition of a control 
49. No. CIV.A.8003 , 1 985 WL 3200 (DeL Ch. June 28,  1985) , aff'd, 50 1  A.2d 401  (Del. 
1985). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion, id. at * 1 -*5 , 
and the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, 501 A.2d at 40 1 -06. 
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position and EAC's changes to the by,laws :50 "Musgrove, confronted with 
what appeared to be a fait accompli ,  nevertheless acted promptly to limit 
EAC's attempt at control .  "5 1  The court detailed Musgrove's tactics , 
including the accelerated issuance of shares to the proposed (but not yet 
established) ESOP, the trustees of which were Musgrove and "two subordi, 
nate officers of Frantz. "52 Moreover, the trustees chose suboptimal 
financing to circumvent the "EAC sponsored bylaw changes requiring 
unanimous director approval [that] foreclosed board action necessary to 
guarantee the ESOP loan. "53 Finally, Musgrove called a board meeting at 
which counsel to the corporation moved for the adoption of a resolution 
establishing an executive committee, consisting of Musgrove, a former 
employee ,  and a local banker, with authority to discharge the duties of the 
board. 54 
The case held that , under these circumstances , issuance of the shares 
to the ESOP would be enjoined on the grounds that "funding an ESOP in 
response to a shift in ownership of a corporation is not valid because the 
directors' action was not taken under the provision of the then valid 
bylaws. "55 But to focus on that holding is to miss the point of the 
opinion. What stands out is the depiction of Musgrove-in both the chan, 
eery and supreme court opinions-as a manager willing to do anything, 
even to take steps to dilute the majority control of an arms,length pur, 
chaser, EAC, in order to preserve his position as CEO. As the Restaurant 
Associates case, which I will discuss shortly, makes clear, it would not be 
50. Under Delaware law, bylaws (like other corporate actions) may be authorized by a 
consent solicitation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (1994). Here , EAC presented several 
modifications of Frantz's bylaws designed to prevent the Frantz board from interfering with its 
acquisition of control. 
5 1 .  EAC Indus. ,  1985 WL 3200, at *4. 
52. Id. 
53 .  Id. 
54 .  There i s  also a passing reference to MBOs in Moran v. Household International, Inc. , 490 
A.2d 1059 ,  1082 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1 985), in the course of the court's discus­
sion of Household's counterclaim against the plaintiffs. One of the members of the plaintiff 
tender offerors was Moran, a former director of Household. The chancery court rejected House­
hold's claim that "Moran [had] used his position as a director to gain access to confidential infor­
mation concerning Household's assets for the purpose of formulating a leveraged buy-out . . .  for 
[his own] benefit and at the expense of [the] other shareholders. " Id. Although the evidence 
presented supported Household 's claim that Moran conducted detailed analyses of Household, the 
court found that "there was nothing secret about that activity, "  nor was any of that information 
used "in a manner hostile to Household 's interests."  ld. "To the contrary, the consistent theme 
which runs through Moran and D-K-M's acquisition interest in Household was a desire to involve 
management in a leverageci buy-our, a goal Moran was legally free to pursue if he wished. Field 
v. Allyn, supra. "  Id. (citing Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1 089, 1098 (1983)). 
55. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus. , Inc. ,  501  A.2d 40 1 ,  409 (Del. 1 985). 
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correct to conclude from this opinion that managers and directors cannot 
ever take steps to dilute the working control of a shareholder group. 
Rather, what we learn from this case is that it is improper to do so with 
Musgrove ' s  lack of good faith. 
b .  Greenfiekl v. National Medical Care (1986) 
The next Delaware MBO case seems to have been Greenfield v .  
National Medical Care, Inc. 56 Following an aborted merger, National 
Medical Care considered a variety of options . After preliminary merger 
negotiations with W.R. Grace became deadlocked over NMC's president's 
insistence that the price not fall below that of the aborted merger, Grace 
suggested a leveraged buyout in which management would have a substan, 
tial equity interest (around twenty,five percent) , a proposal which, after 
modifications , was ultimately recommended by a special committee of 
NMC directors and approved by the board. Plaintiff shareholders chal, 
lenged the merger on the grounds that the NMC officers "breached their 
fiduciary duties by depriving NMC's public stockholders of their investment 
at a grossly inadequate price. "57 
In an opinion denying defendants' motion to dismiss , Vice Chancellor 
Berger relied on the plaintiffs' complaint challenging the independence of 
the NMC board, in combination with the plaintiffs' claims that the price 
was unfair and the lockup prevented the stockholders from obtaining a 
higher offer , to hold that the complaint "sufficiently states a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty" :58 
56.  Nos. 7720 ,  7765 , 1986 WL 6505 (Del. Ch. June 6 ,  1986). The factual account is drawn 
from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1-*2. Although the famous Revlon case 
is not often thought of as an MBO case, it does have an MBO aspect: In response to Ronald 
Perelman's attempt to acquire Revlon, Revlon's board "approved a plan to enter into a leveraged 
buyout agreement with Forstmann Little in which each shareholder would receive $56 cash per 
share with Revlon's management given an opportunity to acquire an equity interest in the corpo­
ration." MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501  A.2d 1239 ,  1 245 (Del. Ch. 
1 985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 {Del. 1986). But management's potential equity interest in the 
Forstmann Little LBO did not figure prominently in the court's discussion. Much more central 
to the analysis was the CEO's "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman,"  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 
1 7 6 , and the directors' personal interest in avoiding potential liability to noteholders. Revlon, 
501  A.2d at 1 250 .  
57 .  Greenfield, 1986 WL 6505, at *3. 
5 8 .  Id. at  *4 (citing Hanson Trust PLC v .  ML SCM Acquisition, Inc . ,  7 8 1  F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 
1 986)). 
The Hanson Trust case seems to have been the first significant MBO case in any court and 
was often cited in the Delaware opinions. See, e.g. , Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan ,  Inc . ,  
559 A.2d 1 2 6 1 , 1 284, 1286 (Del. 1989); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v .  J .P .  Stevens & Co. (ln re 
J .P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig .} , 542 A.2d 770, 784 (Del. Ch. 1988) ;  Greenfield, 1986 WL 
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[The complaint] goes on to charge that the individual defendants are 
interested because certain officers and directors and other key man, 
agement personnel of NMC will be substantial stockholders in NMC 
Holding or otherwise benefit from the merger. The Proxy Statement 
reveals that Messrs. Hampers , Lowrie and Hager [all NMC directors 
and officers] were to own approximately 25% of the common stock 
of NMC Holding at the effective time of the merger. Mr. Paganucci 
[another NMC director] is a director of a Grace subsidiary and the 
Vice President,Finance of Dartmouth College. NMC Holding 
agreed, if the merger were effected, to contribute $2.5 million to 
Dartmouth College over a period of years . . . .  
. . . The special committee is also attacked on the grounds that 
one of its members-Dr. Hager-was a paid consultant to NMC, later 
was asked to become a director of and was allowed to purchase stock 
in NMC Holding and did not withdraw from the committee until 
after it had recommended the merger. 59 
103 1  
As a " legal" matter, the court simply denied defendants' motion to 
dismiss: It did not find against the defendants on the underlying claim, it 
did not impose any liability, and it did not issue any injunction. And yet, 
in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss , and in focusing on these specific 
allegations of the plaintiffs'  complaint, the court sent a strong message, 
both to the parties directly involved in the case, as well as to others. 
This case, like the EAC case, provides an example of improper motiva, 
tion and improper conduct. In both opinions, the courts provide vivid 
depictions of managers hobbled by conflicts of interest ,  acting to protect 
their own interests in conflict with the interests of the shareholders who 
they were obliged to serve. 
c. Restaurant Associates I ( 1987) 
The first full account we get of the performance of a special committee 
in the context of a proposed management buyout is Freedman v. Restaurant 
Associates Industries, Inc. (Restaurant Associates 1} .60 The case falls on the 
6505 , at *4. The Hanson Trust case involved an attempt by management to use a lockup agree­
ment on critical assets to protect a management buyout plan, which emerged in response to a 
hostile tender offer for control. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a 
request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the lockup agreement. 
59. Greenfield, 1986 WL 6505 , at *3. 
60. No. CIV.A.92 1 2 ,  1987 WL 14323 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16 ,  1987) . The factual account is 
drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1 -*5 . 
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boundary between going�private cases (because the management group had 
effective voting control of the company, controlling about forty�eight per� 
cent of the votes) and MBO cases (because the controlling shareholders 
were also the managers) . Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoin� 
ing the closing of a tender offer on the grounds that the management/ con� 
trolling shareholder group advanced their personal interests as buyers and 
blocked the development of competing bids . 
What stands out in Chancellor Allen's opinion denying the plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction is his detailed account of how effec� 
tively the special committee represented the interests of the outside share� 
holders , despite management's voting control. The committee ,  comprised 
of independent directors with no financial interest in the proposed buyout, 
promptly hired Skadden, Arps , Slate, Meagher and Flom as its legal adviser 
and Prudential Bache to provide it with financial advice. When, shortly 
after the management group publicly disclosed its intention to make a 
tender offer, the shareholders had the good fortune to receive a competing 
proposal , the committee did what it could to facilitate a bidding contest. 
After considering the two proposals , the committee informed the 
board that management's proposal was unacceptable. The committee then 
met with the other bidder and told him that, although the management 
group opposed his proposal, he would be considered a qualified bidder once 
he delivered a proposed letter from his contemplated source of financing, 
which he soon provided. 
Despite somewhat higher bids from the management group, the com� 
mittee continued to reject management's offers ,  insisting that it would 
conduct further discussions with the competing bidder. That bidder, after 
reviewing confidential information from the company, indicated that he 
would increase his offer further, provided that financing was obtained and 
the due diligence investigation was satisfactory. In response ,  the managers 
informed the committee that they would refuse to sell their shares to the 
bidder, that they would vote against the proposed merger , and that unless 
management's lower offer was accepted on that same day, the offer would 
be withdrawn. 
Here, in the court's account, the special committee, rather than cav� 
ing in to management's demand, showed its true independence: 
Given the management group's strategic position in the Company 's 
capital structure and its unwavering hostility to Soliman's proposal , 
the special committee suggested that Soliman make a proposal under 
which Soliman would be able to buy one million authorized, but as 
yet unissued, Class B treasury shares at $ 1 9  per share . . . .  Effectua� 
Saints and Sinners 
tion of this proposal would dilute the management group's voting 
power to approximately 40%, at which level a hostile tender offer 
was thought more feasible. 61 
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But because Soliman, the competing bidder, had not yet conducted his due 
diligence , he was unwilling to proceed on this basis. The committee again 
conferred and proposed "recommend[ing] that Restaurant's board grant a 
ten day option to Soliman to purchase at least one million authorized but 
unissued Class B shares at $ 1 9  per share. In exchange, Soliman would 
make a non,refundable payment of $2 million. The ten day option would 
allow Soliman to conduct a due diligence investigation before buying the 
stock. "62 
When the full board subsequently met, the management directors 
opposed the granting of the option to Soliman, voting it down 6-5 . At the 
same meeting, the special committee recommended rej ecting management's 
$ 1 6  per share offer. The special committee met again on September 1 2 ,  at 
which time it resolved not to approve any management group proposal that 
would pay the public shareholders less that $ 1 8  per share. Ultimately, the 
management group raised its offer to the public shareholders to $ 1 8  per 
share, whereupon a merger agreement was negotiated and executed. Even 
then, the merger agreement "contained a provision permitting the board to 
withdraw if the circumstances indicated that fiduciary duties might be 
violated by going forward, "63 a provision interpreted by counsel for the 
special committee as not precluding further proposals by Soliman. Soliman 
made several further proposals at prices above $ 18  per share, none of which 
were unconditioned, and ultimately sold his interest. The management 
group commenced its tender offer at $ 18 per share . 
Against this detailed factual context, the court denied plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction against the completion of the tender 
offer , and, likewise ,  denied plaintiffs' request that Soliman be granted a 
" lockup" option to encourage and facilitate an unconditioned bid. Not 
surprisingly, given the court's description of the behavior of the special 
committee, the court held that 
cases such as this demonstrate that [the use of specially constituted 
committees of disinterested directors when transactions involve 
elements of self dealing] , when pursued in good faith, is a close 
surrogate for the structure that ordinarily provides protection to 
6 1 .  Id. at *4. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at *5 . 
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shareholders. Here there is no structural reason to doubt the effec, 
tiveness of the independent committee-it was appropriately consti, 
tuted, well advised and active. Moreover, the results it achieved 
bespeak an aggressive and effective attempt to maximize public 
shareholder values. 64 
Thus , in this context, the special committee's attempt to dilute the 
management group's working control over the corporation by issuing autho, 
rized but unissued shares to Soliman, far from being an example of improper 
behavior (as it was in EAC), is itself strong evidence of the special commit, 
tee's vigorous efforts on behalf of the shareholders. Moreover, one would 
predict that , if the board composition had been slightly different (with one 
fewer management director and one more outside director) , and the board 
had voted six to five in favor of issuing the option to Soliman, the court 
would not have enjoined that issuance. 
Despite the court's refusal to enjoin the transaction, and despite the 
special committee's efforts , the management tender offer did not close as 
expected. On October 19 ,  1987 , two days after the court's decision, the 
market crashed, leading management to cancel and renegotiate the terms of 
the transaction. As we will see below, the court issued a second opinion 
three years later, which demonstrates the extent to which norms had devel, 
oped and been clarified. 
d. Rosman v. Shoe, Town I ( 1 988) 
While Restaurant Associates I presented an effective special committee, 
the next MBO case provided another negative example. In Rosman v. Shoe, 
Town (Shoe,Town 1),65 although Vice Chancellor Hartnett denied 
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to 
establish inadequate disclosure, he cast a jaundiced eye on the transaction: 
I also find that some aspects of the transaction are troublesome. 
These include that the corporation has a history of going private and 
then going public and then going private again which has resulted in 
the capital of the public stockholders being used by the corporation 
64. Id. at *7 .  
65 . No. CIV.A.9483, 1988 WL 3638 (Del. Ch. Jan. 1 8 ,  1988) .  The factual account is 
drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1 -*2. 
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with little benefit to the investors . It also appears that several of the 
directors have been active participants in these manuevers [sic] .66 
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Plaintiffs also correctly pointed out that a special committee appointed 
to supervise the sale of the corporation was instructed not to be concerned 
with price and that Shearson, Lehman, which was hired by the directors to 
advise the special committee, never expressed an opinion as to the price 
the corporation would be expected to bring. 67 
Although plaintiffs lost their preliminary injunction motion, the case 
continued .68 The court's skepticism returned to haunt defendants . In 
Shoe,Town II ,69 Vice Chancellor Chandler , who had taken over the case 
from Vice Chancellor Hartnett, refused to grant the directors ' motion to 
dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claims , instead finding that plaintiffs 
had stated a claim: 
Plaintiffs have challenged the independence and effectiveness of the 
special committee. Central to this challenge is their contention that 
the special committee was dominated by Kaye. The complaint also 
alleges that one of the two purported independent directors compris, 
ing the special committee (Lachman) was not actively involved in 
the process. The other (Cohn) is charged with lacking independence 
because he is related to a member of the management group. In 
addition, it is alleged that the special committee was not authorized 
to consider the fairness of any proposed transaction, except as to 
procedure. The special committee is purported to have not actively 
negotiated with any potential acquirers. Even this limited function 
was supposedly hampered by the fact that the special committee was 
not permitted to retain independent counsel. Plaintiffs have also 
challenged the disinterestedness of the board majority that approved 
the transaction . . . .  
In light of the specific allegations of the complaint, combined 
with the averments that the transaction was approved by an inter, 
ested board and that the special committee was a sham, I conclude 
66. I d. at * 1 .  
67 . Here we also see a clear example of the managerialist intuition, described earlier. 
68. Plaintiffs may well have desired to lose this motion, as they probably had little interest 
in passing up the offering price at a premium above market-at least so long as the subsequent 
action for damages was not foreclosed. 
69. In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig. ,  No. C.A.9483 , 1990 WL 1 3475 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 12 ,  1990) . 
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that the complaint states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty suffi, 
dent to withstand a motion to dismiss. Cf. Greenfield v. National 
Medical Care, Inc. , Del. Ch. , C.A. Nos. 7720,  7765 , Berger, 
V.C . . . .  (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. , 
2d Cir. , 78 1  F.2d 264 ( 1 986)) . 70 
Without actually finding that the defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties-on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' allegations are taken as 
true-the court thus provided a clear indication that a special committee 
acting as alleged would breach its fiduciary duties .71 The case ultimately 
settled for $2 . 15 million. 
Note several themes that emerge in Shoe Town I. First, the court 
reacted critically to the instruction to the special committee not to be 
concerned with price. Second, the court found troublesome the fact that 
an investment banker supposedly serving shareholder interests never 
expressed an opinion regarding the price the corporation could be expected 
to bring. In Shoe Town I, then, the court-without enjoining the 
transaction-identified relevant characteristics of the process that would 
likely be influential in future determinations of good faith and fair deal, 
ing.72 
e .  In re ]. P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders litigation (1988) 
Finally, the last and most important of the early MBO/special commit, 
tee cases is the decision in the battle for J .P .  Stevens & Co. , a large textile 
70. Id. at *5 . 
7 1 .  In Shingala v. Becor Western Inc. , No. CIV.A.885 8, 1988 WL 73 90 (Del. Ch. Feb . 3 ,  
1988) ,  Vice Chancellor Berger approved a settlement in an MBO situation. In this case, the 
board appointed a special committee that retained independent counsel and a financial advisor 
after management indicated that it was interested in proposing a buyout. Lawsuits were filed 
after the special committee and the management group entered into a merger agreement that 
included a "no shop" provision, but one that "was expressly subject to a 'fiduciary out' clause 
allowing the Becor board to act if the failure to do so would conflict with the proper discharge of 
the directors' fiduciary duties." I d. at * 1 .  Shortly thereafter, Be cor received an acquisition offer 
from a third party and expressions of interest from others. The settlement of the litigation pro­
vided a mechanism for an auction of Becor. The board then took over and conducted an auction 
that, as described by the court in its decision approving the settlement, seems to have been con­
ducted in a way that was calculated to maximize , and likely did maximize, the value that public 
shareholders received for their shares. 
72 .  Shoe-Town II, a later case , shows the evolution m the specificity of the norms governing 
the behavior of special committees and belongs in that later set of cases. 
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manufacturer. 73 In the Stevens case, management informed the board of 
its plan to take the company private in an LBO. The board immediately 
created a special committee charged with considering management's pro, 
posal and with considering and making recommendations with respect to 
any other available alternatives , including proposals from third parties. A 
press release disclosed all this within two days, and triggered a bidding war 
between West Point,Pepperell , another textile firm, and Odyssey Partners , 
an investment partnership, which quickly surpassed management's bid. 
Because West Point was a competitor, its b id raised some antitrust con, 
cerns . Odyssey, on the other hand, was an investment partnership with no 
operating capacity, which, along the way, invited the management group to 
join. The court detailed various ways in which Odyssey received preferen, 
tial treatment over West Point, including, most importantly, better access 
to confidential information.74 Ultimately, the special committee recom, 
mended accepting Odyssey's slightly lower offer because it did not have 
West Point's potential antitrust problems. West Point sought, inter alia, a 
preliminary injunction enjoining provisions that provided for reimburse, 
ment of expenses and a "topping fee , " and the completion of the Odyssey 
offer, so as to permit West Point to consider making a higher offer based on 
information wrongfully withheld until shortly before .75 
The core of West Point's claim was that the special committee acted 
to protect management's interests. When it became clear that management 
could not meet the other offers , the special committee ,  according to West 
Point, did the next best thing by pushing the transaction towards manage, 
ment affiliated Odyssey. 
Although the court refused to enjoin the transaction, because West 
Point did not carry its burden of establishing lack of good faith, it was still 
troubled and , in what is characteristic of this set of cases and, I believe , 
Delaware fiduciary duty cases more generally, made a point of expressing its 
concerns : 
Thus, [in West Point's view,] Odyssey, rather than being an arm's, 
length bidder, as West Point is, appears in this version to be a white 
knight, favored by management and by a Special Corrunittee that 
73 .  West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. S tevens & Co. (In re J .P .  Stevens & Co. Shareholders 
Litig. ) ,  542 A.2d 770  (Del. Ch. 1988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chan­
cery Court opinion. See id. at 773-78. 
74.  ld. at 777 .  
75 .  Id. a t  772 .  
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vibrates sympathetically to management's desires. Maybe that is 
true; it surely is plausible. For example, one is left with the suspicion 
that the need to reach a final decision may not have been so great as 
to require the Special Committee to decide by March 13th to sign a 
merger agreement, when another month might have resolved the 
antitrust question that presented the reason for preferring a lower 
offer. And if one is inclined to second guess board decisions, the 
decision to agree to a $ 1  per share break,up payment on March 1 3  
seems a likely candidate for review. Odyssey had just submitted a 
proposal materially lower than West Point. If Odyssey really wanted 
to acquire the Company, how much leverage did it have, in those 
circumstances , to insist on a $ 1 7  million break,up fee? So the claim 
that the real purpose of that fee provision was to disadvantage West 
Point is not altogether hollow. And why did the Special Committee 
so easily accept Odyssey's threat to retract its March 28th $64 offer, 
if it was not accepted immediately? Would not the practicality of 
the matter suggest to the Special Committee that if Odyssey was 
willing to pay $64 on the 28th, it would be willing to do so a few 
days later? 
Other legitimate questions could be asked, but, in the end, plain, 
tiffs ' plausible story is not, in my opinion, sufficiently supported by 
the evidence at this time to permit the conclusion that it is reason, 
ably likely that at trial it would be found that the Special Committee 
sought to promote the interests of management by advantaging 
Odyssey at the possible expense of the shareholders .76 
As it turned out, the bidding war continued, with West Point making 
additional bids and resolving the antitrust concerns . Ultimately, Odyssey 
and West Point entered into a bidding agreement with each other , ending 
the auction. 77 
From one perspective , the opinion is rather peculiar. What is one to 
make of the court's ruminations if it ultimately denies the motion for a 
preliminary injunction? If plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of estab, 
lishing lack of good faith, who should care whether plaintiff's story is "plau, 
sible"?  Who should care whether one can make plausible arguments 
against the easy grant of a lockup option to Odyssey Partners ? 
76.  Id. at 779-80. 
77 .  On the antitrust issues raised by such a b idding agreement, see Edward B .  Rock, 
Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1365 ( 1989). 
Saints and Sinners 1039 
The answer is obvious: Anyone who cares about whether this transac� 
tion will ultimately proceed , and anyone who cares about whether future 
transactions will be permitted to proceed, will read the court's words with 
great care and attention. And they will read them primarily because they 
give insight into how someone with the power to block a transaction reacts 
to certain recurrent features. To those who structure transactions , the 
words send an unambiguous message: If you want your next transaction to 
proceed, pay attention. 
f. Summary 
Between 1 985 and early 1988,  the Delaware Chancery Court thus 
issued five significant opinions evaluating management buyouts. In only 
one of these cases (EAC) did the chancery court enjoin the transaction. In 
one (Restaurant Associates) , the court expressed its approval of the special 
committee's performance . In the rest, the court expressed varying degrees 
of disapproval , suspicion, and doubt about the performance of management 
and the special committees , leaving open the possibility of damages. 
These opinions illustrate a striking feature of the Delaware fiduciary 
duty cases, specifically , the multivalent character of the outcomes. In these 
cases, and in the ones that follow, the courts avail themselves of one of 
three options :  denying the request for an injunction and blessing the behav� 
ior; denying the motion for an injunction and criticizing defendants' behav� 
ior; or granting the injunction. The intermediate position plays three roles. 
First, it provides guidance applicable to future cases, that is , what kind of 
behavior the courts are likely to find to be a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Second, in these intermediate cases ,  although the court denies plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction, it also typically denies defendants' 
motion to dismiss, leaving defendants with some substantial damages expo� 
sure. Finally, and perhaps most importantly-and certainly least noticed-it 
tells directors , who we may suppose are generally trying to do a good job ,  
what they should do. This pattern continued in the most important MBO 
cases . 
5 .  The Defining Trilogy: Macmillan, Fort Howard, and R]R Nabisco 
After these early discussions, we come to the critical trilogy of 1988 
and 1989:  Macmillan, Fort Howard, and, finally, the biggest deal of all time, 
R]R Nabisco. These cases build on the experience of the earlier cases , and 
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give us detailed and dramatic accounts with a vivid set of heroes and vil, 
lains . In what follows, I have struggled with striking the right balance 
between demonstrating the fact,specific, normatively charged quality of the 
opinions through the quotation of the courts' language, and readability. 
The following descriptions of the Delaware opinions are a pale substitute 
for reading the opinions themselves. The confirmation or falsification of 
my claims can only be found there. At the same time, I am acutely aware 
of the limited extent to which one can impose on one's audience. 
a. The Battle for Macmillan 
( 1 )  Macmillan I Uuly 1 4, 1 988) 
In the wake of takeover bids in the publishing industry, the manage, 
ment of Macmillan, Inc. , a prominent publishing company, became con, 
cerned that the firm might become a target. Management's response to this 
concern led to two chancery court opinions78 and one supreme court opin, 
ion79 providing vivid and sharply critical descriptions of managerial cor, 
ruption, of director passivity, and of investment banker manipulation. 
Together the opinions provide Exhibit A for how not to behave in an 
MBO. 
Macmillan's two "inside" directors, Edward Evans ("Evans") , the chair, 
man and CEO, and William F. Reilly ("Reilly"), the president and chief 
operating officer, turned out to be the principal villains in what even the 
courts thought of as a "drama. " From start to finish, Vice Chancellor 
Jacobs tells us in his opinion, 
two central concepts remained constant. First, Evans, Reilly, and 
certain other members of management would end up owning abso, 
lute majority control of the restructured company. Second, manage, 
ment would acquire that majority control, not by investing new 
capital at prevailing market prices , but by being granted several 
78 .  Robert M. Bass Group , Inc. v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litig.) , 552  
A.2d 1 227 (Del. Ch. 1 988) (Macmillan D ;  Mills Acquisition Co. v.  Macmillan, Inc. , No. 
CIV.A. l 0 168 ,  1988 WL 108332 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988) (Macmillan In. 
79. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. ,  559 A.2d 1261  (Del. 1 989) .  The factual 
account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 
1 228-3 8 .  
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hundred thousand restricted Macmillan shares and stock options. 
Those shares and options would then be "exchanged" . . .  into 
several million shares of the recapitalized company.80 
104 1  
How Evans and Reilly pursued this goal forms the core of all three opin� 
ions. To appreciate fully the nature of these opinions, it is necessary to 
examine how the Delaware Chancery and Delaware Supreme Courts tell 
the story. 
Vice Chancellor Jacobs tells a sad tale: In the first step of Evans and 
Reilly's campaign (June 1987) , they asked the board, and the board agreed , 
inter alia: to grant Evans and Reilly additional shares of restricted stock and 
new employment contracts with "golden parachutes" ;  to approve a loan of 
$60 million that the [already existing] ESOP would then borrow to fund its 
purchase of one million Macmillan shares ; to replace Citibank as ESOP 
trustee, substituting Evans , Reilly, and two Macmillan employees , who 
would thereby obtain voting control of all unallocated shares deposited in 
the ESOP. In the second step , management proposed a restructuring of the 
corporation that would, in effect, have given the management group con� 
trol. 
Management's worries about a hostile tender offer turned out to have 
foundation: On October 2 1 ,  1987 , two days after the October 19  market 
crash, an investment group led by Robert Bass disclosed that it held approx� 
imately 7 .5% of Macmillan stock. In response, Macmillan management 
called a special board meeting at which Bass , the chancery court tells us , 
"was portrayed to the board as a 'greenmailer' whose modus operandi was 
to 'creep' to a control position in publicly held companies . . . .  Based on 
that presentation, the Board determined that the Bass Group's history and 
the volatile market situation constituted a threat to Macmillan and its 
shareholders . "81  
But, says Vice Chancellor Jacobs , management did not accurately 
inform the board. In fact, officials of companies supposedly victimized 
"submitted affidavits attesting that the management of those firms had 
requested Bass (or affiliates) to join their respective boards of directors 
and/or to join in investments with them. "82 In light of this evidence , 
80. Macmillan I, 552 A.2d 1227. 1229-30. 
8 1 .  Id. at 1 232 .  
82. Id. 
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Jacobs concluded, "management's pejorative characterizations of the Bass 
Group , even if honestly believed, served more to propagandize the Board 
than to enlighten it. "83 
Around this same time, management decided to form a special com, 
mittee of the board to evaluate its restructuring proposal. The court details 
the steps that Evans and Reilly took to corrupt the process from its incep, 
tion, by extensively interviewing and eventually selecting the special com, 
mittees ' investment banker without ever disclosing these contacts to the 
committee eventually appointed. 84 
The special committee subsequently met, again with Evans , Reilly, and 
other members of the management group, to hear a presentation by Lazard, 
the compromised investment banker for the special committee that, in the 
court's telling, was focused entirely on how to facilitate management's 
restructuring (which would give the management group control) and how to 
defeat the Bass group's proposal.85 Then, without any negotiation, the 
special committee recommended (and the board approved) management's 
proposed restructuring and rej ected the Bass bid, based in part on Lazard's 
opinion that the $64,per,share offer was " inadequate. "86 Subsequently, in 
response to a sweetened Bass offer , Lazard , in the court's account, again 
revealing the extent to which it was management's tool , "concluded that it 
could furnish an 'adequacy' opinion that would enable the Special 
Committee to rej ect the $7 3 per share cash portion of the Bass offer. "87 
Ultimately, the special committee and the board rejected both Bass offers . 
After this detailed narrative of the behavior of Evans, Reilly, and the 
directors , the court appraised their conduct. Rej ecting defendants' claim 
that the Bass Group represented a threat to Macmillan because of their 
83.  Id. 
84. "In total, Lazard professionals worked with management on the proposed restructuring 
for over 500 hours before their 'client, '  the Special Committee, formally came into existence and 
retained them. " Id. at 1 233-34. Indeed, the court noted in a foomote: 
On May 1 8 ,  the day after the Bass Group offer, a Lazard partner working on the restruc­
turing wrote a letter to Mr. Evans ("Dear Ned ") , stating that "all of us at Lazard are 
keenly interested in working with you in any way that we can in connection 
with . . .  the Bass Group offer] ."  
Id. at  1 234 n. l9  (alterations in original). 
85. Id. at 1235 .  
86. Id. a t  1 236. 
87 . Id. at 1237 .  
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supposed reputation as "greenmailers" as unsupported by the record, the 
court condemned both the special committee and management. 88 
Neither [the Board nor the Special Committee] took reasonable 
measures to uncover the facts . . . .  Where, as here, corporate direc, 
tors decide to resist a takeover bid on the ground that it constitutes a 
threat, Unocal requires that their decision rest upon a reasonable 
investigation and be made in good faith. That decision cannot rest 
upon a studied avoidance of a reasonable investigation, in order to 
rely upon self,serving conclusions without basis in fact.89 
(2) Macmillan II (October 1 8, 1 988) 
Three months later, in Macmillan II ,  we see Evans and Reilly continu, 
ing to undermine the integrity of the process.90 In the wake of Macmillan 
1, management abandoned its restructuring plan. On the very day that the 
restructuring plan was enjoined, Macmillan's management began looking 
for a (management,) friendly bidder. After Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts 
("KKR") contacted Macmillan, the two firms had extensive discussions 
"concerning a possible leveraged buyout of all of Macmillan's stockholders, 
in which Macmillan senior management would participate. "91 At around 
the same time, Robert Maxwell, through Maxwell Communications Corp. 
88. See id. at 1 240: 
The Special Committee made no effort, directly or through its advisers, to investigate 
the B ass offer. Management's investigation consisted of sending Mr. McCurdy to have a 
single cursory meeting with Mr. Scully, a Bass representative. That encounter was little 
more than a charade, because Mr.McCurdy was instructed not to {and therefore did not) 
negotiate or substantively discuss the terms of the Bass offer. 
89. Id. at 124 1 .  The court then went on to note two other "offending qualities [of the 
restructuring] that exacerbate its unreasonableness and which therefore merit comment. 11 Id. at 
1244. First, the court pointed out, the restructuring would render the part of the restructured 
company that held Macmillan 's information-based businesses "takeover proof' because it would 
tend to entrench the management group. Second, management's proposed 39% ownership "[was] 
derived from valuation methods that [were] either incorrect or, at the very least, highly question­
able. 11 ld. Finding that the restructuring proposal posed the threat of irreparable harm to share­
holders, and that the balance of the equities favored the plaintiffs, the court preliminarily 
enjoined the restructuring. ld. at 1246-47 . 
90. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. ,  No. CIV.A. 1 0 1 68, 198 8  WL 108332 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1 8 ,  1988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court 
opinion. See id. at *3-* 1 1 .  
9 1 .  Id. at *3.  
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(" MCC") , also indicated an interest in acquiring Macmillan. In its opin, 
ion, the court details the extent to which management aided KKR while 
discouraging Maxwell. Management gave KKR access to company person, 
nel and nonpublic information, including presentations by senior manage, 
ment. By contrast, Macmillan did not even respond to Maxwell's proposal 
for five weeks. Proceeding anyway, Maxwell announced an $80 all,cash, 
all,share tender offer on August 1 2 ,  topping the Bass offer by a significant 
amount. 
Despite efforts to equalize the information given to the competing 
bidders by developing a common "script, "  Evans and Reilly, the villains of 
Macmillan I, undermined the process by making an unauthorized telephone 
call to KKR, tipping MCC's bid to KKR (presumably so that they could 
outbid it in the final round) . Neither Evans , Reilly, nor KKR disclosed to 
Macmillan's financial or legal advisers that Evans had tipped off KKR . Nor 
did Evans and Reilly inform their fellow directors. In the final round of 
bidding, after a further conversation with each bidder in which Bruce 
Wasserstein, the investment banker for the management group, who inexpli, 
cably also ran the auction, again gave KKR more information than MCC, 
KKR came out on top. 
In the chancery court opinion, Vice Chancellor Jacobs makes clear 
that Evans and Reilly breached their fiduciary duties by tipping off KKR . 
But, while the court found Evans' and Reilly's behavior improper, and 
unfair to MCC, it was unconvinced that the auction failed to promote 
shareholders' interest-in his eyes, the critical measure-in achieving the 
highest available price. The court thus condemned the behavior but 
refused to enjoin the "lockup. "  At the same time, the court concluded that 
the poison pill no longer served any purpose, and ordered it withdrawn, 
giving MCC the opportunity to proceed with its offer, either by waiving its 
condition that the lockup be declared invalid or by successfully invalidating 
it on appeal. 
Maxwell then appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which invali, 
dated the lockup in an oral opinion on November 2 ,  followed by a written 
opinion on May 3 ,  1989.  As we will see , the Delaware Supreme Court 's 
opinion is even more contemptuous of Evans and Reilly, their investment 
bankers , and the board than was the chancery court 's .  This decision 
opened the way to MCC's ultimate acquisition of Macmillan at $90 .25 per 
share. It is to that opinion I now turn. 
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(3) The Delaware Supreme Court 's Macmillan (May 3 , 1 989) 
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In the Delaware Supreme Court opinion,92 Justice Moore agreed with 
Vice Chancellor Jacobs in his overall view of the transactions . In summa, 
rizing Vice Chancellor Jacobs findings , the Delaware Supreme Court 
touched on each of the highlights: the central goal of making sure that 
Evans and Reilly ended up in control without investing new capital; the 
domination of the allegedly " independent" board by the financially inter, 
ested members of management; the "directors ' evident passivity in the face 
of their fiduciary duties" ;  the "rather grim and uncomplimentary picture of 
Bass and its supposed 'modus operandi' in prior investments, " including the 
inaccurate claim that it was a "greenmailer";  the increases in nonemployee 
director compensation and the creation of a nonemployee director retire, 
ment plan. Like the chancery court, the supreme court focused on the 
corruption of the special committee process by Evans and Reilly.93 Like 
the chancery court, the supreme court focused on the extensive and undis, 
closed dealings between the management group and Lazard, the special 
committee's investment banker, before the special committee was formed, 
and its subsequent passivity. 
Having summarized Macmillan I-the Bass offer-with its passive spe, 
cial committee , corrupt managers , and manipulative investment bankers, 
the court moved on to Macmillan II. As the supreme court put it, clearly 
conscious of the extent to which this was a morality play: 
Thus, Macmillan I essentially ended on July 14 ,  1 988 [with the chan, 
eery court 's preliminary injunction] . However, it only set the stage 
for the saga of Macmillan II to begin that same day. It opened with 
92. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. , 559 A.2d 1 2 6 1  (Del. 1989). The factual 
account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme Court opinion. See id. at 1265-78.  
93 . See id. at 1 267 : 
Due to the significant financial interests of Evans, Reilly, Chell, McCurdy and other 
managers in the proposed restructuring , management decided in February or March to 
establish a "Special Committee" of the Board to serve as an "independent" evaluator of 
the plan. The Special Committee was hand picked by Evans, but not actually formed 
until the May 1 8 ,  1988 board meeting. This fact is significant because the events that 
transpired between the time that the Special Committee was conceived and the time it 
was formed illummate the actual working relationship between management and the 
allegedly "independent" directors. It calls into serious question the actual independence 
of the board in Macmillan I and II. 
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Macmillan's senior management holding extensive discussions with 
KKR in an attempt to develop defensive measures to thwart the Bass 
Group offer.94 
The biggest development, of course, was the entry of Robert Maxwell. 
Despite Maxwell's overtures and tender offer, no Macmillan representative 
ever attempted to negotiate with Maxwell. Instead, in Moore's story, "rep, 
resentatives of Macmillan and KKR met to negotiate and finalize KKR's 
buyout of the company. In this transaction Macmillan senior management 
would receive up to 20% ownership in the newly formed company. "95 
Now that a deal with KKR had been struck, Evans instructed 
Macmillan's financial advisors to notify the 
six remaining potential bidders, during September 7 and 8, that "the 
process seems to be coming to a close" and that any bids for 
Macmillan were due by Friday afternoon, September 9. It is particu, 
larly noteworthy that Maxwell was given less than 24 hours to pre, 
pare its bid, not having received this notification until the night of 
September 8. 96 
Against this background, the court then described the auction process 
as one that was systematically corrupted by management and their invest, 
ment bankers , and in which the special committee utterly failed in its task. 
In the supreme court's opinion, like the chancery court's opinion, the court 
describes the critical unauthorized tip to KKR and the other efforts made to 
further KKR's bid. 
In response to these failures , the supreme court (without addressing the 
question of whether Evans' and Reilly's breaches of fiduciary duty likely 
resulted in a lower price for shareholders) reversed the chancery court's 
refusal to enjoin the lockup agreement with KKR, again using harsh lan, 
guage to describe the behavior of the various participants: 
Evans ' and Reilly's conduct throughout was resolutely intended to 
deliver the company to themselves in Macmillan I, and to their 
94. Id. at 1172 .  
95 . Id. at  1273 .  
96. Id. Equally central to the supreme court's summary is that Evans, rather than the spe-
cial committee, seems to have been doing all the negotiating on behalf of Macmillan: 
I d. 
In a September 8 meeting with Robert Maxwell and his representatives, Evans 
announced that the company's management planned to recommend a management-KKR 
leveraged buyout to the directors of Macmillan, and that he would not consider 
Maxwell's outstanding offer despite Maxwell's stated claim that he would pay " top dol­
lar" for the entire company. 
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favored bidder, KKR, and thus themselves, in Macmillan II. The 
board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly 
independent auction, free of Evans' interference and access to confi� 
dential data. By placing the entire process in the hands of Evans, 
through his own chosen financial advisors, with little or no board 
oversight, the board materially contributed to the unprincipled 
conduct of those upon whom it looked with a blind eye.97 
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Finally, the court invalidated the lockup granted to KKR , setting the stage 
for Maxwell's ultimate acquisition of Macmillan. 
When grouped together, these three opinions in Macmillan establish 
Evans and Reilly as among the villains of Delaware corporate law, with 
Wasserstein as an archetype of the unprincipled investment banker. The 
very language of the opinions proclaims its identity as a morality play: 
"management's pejorative characterizations of the Bass group, even if hon� 
estly believed , served more to propagandize the Board than to enlighten it" ; 
"little more than a charade" ;  "they chose to close their eyes" ;  "studied 
avoidance of a reasonable investigation, in order to rely upon self�serving 
conclusions without basis in fact" ;  "offending qualities that exacerbate its 
unreasonableness " ;  "domination of the allegedly ' independent' board by the 
financially interested members of management, coupled with the directors' 
evident passivity";  "tainted process " ;  "Wasserstein falsely claimed" ;  
"Wasserstein mistakenly assured" ;  "clandestinely and wrongfully" ;  "Evans ' 
and Reilly's deliberate concealment of material information";  "the board 
was torpid, if not supine" ;  " the unprincipled conduct of those upon whom 
it looked with a blind eye" ;  "fails all basic standards of fairness . "  
9 7 .  Id. a t  1279-80. The court goes o n  to state: 
It is clear that on July 14 ,  1 988 ,  the day that the Court of Chancery enjoined the 
management-induced reorganization, and with Bass' $73 offer outstanding, Macmillan's 
management met with KKR to discuss a management sponsored buyout. This was done 
without prior board approval. By early September, Macmillan 's financial and legal advi­
sors, originally chosen by Evans, independently constructed and managed the process by 
which b ids for the company were solicited. Although the Macmillan board was fully 
aware of its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the auction, the directors 
wholly delegated the creation and administration of the auction to an array of Evans' 
hand-picked investment advisors. It is undisputed that Wasserstein, who was originally 
retained as an investment advisor to Macmillan's senior management, was a principal, if 
not the pnmary, "auctioneer" of the company. While it is unnecessary to hold that 
Wasserstein lacked independence , or was necessarily "beholden" to management, it 
appears that Lazard Freres, allegedly the investment advisor to the independent directors, 
was a far more appropriate candidate to conduct this process on behalf of the board. Yet, 
both the board and Lazard acceded to Wasserstein 's, and through him Evans' ,  primacy. 
Id. at 1 28 1 .  
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And, if this were not enough, Evans and Reilly, as well as Macmillan's 
general counsel , Beverly Chell ,  were charged by the SEC with violating 
section 13 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act for filing a misleading disclo­
sure regarding the ESOP established in connection with management's 
buyout offer and to fend off other bids . All they disclosed was that the 
ESOP plan was buying Macmillan shares 11 to allow participating employees 
to acquire stock ownership interests in the company. "98 
Consider how Evans , Reilly, or Wasserstein felt when reading these 
opinions. Consider how the members of the special committee , identified 
by name in the opinion,99 must have felt to be characterized as 11torpid , if 
not supine" by the Delaware Supreme Court ,100 combined with the 
equally strong terms used by the chancery court. Consider what it must be 
like to l ive with such a public shaming, to see in acquaintances' eyes the 
unasked question, 11How could you have stood by and allowed this to hap, 
pen?" Imagine how other managers and directors , when they read or heard 
about these opinions , felt about the prospect of being similarly pillor­
ied . 101 Anecdotal evidence confirms what we all would expect: No one, 
including directors and officers of Delaware corporations , Wall Street 
investment bankers , and Wall Street lawyers , enjoys being held up to this 
sort of public condemnation. 
Different people can be expected to be affected in different ways by 
this sort of attention. Edward Evans seems to have retired from public life. 
He does not serve as a director of any publicly traded company except for 
Fansteel, a small metals firm largely owned by his family. 102 According to 
98. Kevin G. Salwen & David B. Hilder, Macmillan Officers Charged in Failure to Disclose 
ESOP Was Takeover Defense, WALL ST. J . ,  Dec . 7 ,  1989, at A6. 
99. "The Special Committee consisted of Lewis A. Lapham, an old college classmate of 
Evans' father, (Chairman), James H. Knowles, Jr. , Dorsey A. Gardner, Abraham L. Gitlow and 
Eric M. Hart. Hart failed to attend a single meeting of the Committee." Mills Acquisition Co . ,  
5 5 9  A.2d at 1 268 n.9. 
100. ld. at 1 280. 
1 0 1 .  See, e.g. , Cynthia Crossen & Karen Blumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal That Failed: 
Macmillan Tried Many Defenses to Stop Suitors , WALL ST. J . ,  Nov. 4 ,  1988 , at B 1  [hereinafter 
Crossen & Blumenthal ,  An Anti-Takeover Arsenal] (summarizing the Delaware Supreme Court's 
criticism of Evans and Reilly); Cynthia Crossen & Karen B lumenthal, Macmillan, Inc. 
Restructuring Blocked in Court, WALL ST. J . ,  July 1 5 ,  1988, at 20 [hereinafter Crossen & 
Blumenthal, Macmillan , Inc. ]  (summarizing the Delaware Chancery Court opiniOn in Macmillan 0;  
David B .  Hilder, As Wasserstein Perella Climbs to Top Rank, Criticism Grows, WALL ST. J . ,  Dec .  
1 1 ,  1989, a t  C 1  (summarizing the Delaware Supreme Court's criticism of Wasserstein m 
Macmillan and the Delaware Chancery Court's criticism in Interco). 
102 .  Fansteel Inc. Proxy Statement (Mar. 24, 1 995), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy 
File, at •4 (noting that Edward Evans' father, T.M. Evans, owns 47 . 1 1 %  of Fansteel). Edward 
Evans 1s also a director of HBD Industries, Inc. , another firm controlled by his father. Id. ; Crane 
Co. Proxy Statement (Mar. 1 5 ,  1 995), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at * 1 6  (not-
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their annual proxy statement, " [s] ince 1989, E. P .  Evans has engaged in 
personal investments . "  Moreover, forever more , Evans must disclose in 
proxy statements that " [i]n December 1989, Mr. E.P. Evans , without admit, 
ting or denying any allegations contained in a complaint filed by the Secu, 
rities and Exchange Commission, consented to the entry of final judgment 
of permanent injunction prohibiting him from violating Section 13 (d) of 
the Exchange Act and Rules 13d, l and 13d,2 thereunder. " 103 
By contrast, William Reilly has maintained a higher profile, staying on 
to run Macmillan for a year or so after the Maxwell buyout and then going 
on to serve as Chairman and CEO of K, III ,  a high profile KKR leveraged 
investment vehicle which he has built into a publishing conglomerate by 
acquiring magazines from Rupert Murdoch and other media properties. 104 
Reilly is also a director of FMC Corporation, a large, publicly held diversi, 
fied chemicals company. 105 
b.  Fort Howard (August 8 ,  1988) 
Macmillan I was decided July 14 , 1 988,  by Vice Chancellor Jacobs. 
Almost immediately thereafter, Chancellor Allen was presented with 
another special committee in another management buyout case, this time 
involving Fort Howard Corporation, a paper company. 106 Although, as 
we will see , the participants behaved substantially better than those in 
Macmillan, and Chancellor Allen did not enjoin the transaction, he did 
severely criticize the performance of the special committee, providing 
another cautionary tale for managers and directors involved in MBO trans, 
actions . 
The scene is ,  by now, an increasingly familiar one (for both the reader 
and for the Delaware Chancery Court) . In the spring of 1 988,  Fort 
Howard's  management, concerned that a temporarily depressed stock price 
(post-October 1987) might lead it to be the target of an unfairly low and 
perhaps coercive takeover attempt, began to meet with an investment 
bank, Morgan Stanley, to discuss ways to elevate its stock price. Shortly 
ing that HBD Industries is controlled by T.M. Evans). 
1 03 .  Fansteel Inc. Proxy Statement, supra note 102 ,  at *4. 
1 04. See generally Patrick M. Reilly, Classroom Ruler: A KKR Vehicle Finds Profit and Education 
a Rich but Uneasy Mix, WALL ST. J . ,  Oct. 1 2 ,  1 994, at Al . 
105 .  K-Ill Communications Corp. Proxy Statement (April 24,  1996) , available in LEXIS, 
Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *4. 
106. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig. ,  No. CIV.A.999 1 ,  1 988 WL 8 3 1 47 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. 
See id. at *2-*9. 
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thereafter , Morgan Stanley presented various options, recommending a 
leveraged buyout and indicating its interest in participating with senior 
management in such a transaction. Subsequently, Fort Howard' s  CEO 
informed Morgan Stanley that he and others of the senior management 
were interested in pursuing such a transaction. That same day, he met with 
a friendly, veteran director. The CEO informed the director, a law school 
classmate, that a special committee of the board would have to be formed 
to consider the buyout proposal and that the CEO wanted that director to 
serve as its chairman. They discussed other possible members of a special 
committee and agreed on two others. 
At the next board meeting, the CEO presented his "proposal to make 
a proposal" to the board, and informed the board that Morgan Stanley and 
the three management directors were interested in exploring an LBO of 
Fort Howard. The management directors then left the meeting, and out, 
side legal counsel guided the remaining directors through the adoption of 
the necessary resolutions to appoint a special committee and to select out, 
side legal counsel and a financial adviser. The membership of the special 
committee was exactly as the CEO had suggested. 
At its first meeting, the special committee made a determination to 
keep the developments confidential. Peter Atkins, a partner at Skadden, 
Arps , Slate , Meagher and Flom, and the committee's  outside legal counsel , 
advised that disclosure was not legally required at that time. In the absence 
of advice that there was a legal obligation to disclose, the special committee 
here, like the special committee in Restaurant Associates I, discussed earlier, 
elected secrecy. 107 Meanwhile , the special committee retained First Bos, 
ton as its financial adviser. 
Subsequently, in the course of a meeting to review draft merger docu, 
ments , a report of high trading volume was received. The volume indicated 
that there had been a leak of information concerning the possibility of a 
buyout. Again, the question of disclosure was raised. The special commit, 
tee concluded that a press release should be issued, which Atkins drafted. 
But after telephone discussions with the management group, which did not 
want any press release, the special committee again agreed not to proceed. 
The next day, after a telephone inquiry to the company about a rumored 
management LBO in the works , Fort Howard finally issued a press release. 
The special committee met over the next several days , and ultimately 
accepted an offer from the management group without having actively 
1 07 .  As before, this reflected a preference for the company to remain independent if manage­
ment could not finance an MBO at a "fair" price. 
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solicited competing bids. The special committee did, however, make clear 
in the initial press releases that the company had the right to and would 
entertain alternative proposals , and, furthermore, would cooperate with any 
such person in the development of a competing bid. Within days of the 
press release,  eight inquiries were received. 
First Boston, on instructions of the special committee, screened the 
inquiries initially and provided each serious inquiry with all of the materials 
that had been given to Morgan Stanley and First Boston. All eight were 
provided with the materials but, ultimately, no other bidders entered the 
fray. 
Without doubt, the Fort Howard Special Committee performed more 
effectively than the Macmillan committee. But, although the court did not 
enjoin the transaction, it still found fault with the special committee's 
performance: 
[T]here are aspects [of the Special Committee's performance] that 
supply a suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame. 
It cannot, for example, be the best practice to have the interested 
CEO in effect handpick the members of the Special Committee as 
was, I am satisfied, done here. Nor can it be the best procedure for 
him to, in effect, choose special counsel for the committee as it 
appears was done here. It is obvious that no role is more critical 
with respect to protection of shareholder interests in these matters 
than that of the expert lawyers who guide sometimes inexperienced 
directors through the process. A suspicious mind is made uneasy 
contemplating the possibilities when the interested CEO is so active 
in choosing his adversary. The June 7 decision to keep the manage, 
ment interest secret, in a sense, represents a decision to sell the 
Company to management if it would pay a fair price, but not to 
inquire whether another would pay a fair price if management would 
not do so. It implies a bias that, while as explained below, I accept 
as valid for purpose of this motion, nevertheless is a source of con, 
cern to a suspicious mind. Similarly, the requested meeting between 
First Boston and Morgan Stanley. For present purposes , I cannot 
conclude that plaintiffs' reading of that affair will be shown to be 
correct. But it is still odd for the Special Committee to risk infect, 
ing the independence of the valuation upon which it would neces, 
sarily place such weight, by requiring its expert to talk directly with 
Morgan Stanley. And that risk is run for what can only be seen as a 
minor benefit to the convenience of the individuals involved. So 
there is ground for suspicion with respect to the good faith of the 
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Special Committee, but, on balance, not such that seem at this stage 
persuasive. 108 
In refusing to draw any inference of bad faith, the court relied heavily 
on the effectiveness of the limited market test in probing the market for 
alternative possible transactions , and the wholehearted response to the 
eight inquiries received. 
What is most striking, here as before, is the way the court, without 
enjoining the transaction, nonetheless makes clear that the behavior of the 
special committee fell below the appropriate standard. Although the Fort 
Howard committee did not behave as badly as the "torpid, if not supine" 
committee in Macmillan, and although Fort Howard's management acted 
better than Evans and Reilly did (by, for example, leaving the meeting after 
announcing their interest in pursuing an LBO, and not tipping confidential 
information during the bidding) , the relationship between management and 
the special committee, and between their supposedly independent invest, 
ment bankers , was nonetheless too cozy. The opinion made clear to the 
planners of all future deals that the court expects a higher standard of behavior. 109 
1 08 .  Fort Howard, 1 988 WL 8 3 1 47 ,  at * 1 2 .  
1 09 .  At just about the same time, Chancellor Allen wrote a second opinion reviewing the 
performance of a special committee in an MBO transaction. See In re Amsted Indus. Inc. Litig . ,  
No.  CIV .A.8224 , 1 988 WL 92736 {Del. Ch. Aug. 24 ,  1 988). In ruling on a settlement motion 
(which Allen ultimately approved) , Allen expressed concern with how the special committee 
performed: 
The Committee was authorized to receive, review and evaluate the fairness of any such 
LBO proposal and also to evaluate the fairness of any other acquisition proposal that 
might be made by a third party. The Special Committee was, however, specifically 
directed not to engage in a search for alternative transactions. 
I conclude that the claims that could be made in this instance with regard to the 
propriety of the process as it relates to securing the best available transaction are signifi­
cantly stronger than those frequently encountered in transactions of this type. Impor­
tantly here, the record discloses no active effort by the Special Committee to attempt to 
shop the Company or to engage in an alternative form of proceeding designed to 
encourage the emergence of an offer that would compete with the management 
sponsored ESOP LBO transaction. Compare In re Fort Howard Corporation Share­
holders Litigation, Del. Ch. C.A. No. 999 1 (August 8, 1 988) . 
. . . The board relied upon the investment banker who was of the view that the tax 
advantages that the ESOP enjoyed permitted it to pay a price higher than that which a 
non-tax advantaged buyer would be able to pay. If the investment b anker was correct 
about that, the price offered was the highest available. But where the transaction is so 
important to the shareholders as this one was, the question does arise, "why did the 
mdependent Committee of the board-if it was motivated in good faith to achieve the 
best transaction for the shareholders-not check that opinion by shopping the Company, 
or at least negotiating for a period in which it could publicly encourage any interested 
party to come forward?" I discount the defendants' position that the market had been 
fully, though passively, checked. 
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Why might this be influential? If the court does not punish at time 
one, why should people feel that there is a higher standard at time two? 
First, such an opinion puts actors on notice that higher standards are liable 
to be applied to future deals, perhaps because of a notion that the court let 
the present deal go through because of insufficient precedent. Second, to 
the extent that actors internalize the articulated standard , they may well 
change their behavior irrespective of whether or not they face personal 
liability. Third, the criticism signals that the court will not subsequently 
grant a defendant 's motion to dismiss, thereby substantially increasing the 
settlement value of a case. 
c. R]R Nabisco (January 3 1 ,  1989) 
The lessons of Fort Howard, it appears , were immediately taken to 
heart in the next big deal , the biggest LBO of all time, the buyout of RJR 
Amsted, 1988 WL 92736, at *3 ,  *7 . 
Chancellor Allen had another case involving the performance of a special committee in the 
context of a parent subsidiary merger around the same time. See In re TWA, Inc. Shareholders 
Litig . ,  No. CIV.A.9844, 1988 WL 1 1 1 2 7 1  (Del. Ch. Oct. 2 1 ,  1988). Consistent with his opin­
ions in Fort Howard and Amsted, he preached about how a special committee should behave: 
First, as pointed out above, the directors did not seem to understand that their duty was 
to strive to negotiate the highest or best available transaction for the shareholders whom 
they undertook to represent. Second, it is not clear that Dillon Read itself thought its 
responsibility was to push for the best available price rather than one it could regard as 
falling within a range of fairness . 
. . . Third, Dillon Read never brought its various analyses down to a single range of 
value for TWA shares . . . .  Thus, the special committee was not apprised whether Dillon 
Read, had it forced itself through the analytical step between the analysis it did and the 
opinion it expressed, would have regarded the price offered as at the lowest edge of a 
broad range of arguably fair prices, or at some other position on such a scale . That infor­
mation would be quite pertinent to a negotiator who understood that a "fair price" is 
always an arguable point on a range; who understood that, while a self-dealing fiduciary 
must offer a "fair" price, minority shareholders-particularly where a majority of minority 
voting provision is employed-have no obligation to accept a price that falls within some 
range of fair prices; and, who sought not merely to bless a transaction that a banker was 
willing to call fair, but who sought to negotiate the highest possible price. But the 
special committee in this case, appearing to reflect a complacency referable to an imper­
fect appreciation of the proper scope and purpose of such a special committee ,  did not 
ask its advisor to express a view about a range of fair value for TWA shares held by the 
minority shareholders. 
Id. at *4-*5 . Based on these findings, the court declined to permit the presence of a special 
committee to result in the application of the business judgment rule. On the contrary, finding 
that the "special committee did not supply an accep(able surrogate for the energetic, informed 
and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an arm's length adversary," id. 
at *7 ,  the court held that the defendants would bear the burden of establishing entire fairness at 
trial. 
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Nabisco. 1 10 Luck , and a very small community, resulted in Peter Atkins 
again representing the special committee, and this time the committee 
performed in an exemplary fashion. We will never know whether he did so 
because of a desire to avoid criticism, to ensure that the deal withstood 
scrutiny, or a bit of both. 1 1 1  
On October 1 9 ,  1988 ,  at an RJR board meeting, F .  Ross Johnson, 
RJR's president and CEO, informed the board that he and a management 
group were seeking to develop a transaction to take the company private in 
a leveraged buyout, and suggested a price of $75 per share . Charles Hugel,  
chairman of RJR' s board but not an officer of the company, had some 
advance notice that this subject would be brought up, and had invited 
Peter Atkins to be present. On October 20, the very next day, the board 
issued a press release announcing the proposed transaction and the appoint, 
ment of a special committee, with Hugel as chairman. The special commit, 
tee immediately retained two financial advisors, Dillon Read (the 
company's regular investment banker) and Lazard Freres , as well as Mr. 
Atkins' firm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom. 
The contrast between Fort Howard and RJR Nabisco is sharp . In Fort 
Howard, the management group handpicked the special committee and its 
advisors. Here , the chairman of the board, apparently on his own initia, 
1 10. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig . ,  No. CIV.A. 10389 ,  1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 
(Feb. 14 ,  1989). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See 
id. at * 1 2-*35 .  
1 1 1 .  See DeMott, supra note 22 ,  a t  34 .  In  their book on the RJR Nab isco buyout, Bryan 
Burrough and John Helyar quote the lawyer who represented F. Ross Johnson, when he heard 
that Peter Atkins had been chosen to represent the special committee, as saying "Oh God":  
Goldstone groaned when he heard Hugel had brought along Atkins. Until that moment 
he had held out some hope the board wouldn't  disclose Johnson's presentation that 
night, giving the management group a chance to finish its negotiations in secrecy. Now 
he knew that an announcement was all but certain. 
The clincher was Atkins's past . . . .  Atkins had been selected to advise Fort 
Howard by the company's chief executive, the man making the bid, a fact that troubled 
the court and called into question Atkins's actions in favor of secrecy. "It  is obvious 
that no role is more critical with respect to protection of shareholder interests in these 
matters than that of the expert lawyers who guide sometimes inexperienced directors 
through the process," the court said. "A suspicious mind is made uneasy contemplating 
the possibilities when the interested CEO is so active in choosing his adversary ." 
Atkins's choice of secrecy, the judge nored, was "a source of concern to a suspicious 
mind. "  
The opinion all but  accused Atkins of  selling out  his neutrality to  a buyout group. 
Goldstone guessed he was still stinging from the rebuke. Jack Nusbaum concurred. "It 
was clear Atkins was going to be  living down Fort Howard,"  Nusbaum recalled. "We 
figured he was going to be holier than Caesar's wife ."  
BRYAN BURROUGH & jOHN HELYAR , BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 
18 1-82 (1 990). 
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rive, brought in  outside counsel at the first indication of a management 
buyout. In Fort Howard, the special committee deferred to the manage, 
ment group's desire for secrecy and did not make any disclosure, even after 
a report of unusual trading volume indicated a leak of information, until a 
rumor of a management buyout left them no choice. By contrast, here full 
disclosure of the possible management buyout was made the very next day, 
effectively broadcasting the message that the company was for sale. 
Within four days , KKR informed the special committee that it was 
planning to make an offer to acquire RJR at $90 per share in cash and 
securities , and, on October 27 , commenced a tender offer. Thereafter, the 
special committee acted as auctioneer, issuing a press release announcing 
that it was interested in receiving proposals to acquire the company. Again 
there is a stark contrast with Fort Howard, in which the committee did not 
take any steps to solicit competing bids until after it had reached an agree, 
ment with the management group. 
Ultimately, three bids were made by the deadline, and, in the ensuing 
auction rounds , the price escalated from Johnson's initial suggestion of $75 
per share , past KKR's opening bid of $90 per share, to KKR's ultimately 
successful bid of around $ 1 10 per share in cash and securities . The special 
committee was so independent of the management group that, in the share, 
holders' class action that was brought, plaintiffs were put in the position of 
arguing that the special committee was " inappropriately motivated to repu, 
diate, and more importantly, to be seen publicly as repudiating the 
Company's management . " 1 12 To avoid being tarred by the public criti, 
cism directed at the management group, it was essential to the special 
committee that KKR win, or so the plaintiffs argued. 
The court focused on the special committee's conduct of the 
auction-applying the supreme court' s  Macmillan holding-and concluded 
that the committee acted in good faith and with due care in ending the 
auction when it did, without returning to the bidders for one more round of 
bids as plaintiffs argued they should have done. 1 13 But the core of the 
case seems to lie in the independence of the committee from the start. 
Unlike the committees in Macmillan or Fort Howard, this was not a com, 
mittee that could supply a suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame. 
When RJR Nabisco is placed next to Macmillan and Fort Howard, we 
see several things. First, we see a detailed example of how an effective 
special committee behaves in a management buyout transaction. Second, 
1 12 .  R]R Nabisco , 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 ,  at *6. 
1 13 .  Id. at *65-*66. 
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we see graphic evidence of how conduct seems to be shaped by Delaware 
opinions , even when the plaintiffs "lose , "  as they did in the Fort HOOJard 
preliminary inj unction motion. Peter Atkins ' performance in Fort HOOJard 
received a negative review from the most important of the critics , the Dela, 
ware Chancery Court. He had an opportunity to try again two months 
after his bad review, and he took that opportunity, leading one reviewer of 
Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of R]R Nabisco to characterize Atkins as one 
of the book's few heroes . 1 14 Finally, when you put together the strongly 
negative portrayal of managers and directors in Macmillan , the somewhat 
less negative, but still negative, portrayal in Fort Howard, and the very 
positive portrayal in RJR Nabisco, you have a pretty clear set of guideposts 
for how managers and directors in management buyout transactions should 
behave. 
In retrospect , the lessons may seem obvious. But at the time, the 
norms were substantially less clear. What led the directors astray in 
Macmillan and Fort Howard was a lack of clarity with respect to their roles . 
Were they to represent the interests of shareholders actively? Were they to 
facilitate the managers ' buyout so long as the price was within the "range of 
fairness" ?  Were they to protect managers and perhaps shareholders from a 
hostile tender offer in the event that managers could not finance a buyout 
at a price within the range of fairness?  Up until the Macmillan , Fort 
HOOJard, R]R Nabisco trilogy, there were relatively few and relatively vague 
guideposts . After these cases , the norms became fairly clear, sufficiently so 
that managers and directors who, by and large, were trying to do the right 
thing had sufficient guidance to figure out what the right thing was . 
6. Other Important Stories 
The Macmillan , Fort Howard, R]R Nabisco trilogy went a long way 
towards describing the norms of conduct in management buyout transac, 
tions. At this point, the style of the Delaware courts' opinions changed 
somewhat, leaning towards the confident application of reasonably well, 
established norms , with less need to articulate those norms explicitly 
through the detailed narratives of the earlier cases. 
1 1 4. Thomas ] .  Andre, Jr. , Barbarians at the Gate: The FaU of R]R Nabisco, 59  U. CrN. L. 
REV. 479 ( 1 990) (book review). 
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The Amsted Industries 1 15 litigation . provided another opportunity for 
the courts to articulate norms of conduct, although it was complicated 
somewhat by the fact that the review of management's behavior was in the 
context of whether to approve settlement of a class action. 1 16 Here, as in 
cases like Fort Howard, one finds the court refusing to set aside the transac, 
tion at the same time that it expresses grave reservations about the behav, 
ior of the board. 1 17 
b. In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litigation ( 1 989) 
The Formica Corporation was created in a management buyout of a 
division of a large conglomerate. 1 18 Two years after the original buyout, 
the company went public. Then, two years after its IPO, management, in 
the wake of some vague threats of a hostile takeover, thought that it might 
make sense to go private again. Management ultimately decided to try an 
MBO and informed the board that it planned to make an offer at $ 1 8  per 
share. Here , Vice Chancellor Jacobs shows us another example of an effec, 
tive special committee chair, Stephen Bershad, a former investment 
banker. Bershad rej ected management's desire to rely on an investment 
bank valuation in place of a market test, arguing that "whatever might be 
the merits of investment banker,generated analytic models, only the mar, 
ketplace could determine Formica's real value, and that value would not be 
known unless the company was shopped. " 1 19 Moreover, Bershad drove a 
tough bargain in negotiating a breakup fee and expense reimbursement 
arrangement that would be sufficient to assure that management's MBO bid 
1 15 .  In re Amsted Indus. Inc Litig. ,  No. CIV.A.8224, 1988 WL 927 36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24 ,  
1 988). 
1 16. For discussions of the difficulties that a court has in evaluating the strength of a case in 
the context of a settlement, see ,  for example, John C. Coffee, Jr. , Understanding the Plaintiff's 
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions , 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. , The Settlement Black 
Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1 257 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: 
Some Problems of judges in Dealing with Class Action Settlements , 163 F.R.D. 369 (1995). 
1 1 7 .  See supra note 109. 
1 1 8.  In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig . .  No. CIV.A. 10598,  1989 WL 258 1 2  (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 22 ,  1989). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See 
id. at * l-*7 . 
1 19. Id. at *6. 
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would remain in place while the company shopped, but not so big as to 
deter other bidders. 1 20 
Here, unlike in Macmillan, Jacobs concluded that the special commit, 
tee could be relied upon. Moreover, the language of his opinion has the 
confidence and clarity that comes from having decided several similar 
cases. 12 1 
But, although the committee performed well ,  the court did not miss 
the opportunity to criticize some features of the structure used. In particu, 
lar, Vice Chancellor Jacobs noted that permitting the CEO to explore the 
company's strategic alternatives when he was actively considering an MBO 
and employing an investment banker with ties to management to represent 
the special committee were inappropriate. The court found that it would 
have been preferable (though not required) to assign the tasks to uncon, 
flicted parties . 
c. Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp. ( 1 989) 
The American Home Shield case , decided in the fall of 1 989, 1 22 shows 
a similar familiarity with accepted approaches by the court, but not yet by 
the parties . Although Chancellor Allen did not grant a preliminary injunc, 
tion, because he believed both that it would not be in the interests of the 
shareholders (for fear that no higher bid would be forthcoming) and that 
120.  For example , negotiations hit a stumbling block with regard to expense reimbursement: 
management's investment banker would not agree to any cap. Again the special committee 
proved its independence: "A press release rejecting the proposal and authorizing Shearson to 
shop the company was prepared and circulated, but ultimately, the investor group relented and 
agreed to a $5.5 million cap on reimbursable expenses. "  I d. at *7 .  
1 2 1 .  Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote: 
[T]his case is not one (as plaintiffs suggest) where an acquisition proposal materializes out 
of nowhere, and unknowledgeable directors are hastily impressed into "special commit­
tee" service, but given no adequate time or resources to discharge their duties. Here , the 
process that eventually resulted in the management LBO proposal began when Glazer 
first surfaced in August, 1 988.  The independent directors, most notably Messrs. Bershad, 
Dunphy, and Cruickshank, were actively and knowledgeably involved in that process 
from that time forward. They carried out their duties in "hands on" fashion, indepen­
dently of Mr. Langone, in their capacities as directors, and later, as the Special Commit­
tee. During that period, those directors had to and did, make certain judgments. And 
while certain of those judgments arguably might be subj ect to criticism, the evidence 
does not support a conclusion that they were made without appropriate due care. 
ld. at * 10.  
122.  Braunschweiger v .  American Home Shield Corp. ,  No. CIV.A. 1075 5 ,  1 98 9 WL 1 285 7 1  
(Del. Ch. Oct. 26,  1989) . 
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monetary damages would be adequate , he harshly criticized the defendants , 
sending a strong signal to them that summary j udgment would not be 
granted and that they faced significant exposure in a full trial : 
There is surely room to litigate the claims asserting that the direc, 
tors , in whose hands consideration of the ServiceMaster proposal was 
placed, failed to inform themselves adequately of what opportunities 
or alternatives were available to the Company if a cash out merger 
was to be negotiated and recommended to the shareholders . . . .  
Here, while there had earlier been inquiry by the Company's man, 
agement of available finance,oriented deals, it is not apparent that 
any serious check was done to uncover potential strategic buyers 
either before announcement of the acceptance of ServiceMaster's 
proposal or after it. 123 
Subsequently, after shareholders approved the transaction, the court 
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment because , the court held, 
defendants ' disclosures to shareholders were insufficient, thereby undermin, 
ing any effect a shareholder vote might have. 124 
d. Restaurant Associates II ( 1 990) 
By 1989, then, the really interesting part of the story is over. The 
norms of conduct for MBOs ,  although not reduced or reducible to a set of 
"safe harbor" rules , nonetheless are sufficiently well mapped out such that 
informed and experienced counsel should know how to guide the board and 
the special committee through an MBO transaction. From the courts' 
perspective, the general norms are pretty clear, even if they have not 
reached all of the parties , especially managers of smaller companies not 
advised by the core group of corporate law firms . Not surprisingly, the 
courts ' view of appropriate behavior evolved over the period during which 
the norms were formulated. This becomes clear when one returns to the 
123 .  Id. at *6. 
1 24.  Additional MBO cases from this period include In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 
No. CIV.A. 10278,  1 988 WL 1 16448 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1 ,  1988) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction), In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litigation, No. CIV.A. 1027 8,  1 990 WL 201 385 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 1 3 ,  1 990) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss); Roberts 11. General Instrument Corp. , 
No. CIV.A. 1 1639, 1 990 WL 1 1 8356 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1 3 ,  1 990) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction); and Norberg 11. Young's Market Co . ,  No. CIV.A. 1 1 208 , 1 1 253 ,  1 989 WL 155462 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 1 9 ,  1 989) (denying motion for preliminary injunction). 
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second act of Restaurant Associates,  125 which had been one of the very 
early MBO cases to result in an opinion. 
To recall briefly, in Restaurant Associates I, 126 the court seemingly 
had been very impressed with the strength and independence of the special 
committee. In the first opinion, the court recounted how the special com, 
mittee, despite obstacles by the managers who controlled forty,eight percent 
of the votes , went so far as to propose dilution of management's votes in 
order to encourage a competing bidder to offer a better deal for share, 
holders . Ultimately, no bid was forthcoming and even management's bid 
was withdrawn after the October 1987 market crash. 
But now, three years later, the court had a more refined sense of appr0' 
priate behavior. The managers and the special committee after the market 
crash promptly renegotiated the price downwards from $ 1 8  per share to 
$ 1 4 . 25 per share. In refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs '  claims against the 
outside directors , the court found fault in the committee's failure to shop 
the company: 
While the special committee has no per se duty to shop the com, 
pany, it did have a duty to proceed reasonably to maximize share, 
holder value. The plaintiffs , in alleging that the special committee 
did not shop the company and agreed to the sale of the company at a 
point in time, immediately following the October 1987 market 
break, when its stock price was particularly depressed {and given 
what preceded that agreement) have alleged circumstances that , if 
true, might support a conclusion that the special committee did not 
act reasonably. 127 
C. What Is the Delaware Standard Governing MBOs ? 
Can the Delaware MBO cases be reduced to a reasonably predictable 
standard or rule ? Can one provide an algorithm to figure out what the 
courts will do? If so, what does it look like? This Article argues that, col, 
lectively, the cases do provide such guidance, but in a distinctive way that 
differs fundamentally from the rule,based view. 
1 2 5 .  Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus. ,  No. CIV.A.92 1 2 ,  1 990 WL 1 35 923 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 2 1 ,  1 990) . The factual account is drawn from the Chancery Court opinion. See id. at 
*2-*3. 
1 26.  Freedman v .  Restaurant Assocs. Indus. ,  No, CIVA.92 1 2 .  1 987 WL 1 4323 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 1 6 , 1 987). 
1 27 .  Freedman, 1990 WL 1 35923,  at *8. 
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Consider a plausible substantive candidate for a rule governing 
MBOs: 128 Managers may buy the company if and only if independent 
directors have auctioned the company and managers submit the highest 
bid. Although a plausible rule, this is clearly not Delaware law. It is clear, 
for example, that the special committee need not auction the company 
before selling the company to management; a post,agreement "market test" 
is sometimes enough. 1 29 Moreover, directors may sometimes sell the com, 
pany for less than the highest bid, if other factors make the lower bid more 
attractive (e.g. , less uncertainty) . 130 Moreover, directors may, under cer, 
tain circumstances, decide not to sell the company at all . 13 1 In other 
words , the submission by managers of the highest bid in an auction of the 
company is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for buying the 
company. 
Now consider the standard as articulated by Vice Chancellor Jacobs in 
the relatively late case of In re Formica Corp. : 132 
In any transaction where corporate management seeks to acquire the 
equity interest owned by the public shareholders , a conflict of inter, 
est is inherent. Management's personal motivation as a potential 
buyer is to pay as little as possible. Management's duty as a fiduciary 
is to obtain the highest available value for the stockholders. See 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. , Del. Supr. , 506 
A.2d 1 73 (1 986); In Re: Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholders Litig. , 
Del. Ch. , C.A. No. 9844, Allen, C. (October 2 1 ,  1 988) . Because of 
that inherent conflict, the respons ibility to represent the share, 
holders' interests adequately falls upon the independent directors, 
who must exercise the utmost good faith and the appropriate degree 
of care to assure "the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary prin, 
ciples of fairness in the conduct of an auction for the sale of the 
corporate enterprise. " Mills Acquisition, Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. , 
128 .  Another plausible candidate would be per se prohibition, as advocated by Brudney and 
Chirelstein. See supra note 26. fu the cases show, that is clearly not the rule that developed in 
Delaware. 
1 29.  See, e.g. , In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig.,  No. CIV.A. 10598, 1 989 WL 258 1 2  
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2 2 ,  1989); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig . ,  No. CIV.A.999 1 ,  1988 
WL 83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1 988). 
1 30. See, e.g. , In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. ,  No. CIV.A. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 9 (Feb. 14 ,  1 989); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J .P.  Stevens & 
Co. Shareholders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1 988) . 
1 3 1 .  Paramount Communications, Inc. v .  Time Inc. ,  57 1 A.2d 1 1 40 (Del. 1 990) . 
132 .  Formica, 1989 WL 25812 .  
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Del. Supr. , Nos. 4 1 5  and 4 16 ,  Consol . ,  Moore, J. (Bench Ruling, 
Nov. 2 ,  1988, Opinion Pending) . 133 
This summary, while on its face vague, is reasonably clear to those 
who have read the underlying cases , including those specifically cited. In 
conjunction with those cases, it provides substantial guidance on how to 
structure a management buyout transaction. A special committee should 
be established to negotiate with management and third parties. The special 
committee should retain its own investment bankers and legal counsel. In 
establishing the special committee, counsel should make sure that the 
managers do not appoint the members or their investment banker. The 
special committee should issue a press release announcing that management 
has made a bid and should be forthcoming in providing information to 
prospective bidders for control . If third parties enter the contest ,  the spe, 
cial committee should behave in an evenhanded manner and should not 
favor the management group. In any event, the special committee should 
test the market, although it need not conduct an auction, to see if compet, 
ing offers are reasonably likely to be available. 
Jacobs' summary is a summary, not a standard. The narratives are not 
the scaffolding-the investigative process-by which the norm is con, 
structed, which can then be jettisoned once the standard is formed and 
articulated. On the contrary, the articulated "standard" does nothing more 
than stand in for the cases: The narratives it summarizes are the content of 
the norm. 134 In the application of the standard-at least by a court, if not 
by the actor himself-the narratives become critical in characterizing the 
new fact pattern and extending the legal norm to a new situation. 
Indeed, this interpretation is the only way to explain the coexistence 
of the typically open,textured and extremely vague statement of the legal 
norm under Delaware law (in an MBO, " independent directors , . . .  must 
exercise the utmost good faith and the appropriate degree of care to assure 
'the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary principles of fairness in the 
conduct of an auction for the sale of the corporate enterprise"') 135 and the 
reasonable predictability of Delaware outcomes that is essential to business 
planners . It is only if the statement is a summary that stands in for the set 
133 .  Id. at * 10. 
1 34.  This view of Delaware fiduciary duty law is consistent with (but does not require) the 
more general claim that standards can only be articulated through narrative. 
135 .  Formica, 1 989 WL 258 1 2 ,  at * 1 0  (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. ,  
559 A.2d 1 261 , 1 285 (Del. 1 989)). 
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of cases that constitute the norm-with the guidance being provided by 
those cases , with all their factual specificity-that there could be sufficient 
certainty. 
Confusion emerges in several situations: First, when there are too few 
cases from which to triangulate the norm; second, when a player confuses 
the summary with the constitutive narratives ; third, when a player inter, 
prets the cases as establishing a substantive safe harbor, rather than 
explicating a conduct norm. 
D. Summary 
The preceding study of the Delaware MBO cases shows that the stan, 
dards governing MBOs evolved through the incremental description of 
good and bad performances by managers . The overall doctrinal structure 
was unchanged throughout: From the beginning to the end, cases were 
analyzed either under the rubric of the "business j udgment rule" or the 
"entire fairness standard, "  with an occasional reference to the intermediate 
Unocal test. At no point does the court ever say: "This is how you must do 
MBOs."  Nor does the court ever say, " If you do MBOs this way, then we 
will leave you alone. "  
It is arguable that this fact,intensive, heavily normative narrative style 
is characteristic of all common law adj udication. It is likewise arguable that 
this style is , at least, characteristic of all standards. At the least, this seems 
to be the characteristic style of Delaware fiduciary duty case law. 
This descriptive claim raises further questions. First, how do the narra, 
tives reach their ultimate audience, and in what form do they do so? This 
is the subject of the next Part. Second, if I am right as a descriptive mat, 
ter, what are the implications for corporate law? That is the subj ect of Part 
IV. 
I I .  TRACES OF THE TRANSMISSION OF NORMS: THE CASE OF MBOs 
The central hypothesis of this Article is that a large part of what the 
Delaware courts do is tell stories as a way of articulating and expressing 
norms , as a way of giving content to the amorphous and highly contextual 
concepts of "good faith,"  " independence , "  "due care, " and "fair dealing. " 
If this is correct, then one would predict that these stories would make 
their way out into the relevant community. There are two primary hypoth, 
eses for how the norms might be transmitted. First, the stories themselves 
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might be transmitted directly to the target audience (directors and officers) , 
either in detail or in summary form. Second, the stories may be digested by 
an intermediary, Delaware corporate lawyers , who then apply the norms 
without actually telling the stories to the clients. 136 In this Part, I exam, 
ine some of the evidence of the public and semipublic manifestations of the 
transmissions of norms. I find some evidence of both sorts of mechanisms 
at work. This evidence is drawn from a number of genres , including the 
community's newspapers , the Wall Street Journal and the New York Law 
Journal, Delaware j udges' extrajudicial speeches and articles , and finally a 
popular but l ittle studied genre of legal literature, the "memoranda to our 
clients" sent by leading law firms to their clients. 
A. Newspaper Accounts 
As one would expect, Delaware cases are covered by the maj or busi, 
ness press . With regard to the MBO cases , one finds that although the 
early and minor cases receive no more than passing mention, 137 the 
maj or , high,profile cases generate substantial coverage that focuses on what 
one would expect a priori , the dramatic clash of egos and the emergence of 
heroes and especially villains. 138 In these articles, one finds the broad, 
casting of the stories told by the Delaware opinions, pitched at a somewhat 
higher rhetorical level and with supplemental reporting. 
1 36. A failure to discover any evidence of transmission of these stories is therefore ambigu­
ous. One explanation of such a lack of evidence would be that, while my hypothesis might be 
correct as a description of what the Delaware courts do, there has been a breakdown in communi­
cation that results in the stories not being transmitted to their intended audience. Secondly, it 
could be that counsel digests the stories and transmits advice, but not the stories. Finally, my 
hypotheses for how Delaware corporate law works may be incorrect. 
1 3 7 .  See, e.g. , Formica Corp. ,  WALL ST. J . ,  Apr. 14 ,  1 989, at C 1 5 ;  Formica Corp. :  Data Has 
Been Received by 15 Interested Parties , WALL ST. ] . ,  Mar. 1 6 ,  1 989, at Cl3 ;  Formica Corp. Enters 
Confidentiality Pacts with Third Parties, WALL ST. ] . ,  Feb. 23 ,  1 989, at A6; Formica Corp. : Potential 
Bidders Total 70; 7 Sign Confidentiality Pacts, WALL ST. ] . ,  Feb. 2 7 ,  1 989, at A4; ServiceMaster 
LP. ,  WALL ST. ] . ,  Apr. 25 ,  1 989, at B4. 
1 38 .  See, e .g. , Crossen & Blumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal, supra note 1 0 1 , at  B 1 ;  John 
Helyar & Bryan Burrough, The R]R Nabisco Takeover-Buy-Out Bluff: How Underdog KKR Won 
R]R Nabisco Without Highest Bid, WALL ST. J . ,  Dec. 2 ,  1 988,  at A 1 ;  Hilder, supra note 10 1 ,  
at C1 . 
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1 .  The Early Cases 
Of the early cases , the two that received the most attention were Becor 
Westem139 and ]. P. Stevens . 140 In Becor Western, management's MBO 
bid was reported on February 1 8 ,  1987 , putting the world on notice that 
Becor was in play. 1 4 1 By June 1987 , the Journal reported that " [i]n the 
past five months, no fewer than five bids have been made for Becor. 11 142 
Management's bid, according to analysts quoted in the article, "was gener, 
ally perceived to be low. 11 143 And, according to an arbitrager quoted, 
"Management was trying to steal the company for bottom dollar, and with 
the amount of exposure these deals have caused, they won't be able 
to. 11 144 Subsequent coverage by the Journal showed the board acting as an 
auctioneer, 145 and ultimately accepting management's bid. 146 The only 
significant mention of the Delaware courts came in the report of the com, 
pletion of the takeover by the management bid , which was conditioned on 
the settlement of the class action shareholder suit in the Delaware 
Chancery Court. 147 
The battle for J .P .  Stevens , which involved an active bidding contest 
for a larger, better,known company with prices escalating sharply, com, 
139 .  Shingala v.  Becor Western Inc . ,  No. CIV.A.885 8,  1 988 WL 7 390 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3 ,  
1 988) . 
1 40. In re J.P.  Stevens Shareholder Litig . ,  542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1 988). National Medical 
Care and Shoe, Town were also covered. See National Medical Care Holder Sues to Block Company 's 
Purchase, WALL ST. J . ,  Aug. 2 2 ,  1984, at 33 ;  Shoe-Town Inc. : Court Declines to Block Acquisition 
by Managers, WALL ST. J . ,  Jan. 20, 1 988, at 7 .  
1 4 1 .  Alex Kotlowitz, Becor Western Buyout to Total $238. 1 Million, WALL ST. J . ,  Feb. 18 ,  
1 987 , at  16 .  
1 42. Michael J.  McCarthy, Becor Western's Cash Stockpil.e Helps Lure Would-Be Acquirers 
Offering Creative Deals, WALL ST. ]. , June 26,  1 987 , at 45 . 
143.  Id. 
1 44 .  Id. 
1 45 .  See, e.g. , Becor Slates July 9 as Bid Deadline, Sets Valuation Guidelines, WALL ST. J . ,  June 
29,  1 987 , at 10; Becor Western Board to Study Latest Bids at Meeting Thursday , WALL ST. J . ,  July 
1 3 ,  1987 , at 1 2 .  
146. See Becor Western Inc. Accepts Bid by Group Led by Management, WALL ST. J . ,  July 20, 
1987 , at 9 .  
147 .  B-E Holdings Buys Concern, WALL ST. J . ,  Feb. 5 ,  1 988,  availabl.e in 1 988 WL 48 1 17 6. 
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manded more attention. But again the proceedings in the Delaware courts 
did not figure prominently in the press reports. There was passing mention 
of the litigation accusing the directors of breaching their fiduciary duties (in 
agreeing to sell the company to Odyssey Partners) and seeking to block the 
merger and force the company to tum over confidential information to 
other bidders. 148 Such references, however, were vastly overshadowed by 
the corporate maneuvering. 
2 .  The Formative Cases 
By contrast, the opinions of the Delaware courts figure much more 
prominently in the formative cases of Macmillan , Fort Howard, and R]R 
Nabisco. 
a. Macmillan 
Here , not only did the Journal report the scheduling of potentially 
determinative hearings , 149 the Journal also found Vice Chancellor Jacob's 
view of the actors ' behavior to be newsworthy: 
In granting the restraining order, Judge Jacobs bluntly described the 
impact the plan could have on shareholders. If the plan were found 
to be a breach of directors ' fiduciary duty, it would cause "irreparable 
damage to Macmillan shareholders, " he said. Not only would the 
restructuring change the company's capital and corporate structure, 
he wrote, it "would adversely affect the quality of the shareholders ' 
investment and prevent or drastically reduce {their) opportunity to 
realize greater value for their shares than is being afforded by the 
restructuring . . . .  " Noting the judge's terms , two persons in the 
Macmillan camp were downbeat. Said one: "The flavor of the order 
was more negative than we would have liked. " 150 
But still the account pays little attention to the details of the story Jacobs 
told, as opposed to the effect and tone of his decision. 15 1 
1 48.  See, e.g. , Ed Bean, PeppereU Ufts Bid for Stevens to $ 1 . 1 4 BiUion, WALL ST. J . ,  Mar. 25 , 
1 988, at 4; PeppereU Begins $ 1 . 1 1  BiUion Offer For ].P. Stevens, WALL ST. J . ,  Mar . 28 ,  1 988,  at 20. 
1 49. See, e.g. , Hearing to Reopen Today on MacmiUan Revamping, WALL ST. J . ,  June 10,  1 988,  
at 29 ("A vice chancellor in the Delaware Chancery Court will reconvene a hearing at 1 0  a.m. 
EDT today to decide whether Macmillan Inc.'s restructuring should be halted.") .  
1 50. Johnnie L. Roberts, MacmiUan's Bid to Restructure is Dealt Setback, WALL ST. J . ,  June 1 3 ,  
1 988, a t  22 .  
1 5 1 .  See Crossen & Blumenthal, MacmiUan, Inc. , supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 20 (" [i]n a sometimes 
harshly worded decision"). 
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It was only after the shooting was over that a more detailed account 
was presented of the Macmillan story. Thus, in the wake of the Delaware 
Supreme Court' s  opinions that invalidated the board's attempt to favor the 
management group, the Journal gave a fuller account of the whole story, 
tracking the narrative given by the Delaware courts. 152 The Journal, like 
the courts , vilified " Edward P. Evans , Macmillan's proud and stubborn 
chairman and chief executive officer. " 153 
The Delaware courts' criticism of Bruce Wasserstein, management's 
investment banker, likewise found its way into a front page article. 154 
Here , the reporters focused on both the courts ' criticism of the opinion 
Wasserstein gave that Maxwell's bid was inadequate, 155 and Wasserstein's 
handling of the final bidding contest in which Evans tipped KKR. 
b. R]R Nabisco 
The battle for RJR Nabisco-the biggest LBO of all time-of course 
received the most press attention, yielding countless articles and a book. 
But in these accounts , the focus shifted to the special committee's striking 
independence from the management group . 156 This same perspective was 
also reflected in the book that the Journal reporters subsequently wrote. 157 
3 .  Summary 
The Wall Street Journal accounts , then, focus primarily on those few, 
high,profile deals that are newsworthy. Moreover, the Journal seems to play 
a prominent role in broadcasting the stories only in those few cases when a 
judge actually stops a deal or threatens to stop it. The nuances of critical 
judicial commentary unaccompanied by an injunction are lost. But when 
the Journal does get interested, as in the Macmillan or R]R Nabisco cases , its 
prominence and additional reporting amplify the volume of criticism from 
the Delaware court. As one experienced Wall Street transactional lawyer 
1 5 2 .  See, e.g. , Crossen & Blumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at  B l .  
153 .  Id. Indeed, Evans is allowed to hang himself: "[Evans] contends that the maneuvers 
were meant only to protect shareholders. He also maintains that he has been more a hapless 
victim than an active player in the struggle. 'I didn't mean to do it, '  he says. 'It was more or 
less done to me. ' "  I d. 
154.  See Hilder, supra note 101 ,  at Cl.  
155 .  "The valuations were 'obviously intended to accord with management's restructuring , '  
the court said ."  Id. 
156.  See, e.g. , Helyar & Burrough, supra note 138,  at Al. 
1 5 7 .  BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 1 1 1 .  
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put it in private conversation, "We 're not afraid of what the Delaware 
courts say. We're afraid of what the press says . "  
B. Extrajudicial Utterances 
Some Delaware judges give speeches and appear on panels. This pro� 
vides an additional platform from which to summarize and promulgate 
standards of conduct for members of the corporate bar and their clients . A 
good example of this, in the context of MBOs, is Chancellor William T. 
Allen's Business Lawyer article , Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: 
Are They Fact or Fantasy?, a slight revision of a speech previously delivered 
at the University of California, San Diego, Seventeenth Annual Securities 
Regulation Institute. 158 
The tone of the article is captured by an early paragraph: 
I remain open to the possibility that [special] committees can be 
employed effectively to protect corporate and shareholder interests. 
But I must confess a painful awareness of the ways in which the 
device may be subverted and rendered less than useful. I conclude, 
as well, that it is the lawyers and the investment bankers who in 
many cases hold the key to the effectiveness of the special com� 
mittee. 159 
To elaborate this view, Allen relied on a contrast between those com� 
mittees that performed badly, such as in Macmillan (quoting the "torpid, if 
not supine" phrase from the Delaware Supreme Court opinion and the 
"little more than a charade" language from the chancery court opinion) , 
and those that performed well, citing RJR Nabisco as well as Restaurant 
Associates. 160 And, moreover, in focusing on these cases , with which 
many in his audience (both in San Diego and those reading the article) 
were familiar, he recalled , in summary form, the critical details. 
If it is possible that special committees can perform well ,  what, asked 
Allen, distinguishes those that act well from those that act badly? 16 1 
158 .  William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 
45 Bus. LAW. 2055 ( 1990). 
159.  Id. at 2056. 
160. Id. at 2059-60. 
1 6 1 .  Id. at 2060. 
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Here, in what can be read as an attempt to exhort the corporate bar to 
counsel virtue,  Allen argued that the duties of members of the special 
committee in these transactions were radically transformed, and that 
[w}hen special committees have appeared to push and resist their 
colleagues, it has been . . .  because the men and women who com� 
prised the committee have understood that as a result of accepting 
this special assignment , they have a new duty and stand in a new 
and different relationship to the firm's management or its controlling 
shareholder. 162 
The lawyers and investment bankers, Allen argued, hold the key to estab� 
lishing the integrity of the process. 
Just so the audience would not miss the message, Allen made clear 
that 
much, of course, will tum on the court's evaluation of the integrity 
of the special committee's process . In reaching that evaluation, the 
court will be mindful-and the lawyers advising the committee need 
to be mindful as well-that the committee, if respected, holds the 
shareholders ' welfare in its hands; the court will be mindful that 
claims of so�called structural bias in the process are plausible; and, 
that the court 's own power of perception is limited. 163 
Moreover, 
this is not a call to pay even greater attention to appearances; it ts 
advice to abandon the theatrical and to accept and to implement the 
substance of an arm's�length process . To do this, the lawyers and 
the bankers must be independent of management. They must accept 
in their hearts that in the MBO or the auction context, their client 
is the committee and not management. They must clearly and 
emphatically remind their client that, at this juncture, the CEO and 
his associates are to be treated at arm's�length. And the lawyers and 
bankers must act on that view. That means that from the outset, 
the advisors must be prepared to forego future business. It comes to 
that. 164 
162 .  Id. at 2061 .  
163 .  Id. at 2062. 
1 64. Id. 
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Here, then, is a relatively explicit attempt-delivered from the podium 
rather than the bench-to induce better behavior by managers . 1 65 On 
this view, to be a moral director is to walk with the shareholders. 
C. "A Memorandum to Our Clients" 
If my hypothesis is correct, one would predict that the stories of the 
Delaware courts would find their way into the communications between 
lawyers and their clients. The best evidence of this would be the actual 
advice that lawyers give their clients, but such evidence is generally not 
available. 166 
An indirect record of such communication is the relatively well, 
known, but little,studied legal genre , the "memorandum to our clients , "  
that prominent firms use to keep their clients apprised of changes in the 
law (and, of course, to market their services) . In connection with this 
project, I have collected such materials from the relevant time period 
( 1 980- 1 990) from Wachtell ,  Lipton, Rosen and Katz , Sullivan and 
Cromwell , and Skadden, Arps, Slate , Meagher and Flom, three firms that 
had active takeover practices during that period. Only the Wachtell 
Lipton memoranda provide any detailed discussion of the duty of indepen, 
dent directors in an MBO transaction. Why neither of the other firms 
seems to have summarized and distributed such advice widely awaits further 
research. 
The materials from Wachtell Lipton are consistent with my hypothesis 
but provide relatively little direct support. In the course of the 1 980s , as 
MBOs became more prominent and as more cases on MBOs arose, one 
finds two types of memoranda in the files. One such memorandum is "The 
LBO White Knight, "  167 in which Martin Lipton addresses MBOs briefly 
in the course of a discussion of the suggestion that directors must conduct 
an auction once a company is for sale. Lipton argues that auctions are 
often not the best way to maximize shareholder value, and therefore it 
1 65 .  Delaware judges also, of course, address other issues when making public addresses. 
Thus, Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II, in The 1 980s-Did We Save the Stockholders While the 
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277 (1992), looked back on the takeover decade with a 
mixture of skepticism with regard to the economic benefits, and with pride with respect to the 
role the Delaware Supreme Court played in constraining what he viewed as abusive behavior. 
1 66 .  It is not available-in part because it is protected by the attorney-client privilege, and in 
part because the parties generally have additional reasons for not disclosing it. But that is not to 
say that it is totally inaccessible. In a companion project, still in its preliminary stages, Michael 
Useem and I will try to gather more direct evidence through structured interviews with lawyers 
and directors. See supra note 19. 
167. Martin Lipton, In Defense of White Knight LBOs, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1 8 ,  1 986, at 1 .  
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would be foolish to mandate them. He notes that the decisions he 
discusses-Revlon, Hanson, and Fruehauf-may have been " influenced by 
the fact that management of the target had an equity participation in the 
LB0. " 168 But, he argues , this is true with respect to almost every LBO, 
and management' s  equity participation should not create a special standard 
for LBOs. Instead, 
[w]hile one must recognize the skepticism of the courts with respect 
to lock,up of an LBO that management originates and participates in, 
those doubts should not exist where the LBO is in response to an 
unsolicited bid . . . .  Any possible detriment to shareholders arising 
from management participation is overwhelmingly counterbalanced 
by the benefit of a higher bid.169 
In contrast to Lipton's  short, policy,oriented discussion of LBOs , 
W achtell Lipton also prepared and circulated a much longer, much more 
complete treatment , which was eventually published in various PLI vol, 
umes . Barry Bryer and Craig Wasserman, two partners at Wachtell Lipton, 
prepared a long memo originally entitled "Representing a Public Company 
in a Leveraged Buyout Transaction: An Update, " 1 70 and eventually evolv, 
ing to "Management Buyouts and the Duties of Independent Direc, 
tors . " 1 7 1  
Thus , in their early memo, written before many of the MBO cases 
were decided, and relying on extensions from the cases governing parent, 
subsidiary freeze,out mergers, Bryer and Wasserman provided a long and 
detailed discussion of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 172 including concise sum, 
maries of the court's narrative, as well as similar discussions of other freeze, 
out cases. They then turned to the then existing major MBO cases: Revlon, 
from Delaware, SCM, from the Second Circuit, and Fruehauf, from the 
Sixth Circuit. In the later memos, the earlier treatments were largely pre, 
served, but supplemented with fairly complete accounts of the cases directly 
addressing MBOs. The result is a memo that is sixty,six pages long, single 
spaced. 
From an academic perspective , reading these memos is very hard 
going. Although the discussions of legal doctrine are extremely sophisti, 
168 .  Id. at 9. 
169. Id. at 1 0- 1 1 .  
1 70. Barry A. Bryer & Craig M. Wasserman, Representing a Public Company in a Leveraged 
Buyout Transaction: An Update (Dec. 9, 1986) (on file with author) . 
17 1 .  BARRY A. BRYER ET AL., MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS AND THE DUTIES OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS (1989) . 
1 7 2 .  457 A.2d 701  (Del. 1983). 
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cated , the memoranda are filled with enormous factual detail about the 
cases . Compared to more academic discussions, 173 the case discussions 
seem only partly digested: one finds only summaries of the factual back, 
ground without the synthesis that makes such case,by,case presentation 
unnecessary. 
But the fact that the most sophisticated practitioners writing for 
sophisticated clients and practitioners present Delaware law in this way 
reflects a recognition-intuitively obvious to practicing lawyers , perhaps less 
obvious to those of us who spend our time responding to student requests 
for the "rule"-that the guidance resides in those specific factual accounts , 
and that summarizing the factual discussion is close to the l imit of how far 
one can go to reduce the cases to a "rule. "  Clients are no less insistent 
than students in demanding clarity. The difference is that practitioners 
suffer a greater penalty than academics for giving in to the desire to provide 
clarity at the sacrifice of accuracy. 
Ill . SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A NORMATIVE/NARRATIVE THEORY 
A. Missing the Point of Delaware "Law":  Viacom v. QVC 
What difference does it make if you think of Delaware law as a set of 
instructive tales of good and bad managers , as opposed to a set of substan, 
tive rules ? The answer is that it can make all the difference in the world. 
A comparison of the Tirne,Wamer174 and ParamountNiacom v. QVC175 
cases provides striking evidence for the generality of my normative/narra, 
tive view of Delaware fiduciary duty law. At the same time, this compari, 
son provides an interesting example of the intersection of law office 
practice, commentary in the trade press , and j udicial opinions , s imilar to 
what occurred in the development of the standards governing MBOs. 
During the takeover battles of the 1 980s , a hotly contested question 
arose whether a corporation faced with an all,cash, all,share tender offer 
could refuse to withdraw a poison pill and "just say no" to the bidder. In 
the Interco case , 176 Chancellor Allen, applying the Unocal standard, 
1 73 .  See, e.g. , Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law 
After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW. 
1593 (1994); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 22 .  
174.  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,  57 1 A.2d 1 1 40 (Del. 1 990). 
1 75 .  Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. ,  637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1 994). 
1 76. City Capital Assocs. L.P.  v. Interco Inc.,  55 1 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). The factual 
account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at 79 1 -94. 
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ordered the removal of a "poison pill" preferred rights plan. Allen held 
that when the only "threat" facing shareholders came from a noncoercive 
(all, cash, all,share) tender offer , the board could not leave the pill in place 
to force shareholders to accept an alternative management,recommended 
restructuring of approximately the same value, even if one assumed that the 
board believed in good faith and after prudent investigation that the 
management,sponsored restructuring was superior. Many read Interco as 
casting doubt on the "just,say,no" defense. 177 That case, which became 
moot after the Delaware Supreme Court had accepted an interlocutory 
appeal , 178 provoked a substantial amount of criticism. 179 As of 1 989 ,  the 
supreme court had not addressed the question. 
Then, in 1989, Time Inc. and W amer Communications announced a 
stock,for,stock merger. 180 Soon, however, the Time, W amer merger faced 
a "threat. " Two weeks before the annual shareholders' meeting at which 
the Time shareholders would vote on the merger, Paramount announced a 
$ 17 5 per share all,cash all,share tender offer for Time, a substantial pre, 
mium over both the market price of $ 1 03-$ 1 1 3 prior to the announcement 
of the proposed Time, Warner merger and the post,announcement market 
price of $ 1 05-$ 1 22.  Paramount's bid was conditioned on, inter alia, the 
termination of the Time, Warner merger agreement, financing, and the 
removal of Time's poison pill , as well as a number of other "defensive" 
measures . 1 8 1  
In response to Paramount's offer, Time and Warner, obviously worried 
that Paramount's bid would lead Time shareholders to reject the Time, 
Warner merger in order to be able to accept Paramount's offer, renegotiated 
the transaction and replaced the merger with a debt,financed cash tender 
offer by Time for the shares of Warner. Because bidding firm shareholders 
have no right or occasion to vote on a tender offer, this restructuring elimi, 
1 77 .  See . e.g. , Theodore N. Mirvis, 'Time/Warner':  Delaware Supreme Court Speaks , N.Y.L.J . ,  
Mar. 29, 1990, at  5 ,  6. 
178 .  Interco Inc. v. City Capital Assocs. L.P. ,  556 A.2d 1070 (Del. Ch. 1988) (unpublished 
table decision). 
1 79 .  See, e.g. , Laurie P. Cohen, Lipton Tells Clients That Delaware May Not Be a Place to 
Incorporate, WALL ST. J . ,  Nov. 1 1 ,  1988, at B7 (discussing Martin Lipton's memorandum to 
clients recorrunending reincorporation in other states if the Interco decision was not reversed). 
180 .  Under the original plan, Warner shareholders would end up with about 62% of the 
corrunon stock of the merged entity, with the Time shareholders receiving the remainder. In 
terms of market capitalization and 1988 net income, Warner was the larger of the two companies. 
1 8 1 .  The factual account is taken from the chancery court opinion, see Paramount 
Corrununications Inc. v. Time Inc . ,  No. CIV.A. 10866, 1989 WL 79880, at *2-* 1 7  (Del. Ch. 
July 1 4 , 1989), and the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, see Paramount Corrununications, Inc. 
v. Time Inc. ,  57 1 A.2d 1 1 40, 1 1 43-49 (Del. 1990). See also Mirvis, supra note 177 .  
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nated the problematic vote by Time's shareholders. Paramount and Time 
shareholders sought an injunction restraining Time from purchasing 
Warner shares pursuant to its tender offer. 
In the chancery court, Chancellor Allen denied the plaintiffs ' motion 
for a preliminary injunction. 182 Plaintiffs appealed to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the chancellor's holding but on broader 
grounds . According to Justice Horsey, plaintiffs' "Revlon claim" fails 
because of " the absence of any substantial evidence to conclude that Time's 
board, in negotiating with Warner, made the dissolution or breakup of the 
corporate entity inevitable, as was the case in Revlon." 183 According to 
Horsey, "Revlon duties" are only triggered when " a  corporation initiates an 
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganiza, 
tion involving a clear break,up of the company . . . .  Revlon duties may also 
be triggered where , in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its 
long,term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the 
breakup of the company. " 184 Thus , because the Time board's reaction to 
the Paramount bid was only a defensive response and "not an abandonment 
1 82 .  The chancellor rejected plaintiffs' claim that the original merger agreement, that, plain­
tiffs claimed, would transfer control of Time to Warner's shareholders, put Time into a "Revlon 
mode" with the obligation to maximize present share value. Time Inc. , 1 989 WL 79880 , at *24. 
The chancellor held that when, as in the case of Time and Warner, both companies were widely 
held public corporations, a stock-for-stock merger left corporate control unaffected: "Control of 
both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market." Id. at *55.  
The chancellor also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Time board had a duty to give 
shareholders a choice with respect to whether the corporation should be sold. First, the chancel­
lor held that recasting the transaction to avoid a shareholder vote breached no duties because 
Delaware law did not afford a shareholder vote in the original transaction. Because the original 
Time-Warner merger was a triangular merger in which Warner and a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Time would merge, the Delaware General Corporation Law, section 25 1 ,  did not grant the share­
holders of Time a vote; only the shareholders of the Time subsidiary were required to approve the 
merger, but, as those votes were held by Time, Time's board had the right to vote them. Time 
shareholders' right to vote on the original transaction arose only because of a New York Stock 
Exchange rule. Finally, interpreting Unocal, the chancellor rejected plaintiffs' claim that the 
Warner tender offer was a disproportionate response to a noncoercive Paramount offer that did 
not threaten a cognizable injury to Time or its shareholders. Rather, although the restructuring 
of the transaction was "reactive in important respects (and thus must withstand a Unocal analy­
sis) ,"  id. at *68, the Chancellor held that the restructuring was a reasonable response to the 
threat posed by the Paramount bid to the realization of Time's major strategic plan. 
183 .  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,  57 1 A.2d 1 140, 1 150 (Del. 1 990). Like 
the chancery court opinion, the supreme court's opinion opened with a long account of the Time 
board's behavior in planning and executing the merger with Warner. Justice Horsey then 
rejected Chancellor Allen's formulation of the Revlon question as a choice between short-term 
and long-term strategy, and rejected his reliance on the fact that control, both before and after 
the merger , remained in the market. Id. at 1 150-5 1 .  
184. Id. at 1 150. 
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of the corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered, 
though Unocal duties attach. " 185 
With respect to the analysis under Unocal, Justice Horsey held that the 
first part of the Unocal test-the requirement that "reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed"-was 
satisfied by the directors ' showing of good faith and reasonable investiga; 
tion. 186 But Justice Horsey went somewhat farther, emphasizing that "we 
have repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport 
with a valid exercise of a board's business judgment. " 187 Justice Horsey 
then reached out to reject Chancellor Allen's suggestion in Interco that an 
all;cash, all;shares offer, fall ing within a range of values that a shareholder 
might reasonably prefer, "cannot constitute a legally recognized ' threat' to 
shareholder interests sufficient to withstand a Unocal analysis . "  1 88 In con; 
trast to the chancellor's opinion, Justice Horsey construed the threat of the 
Paramount offer more broadly, noting that Time shareholders might be 
confused by the Paramount offer or might not fully understand the impact 
of Paramount's conditions , and that the timing of the Paramount offer to 
follow issuance of Time's proxy notice could reasonably be viewed to upset, 
if not confuse, the Time stockholders' vote. 189 
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Time;Wamer was widely 
viewed as the complete undermining of Revlon and as an endorsement of 
the "just;say;no" defense. In an early article in the National Law Journal, 
Robert Todd Lang, co;managing partner of New York's Weil, Gotshal and 
Manges, which represented a Warner investment banker, was quoted as 
saying that " 'Although the Supreme Court still hasn't given corporate 
boards the unlimited right to 'just say no' to hostile bidders , the opinion 
gives boards the power to say 'no' if they have good business reasons for 
refusing to negotiate or to consider an unsolicited offer. "1 190 
In an article also published in the National Law Journal, leading take; 
over lawyers at the Skadden, Arps , Slate, Meagher and Flom firm, James C. 
Freund and Rodman Ward, Jr. , read Time,Wamer broadly. According to 
their analysis, Time,Wamer's narrow interpretation of Revlon rendered the 
doctrine almost irrelevant: 
185 .  Id. at 1 150-5 1 .  
186. Id. at 1 15 2 .  
1 8 7 .  Id. 
188 .  Id. 
189. ld. at 1 15 3 .  
190 .  Sherry R. Sontag, Time May Create Broad Takeover Defense, NAT'L L.J . ,  Mar. 1 2 ,  1 990, 
at 14 .  
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Time slips a safety latch onto the Revlon trigger. According to the 
court, corporate reorganizations that don't bust up the company 
don't give rise to Revlon duties to maximize immediate shareholder 
value. Such duties arise only with "an active bidding process seeking 
to sell" the company or an effort "to effect a business reorganization 
involving a clear break,up of the company. " 
The company most likely to end up in the Revlon soup is one 
which, like Revlon itself, would "abandon its long,term strategy and 
seek an alternative transaction . . .  involving the break,up of the 
company"-a course of action which is so far "out" as to be barely 
discernible on the horizon, because it may be just about the only 
thing that could involuntarily trigger an auction. 191 
With respect to the j ust,say,no defense, Freund and Ward state: 
The "just say no" defense is definitely looking better and better. 
While not explicitly endorsing the tactic (which wasn't at issue in 
the case) , the Time court's strong support of the business-judgment 
rule and its reluctance to intervene in the board's management of 
the company provide genuine muscle to directors ' efforts in resisting 
a takeover. After all, the Supreme Court came right out and said 
that, "absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon , 
a board of directors . . .  is not under any per se duty to maximize 
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a 
takeover. " 192 
Similarly, Theodore Mirvis , a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz who writes often in the New Y ark Law Journal, read the Delaware 
Supreme Court's decision as "an undeniable endorsement of 'Just Say No' 
where the decision not to redeem the pill is made in good faith and on an 
informed basis. " 193 The supreme court's rej ection of the chancery court' s  
decisions in Interco and Pillsbury, "which cast doubt on a board of directors' 
right to 'Just Say No' by refusing to redeem a poison pill rights plan in the 
face of an all,cash, all,shares premium tender offer , "  was , for Mirvis,  a 
strong endorsement of the defense. 194 Mirvis read the court as holding 
that directors need not abandon corporate business plans when a bid is 
1 9 1 .  James C. Freund & Rodman Ward, Jr., What's 'In, ' 'Out' in Takeovers in Wake of 
Paramount v. Time, NAT'L L.J . ,  Mar. 26, 1990, at 22 ,  23 .  
192.  Id. at 25 .  
1 93 .  Mirvis, supra note 1 7 7 ,  a t  6. 
194. Id. at 5. 
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received '"unless there i s  clearly no basis to sustain the corporate stra, 
tegy. "1 1 95 The message for directors , according to Mirvis , is that 
[d] irectors ' identification of threats will be upheld provided only that 
the board identifies the threat in good faith and with reasonable 
investigation; the risk that the stockholders will mistakenly not 
appreciate the company's long,term value is an approved form of 
threat, and the directors do not have to negotiate with a bidder 
before acting on the basis that the bid is too low. 
Directors' responses will not be held to be unreasonable even 
though they preclude stockholder choice and an immediate control 
premium. Defense can be effective. 196 
Moreover, as Mirvis pointed out, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed 
to rej ect explicitly the notion that a firm could unwittingly find itself in 
"Revlon,land. " 197 Rather, the Revlon duty to maximize current share, 
holder value is implicated only when a corporation itself initiates a bidding 
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a reorganization involving a clear 
breakup of the company, or when a corporation, acting in response to a 
bid, abandons its long,term sti ategy and pursues an alternative involving 
the breakup of the company. 198 
Finally, in extraj udicial statements, Justice Andrew Moore, a j ustice of 
the Delaware Supreme Court and a member of the panel that decided Time, 
Warner, seemed to state explicitly that Time,Wamer validated the j ust,say, 
no defense. 199 
Thus, post-Time,Wamer, one could be excused for concluding that the 
"rule" in Delaware was that a board of directors could "just say no" to an 
unwelcome tender offer, and that Revlon, once a major feature of the doc, 
trinal landscape, was now confined to its facts and need never apply unless 
the target board chose to trigger it. 
But as Paramount, the loser in the Time,Wamer case, was to discover 
to its surprise,  reading Delaware cases as establishing "rules " is a deeply 
misleading and dangerous approach. Beginning in 1 983 , Paramount (then 
known as Gulf & Western) began to transform itself from a diffuse con, 
195 .  ld. at 6. 
196 .  Id. at 7 .  
197 .  Id. a t  6. 
198 .  Id. 
199.  'just Say No ' May Be Viable Defense, but Not Carte Blanche, Panelists Say, 2 1  Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 1 5 ,  1 989) ("Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet tack­
led the 'just say no' defense head on, Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II of that court told a Dec. 8 
conference that case law indicates that it may be a vtable defense to hostile takeovers. ") .  
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glomerate into an entertainment and publishing company. 200 Its unsuc, 
cessful attempt to acquire Time in 1989 was one stage along this road. 
Beginning in 1 990, Paramount began to consider a merger with Viacom. 
Preliminary negotiations were unproductive. Throughout this period, Para, 
mount's board of directors devoted substantial attention to Paramount's 
strategic goals and the steps taken by management to achieve those objec, 
rives. 
In the spring of 1993 , negotiations became more serious. Vigorous , 
arms,length negotiations over price and terms of a merger were conducted 
throughout the spring and summer of 1993 , finally resulting in an agree, 
ment in mid,September. The merger agreement provided for the conver, 
sion of Paramount shares into Viacom shares and cash, with a total value of 
around $69 per share. In addition, Paramount's board agreed not to shop 
the company, unless counsel determined that it had a fiduciary obligation 
to do so, and to pay Viacom a termination fee of $ 1 00 million, payable if 
Paramount terminated the merger agreement as the result of a competing 
transaction, if shareholders rejected the merger, or if the board recom, 
mended a competing transaction. Finally, Viacom was granted a " lockup" 
stock option. In announcing the merger, Redstone and Davis issued a joint 
press release stating that the proposed merger offered the "greatest long 
term benefits to stockholders and audiences around the world" and that no 
other company could provide Paramount and Viacom what they could offer 
each other. 
But, just as Paramount tried to barge its way into the Time,Warner 
merger, so QVC tried to derail the Viacom,Paramount merger. A week 
after the Paramount board approved the Viacom,Paramount merger, QVC 
proposed an acquisition of Paramount by QVC at approximately $80 per 
share in cash and securities. Paramount, after extensive board meetings , 
documentation, and reports by consultants , rejected QVC's offer , adhering 
to its original plan to merge with Viacom, albeit now at a higher price , as 
Viacom had raised its offer in response to QVC's bid. Over the ensuing 
weeks , as the QVC offer became more definite and less contingent, Para, 
mount adhered to its intention to merge with Viacom. 
200. This account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court opinions. See 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,  57 1 A.2d 1 140 (Del .  1990). 
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If one read Time�Wamer as validating the just�say�no defense ,  then one 
might reasonably conclude that the Paramount board could "just say no" to 
QVC. After all ,  they had a long�term plan to expand as a communications 
and entertainment company. They-like Time and Warner-had looked 
carefully at potential merger partners and had concluded that the fit with 
Viacom was best. The directors had reviewed a detailed analysis prepared 
by the management consultants Booz Allen that indicated that the merger 
with Viacom would "create over $3BN [billion] more incremental share� 
holder value than a merger with QVC. "201 This situation, Paramount 
could and did argue, was unlike Smith v. Van Gorkom202 
because the directors were at all times fully informed and attentive to 
their duties. And [the facts] are not controlled by Revlon, because 
Paramount did not put itself up for sale, initiate an active bidding 
process, or abandon a long,term business strategy by seeking or 
effecting a reorganization or other transaction involving the breakup 
of the company. 203 
Rather , said Paramount, this case was j ust like Time, W amer: a corporation, 
pursuing a well,thought,out long,term plan that the board believed " [would] 
afford higher long term value to shareholders and [would] be in the corpora, 
tion' s best long, run interests, "204 rejected a last minute attempt to scuttle 
it. 
But it turns out that such a reading was badly mistaken. Paramount 
lost in both the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts , just as it had lost 
in the Time�Wamer case. Both courts enjoined the selective removal of the 
poison pill and the stock lockup, both of which were designed to facilitate 
the Viacom transaction. Why? 
One can tell a doctrinal story distinguishing Time,Wamer, as both the 
chancery and supreme courts did. In the chancery court, Vice Chancellor 
Jacobs, after noting the arguments that Time�Wamer significantly reformu, 
20 1 .  QVC Network , Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc. ,  635 A.2d 1245 ,  1255 (Del. 
Ch. 1993) (citation omitted). 
202. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors in a takeover situation breached their 
duty of care). 
203 . QVC, 635 A.Zd at 1263-64. 
204. Id. at 1 263. 
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lated the circumstances triggering Revlon, avoided the general doctrinal 
issue. Rather, according to Jacobs , the critical circumstance is that "the 
Paramount board has committed the company to a transaction that will 
shift majority voting control from Paramount's public shareholders to Mr. 
Redstone. "205 
The Delaware Supreme Court told a similar doctrinal story. Chief 
Justice Veasey, with Justices Moore and Holland (both of whom were on 
the panel that decided the Time,Wamer case) , affirmed, likewise finding the 
change of control to Redstone critical in distinguishing Time,Wamer. 
Contrary to Paramount's argument, the Delaware Supreme Court argued: 
[O]ur decision in Time,Wamer expressly states that the two general 
scenarios [when a corporation initiates an active bidding process 
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a 
clear breakup of the company] are not the only instances where 
"Revlon duties" may be implicated. The Paramount defendants' 
argument totally ignores the phrase "without excluding other possi, 
bilities ." Moreover, the instant case is clearly within the first gen­
eral scenario set forth in Time,Wamer. The Paramount Board, albeit 
unintentionally, had "initiate[d] an active bidding process seeking to 
sell itself" by agreeing to sell control of the corporation to Viacom in 
circumstances where another potential acquiror (QVC) was equally 
interested in being a bidder.206 
Time,Wamer and Viacom are two different cases. As a technical matter, the 
cases-like all cases-are distinguishable. But the doctrinal arguments are 
not particularly persuasive : The Delaware Supreme Court in Time,Wamer 
had expressly refused to adopt the chancery court' s  attempt to distinguish 
Revlon on the basis of whether a change of control was present. Similarly, 
the notion that a firm could "unintentionally" put itself up for sale was 
likewise rejected in Time,Wamer. After all, if it could be said that the 
Paramount board had (albeit unintentionally) initiated an active bidding 
process seeking to sell itself, the same could have been said of the Time 
board . The music in the two opinions is unmistakably different. Is there 
another basis on which the two cases are more consistent? 
205 . Id. at 1 265 . 
206. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. , 637 A.2 d  34 ,  47 (Del. 1994). 
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If it is the factual narratives that constitute the standard i n  Delaware 
fiduciary duty cases , as I argue, the cases are far more consistent. In Time, 
Warner, fully informed directors acted deliberately pursuant to a well, 
thought,out long,term plan. Along comes Paramount, which tries to stop 
the Time board. In response, the directors reject Paramount's efforts and 
determine to continue their long,term plan. In Viacom, a strong,willed 
CEO misleads the board , keeps crucial information from them, prevents 
them from discussing the terms of the bid with Barry Diller, and structures 
the transaction so that QVC is at a serious disadvantage because of personal 
antipathy for Diller. From this perspective, the cases are completely consis, 
tent with Delaware norms. Strong,willed CEOs who dominate directors are 
disfavored. 207 Allowing personal antipathy for a bidder to interfere with 
the board's serious consideration of the bid is wrong. 208 Tilting the play, 
ing field towards management's preferred bidder immediately raises ques, 
tions . 209 
In this regard , consider the chancery court's opinion. In detailing the 
various rounds and the eventual terms of the deal , Vice Chancellor Jacobs 
emphasized that no matter how the merger was structured, Redstone, the 
controlling shareholder of Viacom, would end up as controlling shareholder 
f h b. d . 2 10 o t e com tne enterpnse. 
The opinion then continues , describing QVC's feared and unwelcome 
acquisition proposal and Paramount's response: delay, delay, delay. 
Throughout, management gave very negative assessments of QVC's offers , 
claiming that they were subject to numerous conditions and uncertainties. 
One director testified that management's summary 
207 . Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ,  636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co. 
v. Macmillan, Inc. , 559 A.2d 1 2 6 1  (Del. 1 989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc . ,  506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1 986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1 985); Guth v. Loft, 
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1 939). 
208. See, for example, Michel Bergerac's "strong personal antipathy" for Ronald Perelman in 
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 .  
209.  See, for example, the behavior of  Macmillan's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
Evans and its President and Chief Operating Officer Reilly in Macmillan I, 552 A.2d 1 227 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
2 10. QVC Network, Inc. v .  Paramount Communications Inc. ,  635 A.2d 1245 , 1 250 (Del. 
Ch. 1993). The style of Jacobs' opinion is particularly noteworthy from the standpoint of this 
i\rticle. It self-consciously follows the dramatic form. For example, part I.C. of the opinion is 
headed "Enter QVC," with the first subheading, "Bidders Beware . "  Id. at 1 25 2 .  Subsequent 
sections read as if they are describing subsequent scenes, as indeed they are. The whole "fact 
section" of the opinion reads like a drama. 
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created a negative impression of the QVC offer from the outset of 
the meeting: "My reaction was that this was not what I consider a 
live offer. It was full of contingencies and I would consider holes in 
it and I was very-by the time I got through reading this, I was very 
negative on the whole subject. "2 1 1 
Here we get to the board's crucial failures. Although it appears that 
the board focused its attention on the contingencies of the QVC offer 
rather than the comparative economic merits of both offers , 
[n]o director suggested that inquiries be made to QVC to ascertain 
whether its financing conditions could be resolved, and no director 
asked Lazard to discuss whether the QVC offer was financeable . . . .  
In sum, although financing concerns were central to the board's 
rejection of the QVC proposal , the board did not request that man� 
agement obtain more information from QVC regarding financing as 
it did at its September 27 meeting. Instead, and with this limited 
data regarding the conditions of QVC's offer, the board simply fol� 
lowed management's lead in rej ecting the unwelcome offer.212 
These findings echo Macmillan I ,  with the CEO's description of Bass as a 
"greenmailer" serving more to propagandize than to inform the board. 
At the crucial moment-the November 15 board meeting, by which 
point it was clear that QVC's bid offered a higher present value to 
shareholders-management and the board failed to fulfill their duties to the 
shareholders : 
The defendants make much of the "conditions" to QVC's tender 
offer and of that offer's supposedly illusory nature. The board is, of 
course, entitled to take such conditions into account in evaluating 
the QVC bid. But, the board's position might be more persuasive 
had management or the board first chosen to discuss those condi� 
tions with QVC, to ascertain which of them would likely be fulfilled 
or waived, before concluding a priori that the conditions were fatal 
and dismissing them out of hand. It is commonplace for tender 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 1257 .  
2 1 2 .  Id. at 1258  (citations omitted) . 
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offers to have conditions of some kind. That, however, does not 
render them "illusory. " If the mere existence of conditions per, 
mitted a board to ignore a higher competing bid for control on that 
basis alone, Revlon and Unocal would have little meaning. In this 
case, discussions with QVC would have revealed (for example) that 
QVC's financing commitments would soon be in hand. Here, the 
board did not even ask QVC on November 1 5  (as it had in Septem, 
her) to produce evidence of its financing. A discussion with QVC 
would also have revealed that QVC had received (or would immi, 
nently receive) Hart,Scott,Rodino antitrust clearance. But meeting 
with QVC was the last thing management wanted to do, and by 
skillful advocacy, management persuaded the board that no explora, 
tion was required. 213 
1 083 
The board's  failure even to talk with QVC is the crucial finding. In 
doctrinal terms , this is translated into a finding that the board was not 
adequately informed. In substantive terms , this is a fact,specific finding of 
the board's lack of good faith. The board went through the steps they 
thought Time,Wamer required-they had a long,term plan-but they evi, 
dently did not do so with the proper intentions. They did not do so in 
good faith. 
In the Delaware Supreme Court opinion affirming Vice Chancellor 
Jacobs' opinion, the same facts are emphasized and the same themes 
sounded: 
When the Paramount directors met on November 1 5  to consider 
QVC's increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of their own 
misconceptions and missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions 
they had imposed on themselves. Yet, it was not "too late" to 
reconsider negotiating with QVC . . . .  Nevertheless, the Paramount 
directors remained paralyzed by their uninformed belief that the 
QVC offer was " illusory ."  This final opportunity to negotiate on the 
stockholders' behalf and to fulfill their obligation to seek the best 
value reasonably available was thereby squandered. 2 14 
213 .  Id. at 1 269. 
2 1 4. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc . ,  637 A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1 994). 
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Subsequently, the Court concludes: 
The directors ' initial hope and expectation for a strategic alliance 
with Viacom was allowed to dominate their decisionmaking process 
to the point where the arsenal of defensive measures established at 
the outset was perpetuated (not modified or eliminated) when the 
situation was dramatically altered. QVC's unsolicited bid presented 
the opportunity for significantly greater value for the stockholders 
and enhanced negotiating leverage for the directors . Rather than 
seizing those opportunities, the Paramount directors chose to wall 
themselves off &om material information which was reasonably 
available and to hide behind the defensive measures as a rationaliza� 
tion for refusing to negotiate with QVC or seeking other alterna� 
tives. Their view of the strategic alliance likewise became an empty 
rationalization as the opportunities for higher value for the stock� 
holders continued to develop. 215 
And then, in a peculiarly apologetic and defensive final paragraph, Chief 
Justice Veasey responds to those who would accuse him of inconsistency 
with the Time-Warner case: 
It is the nature of the judicial process that we decide only the 
case before us-a case which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by 
established Delaware law. Here, the proposed change of control and 
the implications thereof were crystal clear. In other cases they may 
be less clear. The holding of this case on its facts , coupled with the 
holdings of the principal cases discussed herein where the issue of 
sale of control is implicated, should provide a workable precedent 
against which to measure future cases . 216 
In an illustration of how corporate law norms are disseminated,  at least 
m the high�profile cases , a contemporaneous Wall Street Journal article sent 
out the message conveyed by the Delaware courts, and supplemented it 
with independent research of its own.2 17 The article detailed Davis's 
2 15 .  ld. at 5 1 .  
2 16. ld. Finally, and consistent with my overall view of Delaware law as a critical part of a 
system of norms of behavior, the opinion contains an addendum in which the Delaware Supreme 
Court castigates the Texas lawyer defending the deposition of one of the Paramount directors for 
his abusive and unprofessional conduct. ld. at 5 1 -56. 
For an attempt to provide an internally consistent theory that reconciles these cases, see 
Kahan, supra note 10. 
2 1 7 .  The journal story amplifies the court's opinion: 
In a stuffy, windowless conference room on a bleak November afternoon, Para­
mount OJmmunications Inc . 's board of directors found itself in the dark-again. 
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domineering personality,2 18 and his attempts to drive away Malone and 
Diller. It also describes a passive board with personal loyalty to Davis. 2 19 
Casts off and ties loosened, directors had gathered at this hastily convened meeting 
at Paramount headquarters to evaluate competing bids for the company. They knew full 
well that their strong-willed chairman, Martin S .  Davis, was determined to go with a 
friendly Viacom Inc. offer, even though home-shopping giant QVC Network Inc. had 
just sweetened a hostile bid that now was valued at $ 1 .2 billion more. 
Mincing no words, Mr. Davis attacked the QVC bid as containing too many condi­
tions. Then Paramount's investment advisers from Lazard Freres & Co. weighed in with 
their written opinion that Viacom's $85-a-share offer was fair. 
Director George Weissman . . .  raised his hand. Why, he asked, hadn't Lazard 
evaluated QVC's $90-a-share bid, too? Lazard's Felix Rohatyn, according to court 
records, had this reply: "We haven't been asked." 
And with that, the board promptly dropped the issue. QVC's  bid wasn't to be 
taken seriously. 
The November incident wasn't  the only time during the continuing $ 1 0  billion 
takeover fight that Paramount directors weren't given the full story. In memos and 
statements filed in a suit QVC brought against Paramount in Delaware Chancery Court, 
a picture emerges of a chief executive so determined to ward off QVC's  overtures that he 
sometimes withheld crucial information. On numerous occasions, the board wasn't given 
a chance to weigh information that would have put preferred suitor Viacom in an unflat­
tering light-or made archfoe QVC's b id look more attractive. 
Mr. Davis had a willing partner in this exercise in denial: The board itself, which, 
as Mr. Davis himself put it at one point, followed him " in lockstep" toward the Viacom 
deal. For the most part, directors didn't question Mr. Davis's rejection of the higher 
QVC bid ,  court papers and interviews show; and indeed, some legal experts say the board 
had reason to believe it was on solid ground. Though several of the directors-including 
Lazard partner Lester Pollack as well as one of Mr. Davis's top lieutenants, Donald 
Oresman-had reservations about excluding QVC, they rarely if ever voiced their con­
cerns to fellow board members. 
The extent of the board's complacency, and Mr. Davis's willingness to exploit it, 
caught up with Paramount last week. Delaware's Supreme Court upheld an earlier ruling 
forcing Paramount to consider both bids equally, effectively throwing the bidding for 
Paramount wide open. The lower-court ruling it upheld had lashed out harshly against 
Mr. Davis and his passive board. "By skillful advocacy,"  Vice Chancellor Jack B. Jacobs 
of the Delaware Chancery Court wrote in his opinion, "management persuaded the 
board that no exploration [of QVC's offer] was required. "  
Johnnie L .  Roberts & Randall Smith, The Plot Thickens : Who Gets the Blame for Paramount 
Gaffes? Big Cast of Characters , WALL ST. J . ,  Feb. 1 3 ,  1993, at Al . 
2 18 .  "[H]e is characterized even by his fans as a bully who berates his closest allies with the 
slightest provocation. "  Id. 
2 19 .  As the Journal told it: "Several were appointed by his late predecessor, Charles 
Bludhorn, at a time when Mr. Davis was in charge of director relations. He courted them so 
assiduously-mixing a flattering deferential attitude with favors like tickets to movie premieres 
and Knicks games-that they remain loyalists to this day." Id. at A6. 
In an interesting part of the article that does not track the Delaware opinions, the Journal 
confirms the concern that players have with how they are portrayed by the Delaware courts: 
Paramount's own investment advisers at Lazard had also asked whether the company 
should go into an "auction mode." The bankers, led by mergers heavyweight Mr. 
Rohatyn, 65 , and Steven Rattner, 4 1 ,  a boyish former newspaper reporter who is a rising 
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Although doctrinally the fit between Time,Wamer and QVC is ques, 
tionable , if not implausible, from the internal perspective of Delaware 
fiduciary duty cases , the fit is in fact much closer. The principal difference 
between the two cases is that the managers and board behaved well in 
Time,Wamer and badly in QVC.22° 
And one can see how Paramount went astray. If one thought that 
Time,Wamer stood for the proposition that a board need not depart from a 
long,term strategic plan simply because another bidder showed up-a per, 
fectly reasonable reading of the opinion in Time,Wamer-then one can 
understand why Martin Davis and Donald Oresman, having concluded that 
they were following a long,term strategic plan in the interests of Para, 
mount, felt reasonable in giving Diller the brush,off. 
But that is to misunderstand what the Delaware courts are up to. If 
one instead reads Time, W amer as yet another example of a case in which 
the courts approve directorial conduct because they are convinced that the 
directors behaved in good faith and with due care, then one would never 
advise a client to give Barry Diller the brush,off on the grounds that Time, 
Warner authorized just that action. And, indeed, I would be willing to bet 
that Paramount's Delaware corporate lawyers (either those practicing in 
Delaware or the experienced outside counsel practicing Delaware law in 
New York) advised against this course of action. 
The test of my claim is a counterfactual one: Suppose that rather than 
giving Diller the brush,off, Davis and Paramount had sat down with him 
early and often, had given him a full opportunity to present his proposal , to 
discuss and describe his financing, to discuss his plans for the future of the 
company, and so forth. And suppose that after these extensive discussions , 
the Paramount board , after long and careful consideration, had decided that 
I d. 
star at the firm, were growing worried. They had their reputations to consider, and 
didn't want to be pilloried if Mr. Davis was criticized for proceeding improperly. 
220. The epilogue to the decision is interesting. After the Delaware Chancery Court's opin­
ion, and its affirmance by the supreme court by order, the bidding between QVC and Viacom 
continued, see-sawing back and forth. Ultimately, Viacom prevailed with a $ 10 billion offer 
($ 1 07 per share in cash for 50. 1% of Paramount stock, and securities for the remaining shares). 
Randall Smith, WaU Street's Final Analysis: Might Made Right, WALL ST. J . ,  Feb. 16 ,  1 994, at B l .  
This represented an increase of $38 per share over the original deal that Viacom struck with 
Paramount at $69 per share , an increase of around $2 billion, and a much larger percentage of 
cash. Id. 
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a merger with Viacom was in the long,term interests of Paramount because 
Viacom offered a much better fit. Would the case have come out the other 
way? No one , of course ,  knows , but I have no doubt that Paramount would 
have vastly increased its chances of success had it done so. 
Finally, one cannot say that QVC overrules Time,Wamer in any 
straightforward way. In an interesting attempt to put a spin on the QVC 
case in the New York Law Journal, Martin Lipton and Theodore Mirvis, of 
Wachtell Lipton, who (somewhat ironically) represented QVC, wrote " 1 0  
Questions and Answers Raised by Delaware 'Paramount'  Decision. "22 1 Recall 
that it was Mirvis who argued after the Time,Warner case that the case 
represented an acceptance of the just,say,no defense.222 Now, post,QVC, 
Lipton and Mirvis adhere to this view, despite the fact that they had just 
convinced the Delaware courts not to let Paramount "just say no" to 
QVC's bid. The question, as always , is all in how you say it: 
The Paramount decision expressly states that it does not apply to a 
situation where a company is following its own strategic plan and has 
not initiated a takeover situation. Where the target of a hostile bid 
wishes to consider rejecting the bid and remaining independent it is 
critical that the board of directors follows the correct process and 
have the advice of an experienced investment banker and legal 
counsel. 223 
Despite the mildly self,serving quality of the advice, Lipton and Mirvis are 
clearly right. Indeed, if one looks back at their reading of Time,Wamer, it 
is consistent. Mirvis earlier argued that Time,Warner was "an undeniable 
endorsement of 'Just Say No' when the decision not to redeem the pill is made 
in good faith and on an informed business basis . "224 What Lipton and Mirvis 
understood, and what someone on the Paramount side did not, is that in 
Delaware , the qualification " in good faith and on an informed basis " is not 
an empty formula but in fact is nearly the whole show. 
Indeed , QVC makes clear that going through the motions without the 
right intention is legally risky in Delaware. Paramount did meet with 
2 2 1 .  Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, 10 Questions and Answers Raised by Delaware 
'Paramount '  Decision, N.Y.L.J . ,  Feb. 10 ,  1 994, a t  1 .  
222 .  See Mirvis, supra note 177 .  
223.  Lipton & Mirvis, supra note 22 1 ,  at 5 .  
224. Mirvis, supra note 177 ,  at 6 (emphasis added) . 
1088 44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 009 (1 997) 
Diller. They did "consider" his offer. But they did everything grudgingly, 
as if they were simply going through the motions, having previously decided 
the outcome. And note something else: A reliable way of compiling a 
compelling record of good faith and reasonable inquiry is for lawyers to 
counsel their clients to act in good faith and to inquire diligently, guiding 
them through the steps that this requires . This is what the Delaware courts 
are , on my view, seeking to insure, first and foremost. 
B. Shareholder Litigation 
Shareholder litigation has come under mounting criticism of late. The 
conflicts of interest inherent in the relationship between class counsel and 
shareholder plaintiffs have been analyzed in detail.225 More recently , 
Kraakman, Park, and Shavell have looked carefully at the relationship 
between shareholders' incentives to sue and corporate value, finding that 
shareholders incentives may be either excessive or insufficient relative to a 
goal of maximizing corporate value. 226 
Roberta Romano, in the most careful empirical study to date, could 
find little direct benefit to shareholders from shareholder litigation.227 
Plaintiffs had abysmal success in litigated cases .  In her sample, plaintiffs 
won no judgments for damages or equitable relief. Of the two�thirds of the 
cases that settled, only half involved a monetary recovery, while attorneys 
received fees far more frequently. In addition, the settlements are highly 
skewed, which, suggests Romano, is consistent with either of two troubling 
225.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1 987); Coffee, supra note 1 1 6 ;  John 
C. Coffee, Jr. , The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1 985 , at 5 ;  see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs ' Attorney 's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 5 8  U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (199 1),  
226. Reinier Kraakman et al. , When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests ?, 82  GEO. 
L.J. 1 733  (1994). 
227 .  Romano , supra note 10 ; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of 
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis , 7 1  
CoRNELL L. REV. 261  (1 986). 
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hypotheses: that most fiduciary breaches involve only minor harm to share, 
holders , or that most shareholder suits are without merit.228 
Romano finds this "gloomy assessment of the value of shareholder 
litigation . . .  cross,validated by examining the market's evaluation of law, 
suits. "229 Specifically, standard event study methodology fails to reveal 
any benefit to shareholders from litigation. Similarly, Romano finds little 
evidence of specific deterrence. 230 
Other recent work has been consistent with Romano's "gloomy assess, 
ment. " Janet Cooper Alexander's study of a small set of securities class 
actions concluded that the merits did not matter, that is, that the merits of 
the individual cases had no bearing on the settlement amount. 23 1 This 
finding, which has been strongly criticized from a variety of directions ,232 
is consistent with a view that class actions are nothing more than a tax on 
public offerings, failing to distinguish between prohibited and permitted 
behavior. 
But the preceding case study of the elaboration of norms governing 
MBOs places the role of shareholder litigation in a different light and raises 
significant questions regarding both the current wisdom regarding the 
excessive quantity of shareholder litigation as well as the measurement of 
the benefits conferred by such litigation. Two features emerge from the 
study of the MBO cases and will be presented in more detail below. First, 
and perhaps most striking, there are very few of these cases. During a 
period when MBOs were one of the hottest deal vehicles around, they only 
yielded fifteen Delaware cases, with twenty,one opinions, over the period 
1980- 1990. Further , these opinions came extremely late in the day. By 
the time the norms were fully elaborated, MBOs'  day had nearly passed. 
Second, the previous discussion of the MBO cases illustrates the role 
that shareholder litigation plays in the elaboration of corporate norms, a 
228 .  Romano, supra note 227 . at 60-6 1 .  
229.  Id. a t  65 . 
230.  Id. at 84. 
23 1 .  Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class 
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 ( 1991) .  
232 .  For a summary of the criticism, see John C. Coffee, Jr. , The 'New Learning' on Securities 
Litigation, N.Y.L.J . ,  Mar. 25 , 1 993 , at 5 .  
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role sometimes mentioned but not often documented.233 This benefit-a 
public good-is separate from and in addition to compensation, specific 
deterrence, and general deterrence, the three factors normally considered. 
1 .  The Strange Paucity of Cases 
Management buyouts were one of the hottest transactions during the 
1 980s. Moreover, the received wisdom is that lawsuits are filed in almost 
every transaction. Therefore, the fact that there were only fifteen MBOs 
that yielded published or unpublished Delaware opinions in the 1980s is 
surprising and significant. 
Getting a handle on the actual number of MBOs of publicly held 
companies is not easy. First, there is the definitional problem: How large a 
stake, or how early an involvement in a transaction, must management 
have before it is categorized as a "management buyout" ?  Second, one 
wants to distinguish between management buyouts of publicly held com, 
panies and leveraged buyouts more generally and, in particular, leveraged 
buyouts of divisions or privately held companies, both of which pose much 
less severe conflicts of interest. Because management is so often involved 
in LBOs of publicly held companies, often as part of one of the bidding 
groups, or at least as a post,deal equity participant, the frequency and size of 
leveraged buyouts of publicly held companies gives an approximation of the 
number of MBOs. 
Table I ,  drawn from figures in Mergers & Acquisitions , 234 lists the 
number and value of LBOs of publicly held companies from 1 98 1 ,  when 
Mergers & Acquisitions began collecting figures on such transactions , until 
1990, by which time the Delaware jurisprudence was well developed and 
LBOs began to go into at least a temporary decline. 
233.  See, e.g. , Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of 
Professors Fischel and Bradley ,  7 1  CORNELL L. REV. 322 {1986). 
234. See Leveraged Buyout Trends , supra note 30. 
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TABLE l: LEVERAGED BUYOUTS OF PuBLICLY HELD COMPANIES 198 1 - 1 990235 
Year No. of Deals Value ($ b illion) 
198 1  1 7  2 . 1 6  
1 982 27 2 .46 
1 983 26 1 .79  
1 984 60 13 . 1 8  
1 985 4 1  10.38 
1 986 43 24 .9 1  
1 987 32 22.43 
1 988 74 26.54 
1 989 59 50.03 
1 990 25 8 . 14  
Total 404 $ 1 62 .02 
By contrast, consider the number and timing of the MBO cases from 
Delaware. Table II is a listing of all Delaware MBO cases that yielded 
opinions that were reported on Lexis or Westlaw, cross�checked by inquiries 
and examination in the Delaware Chancery Court. As I discuss further 
below, there are substantial reasons to conclude that this is close to the 
complete universe of MBO cases filed in Delaware during the relevant time 
period. 
235 .  LBO Signposts, supra note 30 ,  at  60; Leveraged Buyout Trends, supra note 30 ,  at  8 1 .  
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When Tables I and II are compared, the disproportion between the 
number of reported cases and the number of deals is staggering. Between 
1 980 and 1 990, there were approximately 400 LBOs of public companies in 
the United States, many of which involved management in some form or 
other. By contrast, there were only fifteen litigated MBO deals in the Dela­
ware courts , yielding twenty-one opinions. 236 
The gigantic gap raises several possibilities . First, it is possible that the 
accepted wisdom that litigation is brought in every deal is simply an over­
statement. 
Second, it could be that suits were filed in Delaware in many of the 
other deals but that they were settled or dismissed without order or opinion 
and therefore do not show up on Lexis or Westlaw. This, however, seems 
not to be the case because all of these cases are filed as class actions and 
therefore need judicial approval before being dismissed. In addition, offi­
cials of the Delaware Chancery Court do not know of any such MBO cases. 
A third possibility-consistent with the received wisdom-is that there 
are lots of other cases filed, but they are not filed in Delaware. In other 
words , most of the cases that arise out of these deals arise either under the 
law of other states (for non-Delaware corporations)237 or under the federal 
securities laws, with state claims added, if at all, as pendent state law 
claims. If correct , this is important: Although there were some important 
early MBO cases outside of Delaware,238 no significant jurisprudence of 
MBOs developed in any other state. There seems to be a minimum num, 
her of cases required to generate a reasonably well,specified j urisprudence, 
and only Delaware seems to have passed this threshold. 
236. The question of how often suits are filed in management buyout cases during the rele­
vant period is complicated and unclear. In a recent study, see Easterwood et al. , supra note 30,  
the authors studied 2 1 4  buyout targets between 1978-1988. According to the authors, share­
holders filed suit in 83 of the transactions (38.8%). In only five instances were there court deci­
sions. 
Because the authors do not distinguish between cases filed in Delaware versus cases filed in 
other states, or between cases filed under state law and cases raising federal causes of action, their 
findings do not cast much light on what happened to the 78 cases that did not result in a court 
decision. 
237 .  See Easterwood et al., supra note 30 (of the 2 1 8  sample suits, only 102  involved Dela­
ware corporations) . 
238.  See, e.g. , Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp. ,  7 98 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1 986) ; Hanson Trust PLC 
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc . ,  7 8 1  F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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2. The Time Lag 
The second feature that leaps out from the comparison of T abies I and 
II is the timing of the Delaware cases: They come very late in the deal 
cycle .  Although MBOs of significant publicly held companies , as a transac� 
tional form, got going seriously around 198 1 ,  the cases came so slowly that 
the defining trilogy of Macmillan, Fort Howard, and RJR Nabisco239 was 
not written until l 988 and 1989.240 
This lag, which is endemic to law but which is exacerbated by rapidly 
developing transactional forms, 241 had several consequences. First, it 
interfered with attempts by the Delaware courts to articulate standards in 
"real time . "  This is a problem that all courts interpreting standards face : 
Ex post decision making restricts courts to what comes before them. To 
the extent that standards only emerge over time as narratives accumulate , 
the process of norm articulation will lag behind deals. 
This reactive stance, combined with what I claim to be a fairly self� 
conscious attempt by the courts to shape the standards of conduct in a 
rapidly developing transactional form, may be the driving force behind 
judicial attempts to surpass it. Thus , the "preachiness" of Delaware MBO 
opinions , the pattern of criticizing conduct even when no injunction is 
issued, and judges' extrajudicial utterances can all be read as attempts to be 
heard on a critical matter in the absence of a case raising just the right issue 
and in the absence of the articulation (or articulability) of a governing rule. 
Such utterances are, in a literal sense, advisory opinions . 
As such, these judicial comments share both the vices and virtues of 
advisory opinions. They are useful insofar as they help lawyers and parties 
plan transactions. They are problematic, however, precisely when they are 
239.  See supra Part !.B.S . 
240. A complementary explanation for the timing of the cases was suggested to me by 
Lawrence Hammermesh in a personal conversation. As Hammermesh points out, the Revlon 
case , which raised plaintiffs' hopes of prevailing in challenges to board action in takeovers, was 
decided in 1985 , and may well have triggered the increase in challenges to MBO transactions. 
That Revlon had such an effect is almost certainly true. But, strikingly, even in the post-Rev/on 
enthusiasm, the number of challenges to MBOs as a percentage of the number of deals was small. 
24 1 .  See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational 
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J . 1 457 (1993); Henry T.C. Hu , 
Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of the Regulatory Paradigm, 
138  U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1 989) . 
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" issued" without a full factual record. Given the fact,specific quality of 
Delaware opinions, this may make them particularly problematic. At the 
same time , the disproportion between the number of cases and transactions 
may make them especially necessary. 
The lack of law also pushes transactional lawyers into a central and 
critical position. The MBO cases show that in a world of vaguely defined 
norms and rapidly evolving transactional forms , what the business lawyer 
tells the client-rather than what the judge announces to the world-is the 
" law. " We see traces in the "memoranda to our clients " genre, but the 
core of this body of law resides in the firms and in the advice given to 
clients in confidence. This advice necessarily is given in the shadow of ex 
post judicial review, with, as we have seen in the Delaware cases , the possi, 
bility, albeit somewhat remote, of upsetting the deal. In only two of the 
cases , EAC242 and Macmillan 1, 243 did the court enjoin a transaction, 
the ultimate failure for a business lawyer. Although in other cases criticism 
may have signaled a refusal to grant a defendant's  motion to dismiss , and 
may have led to a subsequent monetary settlement, such settlements can be 
budgeted for and do not destroy a deal . 
One particularly striking manifestation of the tension in the pro, 
duction of law between the judges and the lawyers can be found in the 
competing attempts to put a "spin" on new opinions. If, for example, one 
compares Chancellor Allen's takeover opinions with, for example, 
Theodore Mirvis' columns in the New York Law journal, one immediately 
feels that tension. 244 In part, one observes competing attempts to con, 
vince the Delaware Supreme Court. But one also observes attempts to 
shape accepted practice in the transactional community. 
MBOs again provide a good illustration. A per se ban on MBOs is 
conceivable. Serious and important commentators made just that argument 
in the 1970s. 245 When MBOs started to arrive in significant numbers in 
the early 1980s , the law was clearly unsettled. Lawyers did these deals and, 
by the time the Delaware courts had an opportunity to articulate standards , 
that is, by the latter half of the 1980s , hundreds of deals had already been 
242. EAC Indus. ,  Inc. v. Frantz Mfg. Co. ,  No. CIV.A.8003 , 1985 WL 3200 (Del. Ch. June 
28 ,  1985) , aff'd, 5 0 1  A.2d 40 1 (Del. 1985). 
243. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc . v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litig.), 552 
A.2d 1 227 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
244. Theodore N. Mirvis, What Triggers 'Revlon '? Some New Answers, N.Y.L.J . ,  Dec. 3 ,  
1 990, at 5 ("Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the water . . . .  along comes the 
decision by the Delaware court of Chancery in Roberts v. General Instrument."); see also Lipton 
& Mirvis, supra note 22 1 ,  at 1 .  
245 . See , e.g. , Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 26. 
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done. It was too late in the day to hold MBOs illegal per se. By doing 
these sorts of deals , in the absence of controlling case law, law office prac� 
tice at least influenced and probably constrained judicial decisionmaking. 
3 .  Case Law as a Public Good 
In the closing paragraph of her article, Roberta Romano notes : 
[O]ne potential social benefit from a shareholder suit that is ancillary 
to its role as a governance device has not been discussed: legal rules 
are public goods. All firms benefit from a judicial decision clarifying 
the scope of permissible conduct. The benefit of clarification is not 
simply deterrence of future managerial misconduct, but rather, given 
the contractual setting of the corporation, identification of a rule 
around which the parties (managers and shareholders) can trans� 
act.246 
But Romano seems skeptical of such benefits : 
As few suits produce a legal rule (only two in this sample) , this 
explanation of lawsuit efficacy turns on the need for a large number 
of lawsuits in order to obtain a ruling. There is no reason to believe 
that the current level of litigation is optimal in relation to any public 
good benefits , but I leave that cost�benefit calculation for another 
study.247 
Note how the rule�centered view of corporate law, which forms a basis 
of Romano's skepticism of the efficacy of shareholder lawsuits, understates 
the public good aspect of shareholder litigation. If I am correct that fidu� 
ciary duty law evolves primarily at the level of norms rather than the level 
of rules, then to focus on the number of cases that "produce a legal 
rule"-only two in Romano's sample-is to miss a significant part of the 
benefit. In the MBO cases, it would be a fair reading of the cases to say 
that none of the cases individually "produces a legal rule. " In none of the 
cases does the court overrule any prior cases or explicitly adopt any legal 
rule at all .  Instead, all the discussions are couched as elaborations of the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Indeed, one does not find any new 
legal "rule" even looking back on the cases as a group. Rather, what we see 
is the elaboration of the norms of conduct appropriate to management 
buyouts (all under the guise of applying the standard analysis of the duties 
246. Romano, supra note 10, at 85 . 
247 . ld. 
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of loyalty and care) . From this perspective, each of the cases individually 
told something significant about legal norms governing management 
buyouts. 
In this context, note the ambiguity in Romano's comment: She allows 
for the possibility that a large number of cases is needed to produce a legal 
rule. This either means that you need a large number of lawsuits to yield a 
lawsuit that changes a legal rule (her actual meaning, I believe) , or that a 
legal "rule" or "standard" only emerges out of a large number of cases. This 
second possibility seems to characterize Delaware fiduciary duty law most 
accurately. Moreover, as my earlier discussion suggests, the problem seems 
to be a paucity of cases , not an excess. None of the other states had 
enough cases to generate a standard of conduct. 
This finding has implications for the awarding of attorneys ' fees . First, 
because even defense victories , such as RJR Nabisco,248 are valuable in 
describing appropriate norms of conduct, fees for plaintiff victories must be 
sufficiently generous to make it worthwhile to bring cases that the plaintiff 
may end up losing. 249 
This likewise raises the issue of the definition of success and failure in 
shareholder litigation. Recall Romano's finding that plaintiffs' success rate 
in shareholder litigation was abysmal. Should Fort HowarcF50 be defined 
as a plaintiff defeat or victory? From one perspective , the defendants won: 
The motion for a preliminary injunction was denied and the deal went 
through. But although plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion was obvi, 
ously denied, the court's criticism foreshadowed or perhaps caused the 
subsequent settlement. 
Cases such as Fort Howard that fall into the middle category are most 
appropriately considered partial plaintiff victories. The criticism is a clear 
signal (confirmed in the cases) that a defendants' motion for dismissal or 
summary judgment will likely be denied, with the consequence that most 
such cases will settle. In such cases , plaintiffs' counsel will receive a fee 
and will be paid for the efforts expended and benefits provided by the case 
as a whole, including unsuccessful motions along the way. Thus , if one 
248. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. , No. CIV.A. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 
(Feb. 14 ,  1 989). 
249. An alternative solution would be to provide fees to plaintiffs' counsel even when they 
lose, but the distorted incentives that such a proposal would create make it impossible. 
250. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig . ,  No. CIV.A.999 1 ,  1988 WL 83 147 (Del .  
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988). 
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looks again at the list of cases in Table I I ,  one sees that in each of the 
major cases in which the court criticized defendants ' behavior without 
enjoining the transaction, plaintiffs ' attorneys received fees .25 1 That said , 
it is likewise true that even in cases in which the court approved or even 
applauded defendants' conduct, plaintiffs' counsel usually still received a 
fee, although typically a far smaller one. 252 
Finally, comparing Tables I and II provides a rough, back,of,the, 
envelope estimate of the out,of,pocket cost of developing the specific norms 
of conduct for MBOs: Plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded a total of $ 1 7 .2  
million in fees in the fifteen Delaware MBO cases. In the same time 
period, approximately $ 1 60 billion was spent on LBOs. 
C. The Delaware Way: Could It Be Efficient? 
The earlier case study of the Delaware MBO cases provides a picture of 
the Delaware approach as regulating at least one difficult problem of mana, 
gerial conduct. In this section, I speculate on how the system might work. 
Because of competition from the various markets {product market competi, 
tion and interstate competition for charters , principally) , there are reasons 
to believe that the system that has emerged in Delaware is a reasonably 
efficient system of corporate governance . 253 For present purposes , it is 
useful to assume that the Delaware system is pretty good and to ask, specu, 
latively, how might such a system, which may seem rather odd and fuzzy, 
both in comparison to other areas of U.S. law and in comparison to the 
corporate law of other advanced industrial economies, end up working 
reasonably well? 
25 1 .  I cannot discover whether plaintiffs' attorneys received fees in the first two cases, EAC 
and National Medical Care. But plaintiffs' attorneys received fees in Shoe Town, J.P. Ste\lens, 
Macmillan , Fort Howard, Formica, and American Home Shield. 
252. The major exception to this finding is the RJR Nabisco case in which the coun 
applauded the performance of the special committee, yet still awarded plaintiffs '  counsel an enor­
mous fee ,  finding that their watchdog function benefited the class. Even when a b idder is also 
suing, (and taking the lead role ahead of the shareholder plaintiffs) , Delaware courts have found 
that class counsel has an important role to play as a watchdog, standing by to take over if the 
bidder should strike a deal or lose interest or change its position. See, e.g. , In re Macmillan, Nos. 
CIV.A.995 3 ,  9909 , 1989 WL 137936 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16 ,  1 989). It is interesting to note that 
parallel federal class actions resulted in a recovery to shareholders of $72.5 million and a fee to 
class counsel of $ 1 7.7 million. R]R Nabisco , 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12702 (S .D.N.Y. 1 992). 
253. See generaUy ROMANO, supra note 9. It  could be that this is simply wrong, that Dela­
ware's system survives despite substantial inefficiency because of network externalities or market 
failure or something else. Whether or not this is true is a separate debate. 
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The Delaware MBO cases display a number of features. As already 
discussed , there were relatively few decisions in relation to the number of 
deals , and these decisions came relatively late in the deal cycle. Second, 
most of the opinions were written in the context of motions for preliminary 
injunction, and almost all such motions were denied. Third, despite the 
fact that most such motions were denied, the judicial opinions were often 
very critical of defendants' conduct. Fourth, the opinions themselves are 
fact,intensive , process,oriented, and deeply and persistently judgmental of 
managerial conduct. Although the individual opinions are highly fact 
specific, over time certain features of transactions assume prominence . 
Thus , in the case of MBOs, the independence and activism of the special 
committee and its investment banker , as well as the extent to which alter, 
native bids were sought, all feature prominently in the narratives. Finally, 
the opinions-even those in which the motion for preliminary injunction is 
denied-seem to shape conduct. 
These features raise several questions . First, why might such a system 
be superior to potential alternatives , such as a system in which the courts 
(or the legislature) articulate rules ex ante that make it clearer what sort of 
transactions are permitted and what sort of transactions are forbidden? 
Second, if I am right that the system seems to rely on the possibility of 
public shaming to constrain behavior, how is it that such a system works? 
One might suspect, ex ante, "that being a successful businessman requires 
having a very thick skin, even enjoying the reputation of someone who 
skates close to the edge, even being something of an outlaw. "254 How is 
it that such a person would be deterred by the possibility of being criticized 
by a Delaware civil servant who wears black robes , much less incorporate 
such criticism into his or her personal code of conduct? Third , might there 
be an alternative explanation for the distinctive Delaware style? 
I will try to address these questions separately. 
254. Letter from Eric Posner (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author) . 
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Why might it be that Delaware corporate law shies away from using 
" laws" to deter bad behavior and leans, instead, towards morality tales?255 
One can try to answer this question from several directions. 
From an historical perspective, one could tell a story (as has already 
been told)256 of the historical differences between law and equity, of 
equity's greater concern with "equity," and of the survival of the division 
between courts of law and courts of equity in a few U.S. jurisdictions (most 
prominently New Jersey and Delaware) . The problem with this sort of 
account is that it does not tell us very much about why the equity style 
survived in corporate law, or what functions that style serves .  
One can gain somewhat more insight from a comparative perspective. 
Corporate law can be divided into two alternative and rather incompatible 
models. On one side there is the civil code , Germanic approach which, 
with some significant parody, can be described as "anything not explicitly 
permitted is prohibited . "  The second approach is the "enabling" approach 
that characterizes Delaware law: Anything not explicitly prohibited is 
permitted, and the law mainly serves to save transaction costs by providing 
low-cost standard form contracts . Tracking this difference in character is a 
difference in judicial role: In Germany, the free-ranging, fact-specific, fidu­
ciary duty analysis of Delaware is absent and utterly foreign to the corporate 
law sensibility. 
255.  Because the Delaware legislarure is responsive to pressures from Delaware-chartered 
corporations, (see, for example, the adoption of Delaware General Corporation Law sec­
tion 102(b) (6) in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)) , the persistence of 
the Delaware style requires the acquiescence of the relevant players: the courts, the bar, the 
legislarure, and Delaware-chartered corporations. 
256. William T. Allen, Speculations on the Bicentennial: What Is Distinctive About Our Court of 
Chancery , in CoURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792-1992, at 1 3  (1992) ; 
William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1 993 , at 29. 
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These contrasts in national styles suggest that the peculiar quality of 
Delaware cases may be linked to, and is perhaps a necessary consequence of 
or supplement to, the open,textured quality of the law. The virtues of the 
enabling approach to corporate law have been celebrated. 257 But because 
the possibilities are (intentionally) open,ended, the Delaware legislature and 
courts cannot promulgate ex ante the standards to govern new s ituations 
until they see a variety of cases and figure out how well or badly people 
behaved.258 To put it differently, in an open,textured regulatory struc, 
ture, many important norms can only be generated ex post, and with end, 
less possibilities , safe harbors are particularly risky.259 
Because of the enormous discretion exercised by Delaware Chancery 
and Supreme Court judges , the personnel are critical. If one is to depend 
on the courts to fill out the details of proper behavior in the corporate 
community, the judges must be respected by the community. Delaware 
accomplishes this in two ways . First, a substantial number of the j udges are 
drawn from the very world at issue, that is , they are experienced and 
respected practitioners of Delaware corporate law. Second , the Delaware 
courts have traditionally been characterized by a very high degree of collegi, 
ality among the judges , so that even those judges who did not practice in 
the area are socialized into the peculiar practices after joining the court. 
But, if most law,following is self,induced, then a system of enabling 
rules with ex post judicial review, like Delaware's , faces an additional prob, 
lem: It is notably lacking in mandatory rules that themselves provide the 
guidance that individual law followers need to follow the rules. Moreover, 
in such a system, the type of law,following required goes more to process 
and motive than to substantive outcome. In such circumstances ,  the artie, 
ulation of substantive rules does not provide the sort of guidance required. 
On the contrary, the particular sort of guidance demanded seems to be 
better provided by narrative than by rule. Martha Nussbaum has argued 
257 .  See, e .g. , FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) ;  ROMANO, supra note 9; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1 989) . 
258 .  Alternatively stated, It is too expensive to figure out ex ante the appropriate response to 
the uncountable number of cases that could arise under the open-textured Delaware provisions. 
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 568-86. 
259. Note that on this view, the Delaware system requires a functioning court system. In 
economies in which this feature is absent-Russia, for example-this particular combination of 
flexibility and constraint is unavailable, leading one generally to prefer a system of greater manda­
tory rules. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 19 1 1 (1 996). 
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that narratives , especially moralistic novels like those of Henry James , 
provide the kind of moral guidance one needs to be a moral person, and, in 
their thick descriptions, provide a better guide-that is , more useful, rele, 
vant, and interesting-than the kind of principles discussed in traditional 
moral theory . 2ro The suggestion here is similar. 
2 .  But How Could Shame Constrain the Shameless ? 
It is fine to claim that Delaware fiduciary duty law relies , in large 
measure , on the possibility of public shaming or praise to constrain manag, 
ers , but , as was pointed out before , would one not expect that successful 
businessmen might have sufficiently thick skins to be immune to such 
influence? 
Here , it seems to me, the answers are particularly interesting. The 
short answer is "yes , "  one would expect some particularly successful busi, 
nessmen to be immune to such influence , and here the effect of Delaware 
corporate law seems particularly subtle. 
Consider what I have claimed is a characteristic style of Delaware law: 
The denial of a preliminary injunction motion coupled with strong criti, 
cism. In the next deal, the "thick,skinned" businessman wants to skate 
close to the edge. Will he be constrained by the possibility that he will go 
down in history as a villain of Delaware corporate law? Probably not. But 
his lawyer is likely to advise him that such behavior will make it more 
likely that the deal will be enjoined, or that he will be left unprotected 
against maneuvers by his opponents . In other words , even the corporate 
actor who is immune to the social sanctions of Delaware corporate law will 
be constrained to some degree by Delaware "law. " In this regard, it is 
worth recalling T. Boone Pickens , a corporate actor who fits the mold of 
the outsider unlikely to be constrained by Delaware norms. Although it is 
possible that a negative portrayal in Delaware opinions meant little to him 
and other outsiders, it is likely also that the principle of Delaware law that 
eventually emerged-that Pickens always loses-meant more. 26 1  
And what about the others? Will the nonlegal sanctions have bite, 
separate from the possibility that the deal might not go through? To put it 
260. NUSSBAUM,  supra note 1 3 ,  at  1 25-47 . I owe this point, and cite, to Eric Posner. 
261 .  Ivanhoe Partners v .  Newmont Mining Corp.,  535  A.2d 1334 (Del .  1 987); Unocal Corp. 
v .  Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Dale Arthur Oesterle, Delaware 's 
Takeover S tatute of Chills, Pills, Standstills and Who Gets Iced, 1 3  DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 923 n. l 7 1  
(1988). 
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differently, under what circumstances are Delaware norms likely to be internalized? 
Here we come to what one might call the silver lining in the agency 
cost cloud. The prototypical Delaware corporation is a large, publicly held 
corporation in which ownership is separated from control. In such corpora, 
tions , the principal actors are agents. For them, the financial gains from 
allowing the corporations they manage to skate close to the edge are likely 
to be small. Moreover, the culture of such an organization is typically more 
bureaucratic than entrepreneurial , with directors of such corporations serv, 
ing as much a ritual function as a managerial function. A system that relies 
on public shaming is perfectly suited to such contexts : The cost to the 
actor-the disdain in the eyes of one's acquaintances ,  the loss of director, 
ships, the harm to one's reputation-may often be sufficiently great to deter 
behavior, even without anything more. 
Consider how this dynamic played out in the MBO context. MBOs, 
overnight, provided the opportunity for the senior managers to become very 
rich, to go from being bureaucrats to entrepreneurs . Under such circum, 
stances , one can expect that some managers might rather quickly become 
indifferent to the criticism of the judges. The possibility of becoming seri, 
ously rich sometimes has that effect. 
How did the courts respond? In the MBO cases ,  one sees a subtle shift 
of attention from the managers to the special committee. Although the 
potential gains to managers in MBOs might lead them to develop resistance 
to the deterrent effect of public shaming, the members of the special com, 
mittee had no such prospects. They were not getting rich. They were 
simply trying to do their best as outside directors. One would predict that 
such actors are likely to be far more susceptible to the kind of influence 
that Delaware opinions exert than the managers. The Delaware courts, 
perhaps sensing this, focused much of their attention-both in the opinions 
and in extrajudicial utterances-on influencing the conduct of the special 
committees. 
Note , now, a surprising implication of this analysis. If the success of 
Delaware's method for constraining or encouraging managers to act on 
behalf of shareholders depends critically on a separation of ownership and 
control , with the greater susceptibility to reputational effects that agents 
have in comparison to principals, then the system is likely to be less suit, 
able for corporations not characterized by this separation, such as closely 
held corporations. The Delaware style may well have evolved in response 
to the particular needs and properties of the large , publicly held corpora, 
tion. The same mixture of flexibility and court scrutiny may be less effec, 
tive when the objects are less susceptible to shaming. 
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To this point, I have largely described the Delaware judicial style as 
one well suited to the articulation and expression of standards of managerial 
conduct. But might there be a different, politically driven explanation? 
Delaware is a small state. It is, in part because of historical accident, 
the state of incorporation for some of the largest and most powerful corpo, 
rations in the country and the world. Delaware law governs the internal 
affairs of corporations because of the internal affairs doctrine, a doctrine 
that is in tension with the approaches to choice of law and conflict of law 
dominant in the United States. 262 Within Delaware, five appointed 
judges on the chancery court and five appointed judges on the supreme 
court interpret and apply Delaware corporate law, with the nominal power 
to stop the largest business transactions in the country. Billions of dollars 
ride on these deals, with millions of dollars in fees involved. In a word, the 
Delaware courts may be, or at least may feel themselves to be, politically 
vulnerable. 
How could actors in such an institution be expected to justify their 
decisions? One method of increasing the political legitimacy of wielding 
such extraordinary judicial power will be to demonstrate that the objects of 
such power, the directors and managers of particular companies, have 
behaved very badly. On this analysis , the style of Delaware opinions can be 
understood as deriving from political considerations. 
If we assume that this explanation is true , how does it affect the rest of 
my analysis? First, even if true, judges may be acting from mixed motives: a 
desire to defend the political legitimacy of their power; and, likewise, a 
desire to shame, praise, or influence the behavior of the relevant actors . 
Indeed, to the extent that the judges' efforts are successful in constraining 
the relevant actors , their political legitimacy may be increased. Thus , the 
spectacle of important Delaware Supreme Court arguments being broadcast 
live on CNN with leading corporate law academics as "color comrnenta, 
tors " may bolster the legitimacy of the Delaware courts by showing graphi, 
cally how, through the existing system, even the most powerful actors in 
the economy are held accountable. On this account, the "morality play" 
aspect may serve both functions simultaneously. It may promulgate com, 
munity standards for the community of senior managers at the same time 
that it j ustifies the exercise of extraordinary power by unelected judges of 
the second smallest state. 
262 . See generally P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1 985 DUKE L.J. 1 .  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a theory of how corporate law works, of the 
mechanisms that link what the Delaware courts do with the behavior of 
members of the governed community, the managers and directors of Dela, 
ware corporations . The core of my claim is that we should understand 
Delaware fiduciary duty law as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad 
managers and directors, tales that collectively describe their normative 
role. 263 The evolution during the 1980s of the norms of managerial and 
directorial conduct in management buyouts provides a case study in which 
we can trace out this process in sufficient detail to begin to understand 
some of its subtlety and complexity. 
The evidence I gather leaves unsettled the important question of how 
the norms are transmitted. In particular, it is still unclear how (and 
whether) the parables make their way to their audience. There is evidence 
that some of the most important and dramatic tales are transmitted fairly 
directly, while others are mediated by corporate lawyers who digest them, 
transmitting the lessons through the exercise of judgment and through the 
ways in which they structure the board's deliberations . The mechanism by 
which Delaware opinions influence conduct is ultimately an empirical 
question, the full description of which awaits further research. 
An appreciation of how Delaware law works has implications , first ,  for 
how lawyers advise their clients. Second, it affects our view of the role of 
shareholder litigation in the Delaware courts , finding greater benefits than 
the current skepticism recognizes. Such a system, which has at least with, 
stood the pressures of interstate competition for corporate charters , may 
have developed as an efficient response to Delaware' s  unique corporate 
environment. 
The fiduciary duty cases of the Delaware courts form an important part 
of U.S.  corporate law. We know, or at least have good grounds to believe, 
263. Robert Cover argued that the "folktales" of jurisdiction in which judges assert authority 
to judge kings serve important inspirational and aspirational functions, that they inspire judges to 
resist "[p]rudential deference . . .  the great temptation, and the final sin of judging." Cover, 
Folktales, supra note 15 ,  at 190. This aspirational function is closely related to their mythical 
character: 
[W]ere the gesture and aspiration of resistance not the principal motif of these stories, we 
would have no reason to remember them or to make them our own. We would need no 
myth to prepare us to cave in before violence and defer to the powerful. We must get 
the relative roles of myth and history straight. Myth is the part of reality we create and 
choose to remember in order to reenact. 
Id. One claim of this Article is that Delaware folktales of fiduciary duty have similar ambitions 
and serve similar purposes. 
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that U.S. corporate law works reasonably well . But we know extremely 
little about how that system works, about the connections between corpo, 
rate law and corporate managers . This Article is an attempt to begin to 
answer this central, but largely unasked, question of corporate law. 
